Yudong Gao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yudong Gao has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Honglong Chen
China University of Petroleum (East China)
12 shared publications - Junjian Li
Qingdao Key Laboratory of Intelligent Sensing Technology for Extreme Environment, College of Control Science and Engineering, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao, China
8 shared publications - Weifeng Liu
College of Control Science and Engineering, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao, China
7 shared publications - Peng Sun
Hunan University
5 shared publications - Zhe Li
College of Control Science and Engineering, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao, China
4 shared publications Honglong Chen
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 18-32
PathMark: Protecting Intellectual Property of Mixture-of-expert LLMs via Path Watermarks
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 18-32
Open AccessPathMark: Protecting Intellectual Property of Mixture-of-expert LLMs via Path Watermarks
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
- Vol. 28, 14482-14494
Toward Channel-Level Privacy: Exploring Gradient Leakage Attack and Lightweight Defense in Federated Learning
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
- Vol. 28, 14482-14494
Toward Channel-Level Privacy: Exploring Gradient Leakage Attack and Lightweight Defense in Federated Learning
- Open Access
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3884-3892
FFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3884-3892
Open AccessFFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks
- 19 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (6) , 7746-7758
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains
Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks to deep neural networks (DNNs). These attacks involve models that make intentionally incorrect (and potentially targeted) predictions on poisoned inputs containing carefully crafted triggers, while operating normally with clean inputs. Prior studies have investigated the invisibility of backdoor triggers to improve attack stealthiness. However, they primarily concentrate on achieving invisibility solely in the spatial domain, ignoring the generation of invisible triggers in the frequency and feature domains. This constraint makes the poisoned images vulnerable to detection by recent defense mechanisms. To tackle this problem, we introduce a Triple stealthy BAckdoor attack approach, termed TriBA, which simultaneously ensures the invisibility of triggers in all the spatial, frequency, and feature domains, to achieve desirable attack performance, while ensuring strong stealthiness. Specifically, we initially utilize Wavelet Transform to embed the high-frequency information from the trigger image into the clean image to ensure effective attack performance. Then, to achieve strong stealthiness across both spatial and frequency domains, we integrate Fourier Transform and Cosine Transform to blend the poisoned image and clean image in the frequency domain. Furthermore, TriBA adopts an attack strategy to make the backdoor features similar to clean features in the feature space, which guarantees trigger invisibility in the feature domain while maintaining attack effectiveness. We theoretically prove the effectiveness of this strategy. Finally, TriBA has been comprehensively evaluated on four datasets against popular image classifiers, demonstrating a marked improvement over existing state-of-the-art backdoor attacks in terms of both attack success rate and stealthiness.
- 19 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (6) , 7746-7758
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains
Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks to deep neural networks (DNNs). These attacks involve models that make intentionally incorrect (and potentially targeted) predictions on poisoned inputs containing carefully crafted triggers, while operating normally with clean inputs. Prior studies have investigated the invisibility of backdoor triggers to improve attack stealthiness. However, they primarily concentrate on achieving invisibility solely in the spatial domain, ignoring the generation of invisible triggers in the frequency and feature domains. This constraint makes the poisoned images vulnerable to detection by recent defense mechanisms. To tackle this problem, we introduce a Triple stealthy BAckdoor attack approach, termed TriBA, which simultaneously ensures the invisibility of triggers in all the spatial, frequency, and feature domains, to achieve desirable attack performance, while ensuring strong stealthiness. Specifically, we initially utilize Wavelet Transform to embed the high-frequency information from the trigger image into the clean image to ensure effective attack performance. Then, to achieve strong stealthiness across both spatial and frequency domains, we integrate Fourier Transform and Cosine Transform to blend the poisoned image and clean image in the frequency domain. Furthermore, TriBA adopts an attack strategy to make the backdoor features similar to clean features in the feature space, which guarantees trigger invisibility in the feature domain while maintaining attack effectiveness. We theoretically prove the effectiveness of this strategy. Finally, TriBA has been comprehensively evaluated on four datasets against popular image classifiers, demonstrating a marked improvement over existing state-of-the-art backdoor attacks in terms of both attack success rate and stealthiness.
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
- Vol. 27 (15209210) , 5909-5921
Black-Box Adversarial Defense Based on Image Decomposition and Reconstruction
Adversarial attacks have challenged the security of deep neural networks (DNNs) recently. The most prominent adversarial attack methods include backdoor attacks, adversarial examples, etc. These attack methods inject triggers or perturbations into images, leading to extremely dangerous security vulnerability in deep learning domain. The various forms of adversarial attacks can contaminate DNNs with their distinct characteristics. The complexity of adversarial attack poses a great challenge to designing a general defense strategy. In this paper, we propose a novel defense method against most of adversarial attacks through Image Decomposition and Reconstruction (IDR). Our method can be applied to poisoned images without the need for internal information about the model or any prior knowledge of the clean/poisoned images. We apply a linear transformation on the poisoned image to destroy the perturbations or triggers and deploy a pre-trained diffusion model to reconstruct the original information. In particular, we propose a novel reverse process that utilizes the consistency of range-null space decomposition to guide the generation of purified images. The decomposition of the range-null space can guarantee the retrieval of image information, which enhances the robustness of our method and contributes to the reliable purification of poisoned images. We assess the effectiveness of our proposed IDR against various prevalent backdoor attacks, adversarial examples and Image-Scaling attack methods. The experimental results highlight the outstanding defensive capabilities of our proposed IDR, demonstrating an exceptionally high defense success rate.
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
- Vol. 27 (15209210) , 5909-5921
Black-Box Adversarial Defense Based on Image Decomposition and Reconstruction
Adversarial attacks have challenged the security of deep neural networks (DNNs) recently. The most prominent adversarial attack methods include backdoor attacks, adversarial examples, etc. These attack methods inject triggers or perturbations into images, leading to extremely dangerous security vulnerability in deep learning domain. The various forms of adversarial attacks can contaminate DNNs with their distinct characteristics. The complexity of adversarial attack poses a great challenge to designing a general defense strategy. In this paper, we propose a novel defense method against most of adversarial attacks through Image Decomposition and Reconstruction (IDR). Our method can be applied to poisoned images without the need for internal information about the model or any prior knowledge of the clean/poisoned images. We apply a linear transformation on the poisoned image to destroy the perturbations or triggers and deploy a pre-trained diffusion model to reconstruct the original information. In particular, we propose a novel reverse process that utilizes the consistency of range-null space decomposition to guide the generation of purified images. The decomposition of the range-null space can guarantee the retrieval of image information, which enhances the robustness of our method and contributes to the reliable purification of poisoned images. We assess the effectiveness of our proposed IDR against various prevalent backdoor attacks, adversarial examples and Image-Scaling attack methods. The experimental results highlight the outstanding defensive capabilities of our proposed IDR, demonstrating an exceptionally high defense success rate.
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 138
: Backdoor attack with bokeh effects via latent separation suppression- 22 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 138
: Backdoor attack with bokeh effects via latent separation suppression- 17 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Information Sciences
- Vol. 690
Defending against backdoor attack on deep neural networks based on multi-scale inactivation
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Information Sciences
- Vol. 690
Defending against backdoor attack on deep neural networks based on multi-scale inactivation
- 15 August 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
- Vol. 23 (12) , 14471-14483
Towards Adaptive Privacy Protection for Interpretable Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is an effective privacy-preserving mechanism that collaboratively trains the global model in a distributed manner by solely sharing model parameters rather than data from local clients, like mobile devices, to a central server. Nevertheless, recent studies have illustrated that FL still suffers from gradient leakage as adversaries try to recover training data by analyzing shared parameters from local clients. To address this issue, differential privacy (DP) is adopted to add noise to the parameters of local models before aggregation occurs on the server. It, however, results in the poor performance of gradient-based interpretability, since some important weights capturing the salient region in feature maps will be perturbed. To overcome this problem, we propose a simple yet effective adaptive gradient protection (AGP) mechanism that selectively adds noisy perturbations to certain channels of each client model that have a relatively small impact on interpretability. We also offer a theoretical analysis of the convergence of FL using our method. The evaluation results on both IID and Non-IID data demonstrate that the proposed AGP can achieve a good trade-off between privacy protection and interpretability in FL. Furthermore, we verify the robustness of the proposed method against two different gradient leakage attacks.
- 15 August 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
- Vol. 23 (12) , 14471-14483
Towards Adaptive Privacy Protection for Interpretable Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is an effective privacy-preserving mechanism that collaboratively trains the global model in a distributed manner by solely sharing model parameters rather than data from local clients, like mobile devices, to a central server. Nevertheless, recent studies have illustrated that FL still suffers from gradient leakage as adversaries try to recover training data by analyzing shared parameters from local clients. To address this issue, differential privacy (DP) is adopted to add noise to the parameters of local models before aggregation occurs on the server. It, however, results in the poor performance of gradient-based interpretability, since some important weights capturing the salient region in feature maps will be perturbed. To overcome this problem, we propose a simple yet effective adaptive gradient protection (AGP) mechanism that selectively adds noisy perturbations to certain channels of each client model that have a relatively small impact on interpretability. We also offer a theoretical analysis of the convergence of FL using our method. The evaluation results on both IID and Non-IID data demonstrate that the proposed AGP can achieve a good trade-off between privacy protection and interpretability in FL. Furthermore, we verify the robustness of the proposed method against two different gradient leakage attacks.
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 6923-6934
Investigating the Backdoor on DNNs Based on Recolorization and Reconstruction: From a Multi-Channel Perspective
Recently, backdoor attacks have become a serious security threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Backdoor attacks involve embedding a hidden backdoor into a DNN model, compelling it to correctly classify benign images while erroneously classifying images with backdoor triggers as the target label. However, both current backdoor attacks and defenses have their limitations. In backdoor attacks, they are either non-stealthy or vulnerable to well-designed backdoor defense strategies. As for backdoor defenses, they often rely heavily on additional assumptions (such as determined extra clean images) and are not universally applicable, which may become impractical in the face of the latest backdoor attacks. To address the above problems, in this paper, we investigate the backdoor attack and defense strategies from a multi-channel perspective. Specifically, in terms of attacks, we propose a recolorization based attack method (RC-Attack) to generate triggers in color ab channels, which is more stealthy and effective. In terms of defenses, we propose a reconstruction-based defense method (RC-Defense) to reconstruct the color AB channels and lightness channel respectively, thus making the triggers in the reconstructed images ineffective, which is a more practical solution. Extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed RC-Attack in terms of effectiveness, stealthiness and defense-resistance, and also to validate the effectiveness of the proposed RC-Defense.
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 6923-6934
Investigating the Backdoor on DNNs Based on Recolorization and Reconstruction: From a Multi-Channel Perspective
Recently, backdoor attacks have become a serious security threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Backdoor attacks involve embedding a hidden backdoor into a DNN model, compelling it to correctly classify benign images while erroneously classifying images with backdoor triggers as the target label. However, both current backdoor attacks and defenses have their limitations. In backdoor attacks, they are either non-stealthy or vulnerable to well-designed backdoor defense strategies. As for backdoor defenses, they often rely heavily on additional assumptions (such as determined extra clean images) and are not universally applicable, which may become impractical in the face of the latest backdoor attacks. To address the above problems, in this paper, we investigate the backdoor attack and defense strategies from a multi-channel perspective. Specifically, in terms of attacks, we propose a recolorization based attack method (RC-Attack) to generate triggers in color ab channels, which is more stealthy and effective. In terms of defenses, we propose a reconstruction-based defense method (RC-Defense) to reconstruct the color AB channels and lightness channel respectively, thus making the triggers in the reconstructed images ineffective, which is a more practical solution. Extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed RC-Attack in terms of effectiveness, stealthiness and defense-resistance, and also to validate the effectiveness of the proposed RC-Defense.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems
IBAQ: Frequency-Domain Backdoor Attack Threatening Autonomous Driving via Quadratic Phase
The rapid evolution of backdoor attacks has emerged as a significant threat to the security of autonomous driving models. An attacker injects a backdoor into the model by adding triggers to the samples, which can be activated to manipulate the model’s inference. Backdoor attacks can lead to severe consequences, such as misidentifying traffic signs during autonomous driving, posing a risk of causing traffic accidents. Recently, there has been a gradual evolution of frequency-domain backdoor attacks. However, since the change of both amplitude and its corresponding phase will significantly affect image appearance, most of the existing frequency-domain backdoor attacks change only the amplitude, which results in a suboptimal efficacy of the attack. In this work, we propose an attack called IBAQ, to solve this problem by blurring semantic information of the trigger image through the quadratic phase. Initially, we convert the trigger and benign sample to YCrCb space. Then, we perform the fast Fourier transform on the Y channel, blending the trigger image’s amplitude and quadratic phase linearly with the benign sample’s amplitude and phase. IBAQ achieves covert injection of trigger information within amplitude and phase, enhancing the attack effect. We validate the effectiveness and stealthiness of IBAQ through comprehensive experiments.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems
Open AccessIBAQ: Frequency-Domain Backdoor Attack Threatening Autonomous Driving via Quadratic Phase
The rapid evolution of backdoor attacks has emerged as a significant threat to the security of autonomous driving models. An attacker injects a backdoor into the model by adding triggers to the samples, which can be activated to manipulate the model’s inference. Backdoor attacks can lead to severe consequences, such as misidentifying traffic signs during autonomous driving, posing a risk of causing traffic accidents. Recently, there has been a gradual evolution of frequency-domain backdoor attacks. However, since the change of both amplitude and its corresponding phase will significantly affect image appearance, most of the existing frequency-domain backdoor attacks change only the amplitude, which results in a suboptimal efficacy of the attack. In this work, we propose an attack called IBAQ, to solve this problem by blurring semantic information of the trigger image through the quadratic phase. Initially, we convert the trigger and benign sample to YCrCb space. Then, we perform the fast Fourier transform on the Y channel, blending the trigger image’s amplitude and quadratic phase linearly with the benign sample’s amplitude and phase. IBAQ achieves covert injection of trigger information within amplitude and phase, enhancing the attack effect. We validate the effectiveness and stealthiness of IBAQ through comprehensive experiments.