Siwei Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Siwei Wang has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Baran Atalar
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
1 shared publication - Carlee Joe-Wong
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
1 shared publication - Jinhang Zuo
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication - Kai Chen
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication - Lixin Fan
WeBank
1 shared publication - Qiang Yang
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 381-390
Continuous Semantic Caching for Low-Cost LLM Serving
- 22 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 381-390
Open AccessContinuous Semantic Caching for Low-Cost LLM Serving
- Open Access
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-35
A Game-theoretic Framework for Privacy-preserving Federated Learning
In federated learning, benign participants aim to optimize a global model collaboratively. However, the risk of privacy leakage cannot be ignored in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Existing research has focused either on designing protection mechanisms or on inventing attacking mechanisms. While the battle between defenders and attackers seems never-ending, we are concerned with one critical question: Is it possible to prevent potential attacks in advance? To address this, we propose the first game-theoretic framework that considers both FL defenders and attackers in terms of their respective payoffs, which include computational costs, FL model utilities, and privacy leakage risks. We name this game the federated learning privacy game (FLPG), in which neither defenders nor attackers are aware of all participants’ payoffs. To handle the incomplete information inherent in this situation, we propose associating the FLPG with an oracle that has two primary responsibilities. First, the oracle provides lower and upper bounds of the payoffs for the players. Second, the oracle acts as a correlation device, privately providing suggested actions to each player. With this novel framework, we analyze the optimal strategies of defenders and attackers. Furthermore, we derive and demonstrate conditions under which the attacker, as a rational decision-maker, should always follow the oracle’s suggestion not to attack .
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-35
Open AccessA Game-theoretic Framework for Privacy-preserving Federated Learning
In federated learning, benign participants aim to optimize a global model collaboratively. However, the risk of privacy leakage cannot be ignored in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Existing research has focused either on designing protection mechanisms or on inventing attacking mechanisms. While the battle between defenders and attackers seems never-ending, we are concerned with one critical question: Is it possible to prevent potential attacks in advance? To address this, we propose the first game-theoretic framework that considers both FL defenders and attackers in terms of their respective payoffs, which include computational costs, FL model utilities, and privacy leakage risks. We name this game the federated learning privacy game (FLPG), in which neither defenders nor attackers are aware of all participants’ payoffs. To handle the incomplete information inherent in this situation, we propose associating the FLPG with an oracle that has two primary responsibilities. First, the oracle provides lower and upper bounds of the payoffs for the players. Second, the oracle acts as a correlation device, privately providing suggested actions to each player. With this novel framework, we analyze the optimal strategies of defenders and attackers. Furthermore, we derive and demonstrate conditions under which the attacker, as a rational decision-maker, should always follow the oracle’s suggestion not to attack .