LTLewis Tseng

Lewis Tseng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Lewis Tseng has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Fault-tolerant Consensus in Anonymous Dynamic Network

    by Qinzi Zhang, Lewis Tseng

    This paper studies the feasibility of reaching consensus in an anonymous dynamic network. In our model, $n$ anonymous nodes proceed in synchronous rounds. We adopt a hybrid fault model in which up to $f$ nodes may suffer crash or Byzantine faults, and the dynamic message adversary chooses a communication graph for each round. We introduce a stability property of the dynamic network -- $(T,D)$-dynaDegree for $T \geq 1$ and $n-1 \geq D \geq 1$ -- which requires that for every $T$ consecutive rounds, any fault-free node must have incoming directed links from at least $D$ distinct neighbors. These links might occur in different rounds during a $T$-round interval. $(1,n-1)$-dynaDegree means that the graph is a complete graph in every round. $(1,1)$-dynaDegree means that each node has at least one incoming neighbor in every round, but the set of incoming neighbor(s) at each node may change arbitrarily between rounds. We show that exact consensus is impossible even with $(1,n-2)$-dynaDegree. For an arbitrary $T$, we show that for crash-tolerant approximate consensus, $(T,\lfloor n/2 \rfloor)$-dynaDegree and $n > 2f$ are together necessary and sufficient, whereas for Byzantine approximate consensus, $(T,\lfloor (n+3f)/2 \rfloor)$-dynaDegree and $n > 5f$ are together necessary and sufficient.

  • Open Access

    Longest-chain Attacks: Difficulty Adjustment and Timestamp Verifiability

    by Tzuo Hann Law, Selman Erol, Lewis Tseng

    We study an adversary who attacks a Proof-of-Work (POW) blockchain by selfishly constructing an alternative longest chain. We characterize optimal strategies employed by the adversary when a difficulty adjustment rule alà Bitcoin applies. As time (namely the times-tamp specified in each block) in most permissionless POW blockchains is somewhat subjective, we focus on two extreme scenarios: when time is completely verifiable, and when it is completely unverifiable. We conclude that an adversary who faces a difficulty adjustment rule will find a longest-chain attack very challenging when timestamps are verifiable. POW blockchains with frequent difficulty adjustments relative to time reporting flexibility will be substantially more vulnerable to longest-chain attacks. Our main fining provides guidance on the design of difficulty adjustment rules and demonstrates the importance of timestamp verifiability.