Feng Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Feng Zhang has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hendrik Bessembinder
W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
2 shared publications - Michael J. Cooper
David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA
2 shared publications - Shenje Hshieh
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
2 shared publications - Atif Ellahie
University of Utah
1 shared publication - Jun Chen
College of Business Administration, University of Illinois Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60607
1 shared publication - Melvyn Teo
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Immigrants in Finance: Evidence from Hedge Funds
We examine the value of skilled immigrants in finance by exploiting evidence from visa lotteries. We find that hedge fund management companies that secure more H-1B visas in random lotteries deliver higher alphas, Sharpe ratios, and information ratios. The superior performance of funds with high H-1B visa allocations can be attributed to well-paid and highly educated H-1B workers with quantitative skills. H-1B workers add value by helping hedge funds develop distinctive investment strategies, arbitrage prominent stock anomalies, and overcome capacity constraints. Hedge funds appear to exploit labor market frictions as alpha generation is greatest by workers from countries with the longest wait times for U.S. permanent residency. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07615 .
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Immigrants in Finance: Evidence from Hedge Funds
We examine the value of skilled immigrants in finance by exploiting evidence from visa lotteries. We find that hedge fund management companies that secure more H-1B visas in random lotteries deliver higher alphas, Sharpe ratios, and information ratios. The superior performance of funds with high H-1B visa allocations can be attributed to well-paid and highly educated H-1B workers with quantitative skills. H-1B workers add value by helping hedge funds develop distinctive investment strategies, arbitrage prominent stock anomalies, and overcome capacity constraints. Hedge funds appear to exploit labor market frictions as alpha generation is greatest by workers from countries with the longest wait times for U.S. permanent residency. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07615 .
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- Vol. 56 (9) , 1150-1169
Long-run post-event returns in global stock markets
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Studies
- Vol. 56 (9) , 1150-1169
Long-run post-event returns in global stock markets
- Open Access
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (7) , 3380-3411
How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership
We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (vs. negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, bargaining hard, and inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality.
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (7) , 3380-3411
Open AccessHow Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership
We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (vs. negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, bargaining hard, and inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Critical Finance Review
- Vol. 14 (3) , 389-424
The (Large) Effect of Return Horizon on Fund Alpha
Publishers of Foundations and Trends, making research accessible
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Critical Finance Review
- Vol. 14 (3) , 389-424
The (Large) Effect of Return Horizon on Fund Alpha
Publishers of Foundations and Trends, making research accessible
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Measuring the Quality of Mergers and Acquisitions
We develop a measure of merger and acquisition (M&A) quality using accounting theory. This measure, implied return-on-equity improvement (IRI), quantifies the minimum improvement in the target’s post-acquisition return on equity (ROE) the acquirer must attain to break even on the acquisition price. Employing a large sample of M&As from 1980 to 2018, we find that a high IRI is, on average, less attainable ex post and predicts worse acquirer financial performance. The acquirer’s ROE growth over the first three years after the M&A is 11 percentage points lower for high-IRI M&As compared with low-IRI M&As. Worse high-IRI acquirer performance is observable through higher operating costs, tighter financial constraints, lower investments, and larger and more frequent goodwill impairments. We also find that IRI increases with acquiring chief executive officers’ overconfidence, incentive misalignment, and difficulty in estimating synergies; IRI decreases with acquirers’ financial discipline and due diligence effort. As such, overestimating synergies and managerial incentives that drive overpayment are potential mechanisms underlying IRI’s negative association with acquirers’ post-M&A performance. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01225 .
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Measuring the Quality of Mergers and Acquisitions
We develop a measure of merger and acquisition (M&A) quality using accounting theory. This measure, implied return-on-equity improvement (IRI), quantifies the minimum improvement in the target’s post-acquisition return on equity (ROE) the acquirer must attain to break even on the acquisition price. Employing a large sample of M&As from 1980 to 2018, we find that a high IRI is, on average, less attainable ex post and predicts worse acquirer financial performance. The acquirer’s ROE growth over the first three years after the M&A is 11 percentage points lower for high-IRI M&As compared with low-IRI M&As. Worse high-IRI acquirer performance is observable through higher operating costs, tighter financial constraints, lower investments, and larger and more frequent goodwill impairments. We also find that IRI increases with acquiring chief executive officers’ overconfidence, incentive misalignment, and difficulty in estimating synergies; IRI decreases with acquirers’ financial discipline and due diligence effort. As such, overestimating synergies and managerial incentives that drive overpayment are potential mechanisms underlying IRI’s negative association with acquirers’ post-M&A performance. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01225 .