TLTheodore Tangie Longtchi

Theodore Tangie Longtchi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Theodore Tangie Longtchi has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Rosana Montañez Rodriguez

    Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, Sans Antonio, TX, USA

    2 shared publications
  • Shouhuai Xu

    University of Colorado Colorado Springs

    2 shared publications
  • Adham Atyabi

    Department of Computer Science, University of Colorado Colorado Springs, 1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway, Colorado Springs, CO 80918, USA

    1 shared publication
  • Christopher P. Kelley

    Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, USA

    1 shared publication
  • David P. Azari

    Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, USA

    1 shared publication
  • Ekzhin Ear

    Department of Computer Science, University of Colorado Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, CO, USA

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Quantifying Psychological Sophistication of Malicious Emails

    by Theodore Tangie Longtchi, Rosana Montañez Rodriguez, Kora Gwartney, Ekzhin Ear, David P. Azari, Christopher P. Kelley, Shouhuai Xu

    Malicious emails (including Phishing, Spam, and Scam) are one significant class of cyber social engineering attacks. Despite numerous defenses to counter them, the problem remains largely open. The ineffectiveness of current defenses can be attributed to our superficial understanding of the psychological properties that make these attacks successful. This problem motivates us to investigate the psychological sophistication , or sophistication for short, of malicious emails. We propose an innovative framework that accommodates two important and complementary aspects of sophistication, dubbed Psychological Techniques (PTechs) and Psychological Tactics (PTacs). We propose metrics and grading rules for human experts to assess the sophistication of malicious emails via the lens of these PTechs and PTacs. To demonstrate the usefulness of the framework, we conduct a case study based on 1,036 malicious emails assessed by four independent graders. Our results show that malicious emails are psychologically sophisticated, while exhibiting both commonalities and different patterns in terms of their PTechs and PTacs. Results also show that previous studies might have focused on dealing with the less proliferated PTechs (e.g., Persuasion) and PTacs (e.g., Reward), rather than the most proliferated PTechs (e.g., Attention Grabbing and Impersonation) and PTacs (e.g., Fit & Form and Familiarity)) that are identified in this study. We also found among others that social events are widely exploited by attackers in contextualizing their malicious emails. These findings could be leveraged to guide the design of effective defenses against malicious emails.


  • Internet-Based Social Engineering Psychology, Attacks, and Defenses: A Survey

    by Theodore Tangie Longtchi, Rosana Montañez Rodriguez, Laith Al-Shawaf, Adham Atyabi, Shouhuai Xu

    Internet-based social engineering (SE) attacks are a major cyber threat. These attacks often serve as the first step in a sophisticated sequence of attacks that target, among other things, victims’ credentials and can cause financial losses. The problem has received mounting attention in recent years, with many publications proposing defenses against SE attacks. Despite this, the situation has not improved. In this article, we aim to understand and explain this phenomenon by investigating the root cause of the problem. To this end, we examine Internet-based SE attacks and defenses through a unique lens based on psychological factors (PFs) and psychological techniques (PTs). We find that there is a key discrepancy between attacks and defenses: SE attacks have deliberately exploited 46 PFs and 16 PTs in total, but existing defenses have only leveraged 16 PFs and seven PTs in total. This discrepancy may explain why existing defenses have achieved limited success and prompt us to propose a systematic roadmap for future research.