Mingqing Kang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mingqing Kang has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yinzhi Cao
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
3 shared publications - Rigel Gjomemo
University of Illinois Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
2 shared publications - Venkat Venkatakrishnan
University of Illinois Chicago, USA
2 shared publications - Jason Nieh
Columbia University, New York, USA
1 shared publication - Jianjia Yu
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
1 shared publication - Junfeng Yang
Columbia University, New York, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1943-1954
CoBrA: Context-, Branch-sensitive Static Analysis for Detecting Taint-style Vulnerabilities in PHP Web Applications
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1943-1954
Open AccessCoBrA: Context-, Branch-sensitive Static Analysis for Detecting Taint-style Vulnerabilities in PHP Web Applications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 585-599
ReactAppScan: Mining React Application Vulnerabilities via Component Graph
React, a single-page application framework, has recently become popular among web developers due to its flexible and convenient management of web application states via a syntax extension to JavaScript, called JSX (JavaScript and XML). Despite its abundant functionalities, the security of React, especially vulnerability detection, still lags: many existing vulnerability detection works do not support JSX let alone React Data Flow introduced by React components. The only exception is CodeQL, which supports JSX syntax. However, CodeQL cannot properly track React Data Flow across different components for detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we design a novel framework, called ReactAppScan, which constructs a Component Graph (CoG) for tracking React Data Flow and detecting vulnerabilities following both JavaScript and React data flows. Specifically, ReactAppScan relies on abstract interpretation to build such a component graph via tracking component lifecycles and then detects vulnerabilities via finding paths between sources and sinks. Our evaluation shows that ReactAppScan detects 61 zero-day vulnerabilities in real-world React applications. We have responsibly reported all the vulnerabilities and so far six vulnerabilities have been fixed and two have been acknowledged.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 585-599
Open AccessReactAppScan: Mining React Application Vulnerabilities via Component Graph
React, a single-page application framework, has recently become popular among web developers due to its flexible and convenient management of web application states via a syntax extension to JavaScript, called JSX (JavaScript and XML). Despite its abundant functionalities, the security of React, especially vulnerability detection, still lags: many existing vulnerability detection works do not support JSX let alone React Data Flow introduced by React components. The only exception is CodeQL, which supports JSX syntax. However, CodeQL cannot properly track React Data Flow across different components for detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we design a novel framework, called ReactAppScan, which constructs a Component Graph (CoG) for tracking React Data Flow and detecting vulnerabilities following both JavaScript and React data flows. Specifically, ReactAppScan relies on abstract interpretation to build such a component graph via tracking component lifecycles and then detects vulnerabilities via finding paths between sources and sinks. Our evaluation shows that ReactAppScan detects 61 zero-day vulnerabilities in real-world React applications. We have responsibly reported all the vulnerabilities and so far six vulnerabilities have been fixed and two have been acknowledged.
- Open Access
- 12 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-13
RogueOne: Detecting Rogue Updates via Differential Data-flow Analysis Using Trust Domains
Rogue updates, an important type of software supply-chain attack in which attackers conceal malicious code inside updates to benign software, are a growing problem due to their stealth and effectiveness. We design and implement RogueOne, a system for detecting rogue updates to JavaScript packages. RogueOne uses a novel differential data-flow analysis to capture how an update changes a package's interactions with external APIs. Using an efficient form of abstract interpretation that can exclude unchanged code in a package, it constructs an object data-flow relationship graph (ODRG) that tracks data-flows among objects. RogueOne then maps objects to trust domains, a novel abstraction which summarizes trust relationships in a package. Objects are assigned a trust domain based on whether they originate in the target package, a dependency, or in a system API. RogueOne uses the ODRG to build a set of data-flows across trust domains. It compares data-flow sets across package versions to detect untrustworthy new interactions with external APIs. We evaluated RogueOne on hundreds of npm packages, demonstrating its effectiveness at detecting rogue updates and distinguishing them from benign ones. RogueOne achieves high accuracy and can be more than seven times as effective in detecting rogue updates and avoiding false positives compared to other systems built to detect malicious packages.
- 12 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-13
Open AccessRogueOne: Detecting Rogue Updates via Differential Data-flow Analysis Using Trust Domains
Rogue updates, an important type of software supply-chain attack in which attackers conceal malicious code inside updates to benign software, are a growing problem due to their stealth and effectiveness. We design and implement RogueOne, a system for detecting rogue updates to JavaScript packages. RogueOne uses a novel differential data-flow analysis to capture how an update changes a package's interactions with external APIs. Using an efficient form of abstract interpretation that can exclude unchanged code in a package, it constructs an object data-flow relationship graph (ODRG) that tracks data-flows among objects. RogueOne then maps objects to trust domains, a novel abstraction which summarizes trust relationships in a package. Objects are assigned a trust domain based on whether they originate in the target package, a dependency, or in a system API. RogueOne uses the ODRG to build a set of data-flows across trust domains. It compares data-flow sets across package versions to detect untrustworthy new interactions with external APIs. We evaluated RogueOne on hundreds of npm packages, demonstrating its effectiveness at detecting rogue updates and distinguishing them from benign ones. RogueOne achieves high accuracy and can be more than seven times as effective in detecting rogue updates and avoiding false positives compared to other systems built to detect malicious packages.