LNLalitha Naveen

Lalitha Naveen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Lalitha Naveen has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Information Discovery by Analysts

    by Naveen D. Daniel, Sang Mook Lee, Lalitha Naveen

    We provide direct evidence that analysts engage in information discovery, and that investors value this discovery. The innovation in our article is to read through the summaries of over 3,500 analyst reports to identify whether analysts engage in discovery and/or interpretation. Analysts discover new information from management sources (example: personal meetings) and non-management sources (example: channel checks). Information discovery is prevalent in 17% of the reports. Investors react more strongly to analyst reports containing changes in price targets or Earnings per Share if those reports are accompanied by information discovery. Economic determinants predict whether a report contains discovery.


  • Open Access

    Musk's $56 billion: Pay, Incentives, or Rewards?

    by Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen

    The pay package of Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, has featured prominently in the news in recent months. Articles related to the size of his pay and the legal battle over the pay package have appeared in numerous media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, Fortune, CBS News, Barron's, PBS News, Reuters, and NPR, to name just a few. The most frequently mentioned headline number for the CEO's compensation is $56 billion. Even a cursory study of the pay package, however, shows that this number is not the CEO's annual pay, which is the usual focus of comparison across CEOs by media and academics. We perform a detailed analysis of Tesla's compensation contract and make three contributions. (i) We find that the compensation design is consistent with sound contracting principles. (ii) We use the Tesla case study to focus attention on three critical elements of CEO compensation: the cost to the company ("annual pay"), the incentives embedded in the pay package to motivate the CEO's future performance, and the estimated maximum rewards to the CEO based on these performance incentives. (iii) We show that the sound-bite figure of $56 billon is not the cost, is not the incentives, and is only loosely related to the estimated maximum rewards to the CEO.

  • Open Access

    Survey of Boards’ Monitoring and Advisory Roles

    by Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen

    In this paper, we survey the literature on corporate boards, with a specific focus on its primary functions of monitoring and advising the CEO. In particular, we consider how board structure and the individual directors’ characteristics, skill sets, connections, busyness, and incentives affect the board’s ability and willingness to perform these dual roles effectively. We also review how endogeneity between board structure and firm outcomes has been addressed in the literature. While the literature on boards is vast, we pay more attention to studies that have emerged subsequent to Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010). We conclude with suggestions for future research. This paper is being prepared for inclusion in the "Handbook of Corporate Finance.”


  • Open Access

    Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk: Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act

    by Lakshmi Balasubramanyan, Naveen D. Daniel, Joseph Haubrich, Lalitha Naveen

    We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment. The Act requires bank holding companies with over $10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over $50B of assets are additionally required to have a CRO. We use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Overall, we find no evidence that the RC or CRO have a causal impact on bank risk.

  • Open Access

    Causal Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

    by Lakshmi Balasubramanyan, Naveen D. Daniel, Joseph G. Haubrich, Lalitha Naveen

    Our goal is to document the causal impact of having a board-level risk committee (RC) and a management-level executive designated as chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk. The Dodd Frank Act requires bank holding companies with over $10 billion of assets to have an RC, while those with over $50 billion of assets are additionally required to have a CRO to oversee risk management. The innovation that allows us to document a causal impact is our research design. First, we use the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment that forced noncompliant firms to adopt an RC and appoint a CRO. We adopt the difference-in-difference approach to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Second, we use the regression discontinuity approach centered on the $10 billion and $50 billion thresholds whereby firms that were just below the threshold were not required by the law to install an RC and to recruit a CRO, while those just above the thresholds had to comply with the regulation. Our contribution is to document that neither the RC nor the CRO have a causal impact on risk near these thresholds. However, we do find strong evidence of risk reduction following the passage of the law.


  • Open Access

    Calculation of Compensation Incentives and Firm-Related Wealth Using Execucomp: Data, Program, and Explanation

    by Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen

    In response to recent requests from academics and practitioners, this note addresses the data and program we use in our published articles on executive compensa


  • Open Access

    Board Advising

    by Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen

    While the fraction of independent directors has been widely used as a proxy for monitoring effectiveness of the board, there are no clear-cut measures that capture the advising effectiveness of the board. We develop and validate two new measures of board advising: (i) per-outside-director advising quality; and (ii) aggregate board advising capability. These measures, which are based on connections of outside directors to directors on other boards, offer the advantage of being easy to compute from readily available data. We find that as firm demand for advising, as measured by firm complexity, increases: (i) both advising quality and total advising increase; and (ii) the sensitivity of firm value to both advising quality and total advising increase.


  • Open Access

    Costs of Performance Pricing Loans

    by Yan Hu, Connie X. Mao, Lalitha Naveen

    We examine how monitoring costs and costs of financial distress affect the use of performance pricing provisions in bank loan contracts. We find that firms that are easier to monitor, such as those with better accounting quality, lower information opacity, or a stronger prior relationship with the lender are more likely to have performance pricing loans. The likelihood of using performance pricing is significantly reduced after financial restatement events. Conditional on using performance pricing loans, firms with lower (higher) accounting quality are more likely to have credit rating (accounting) based performance pricing loans. Finally, we find that the use of performance pricing decreases in the likelihood of financial distress. Our results are robust to various alternative measures of accounting quality, information opacity, as well as default risk. Our results are consistent with the notion that the quality of accounting information has a significant influence on the design of financial contracts.


  • Open Access

    The Advisory Role of Multinational Directors in U.S. Firms

    by Lalitha Naveen, Naveen D. Daniel, John J. McConnell

    We study the role of foreign directors in U.S. firms. We conclude that foreign directors, especially those from countries that are dissimilar to the U.S. in terms of business environment (i.e., dissimilar directors), are chosen by multinational corporations (MNCs) to provide advice, and this advice is valuable. We measure director dissimilarity along the dimensions of legal regime, language, trust, and religion. Our conclusion is supported by two findings. (i) Firms with operations in countries that are dissimilar to the U.S. in terms of business environment are more likely to choose dissimilar directors. (ii) The average announcement period return to the appointment of foreign directors is significantly positive, and is due to appointments by MNCs, and within MNCs, to dissimilar directors. Analysis using Tobin’s q leads to similar inferences.


  • Open Access

    Dividends, Investment, and Financial Flexibility*

    by Naveen D. Daniel, David J. Denis, Lalitha Naveen

    Faced with cash flows that fall short of the sum of expected dividend and investment levels, firms must do one of the following: cut dividends, cut investment, or raise funds through security sales, asset sales or reductions in cash reserves. Our analysis indicates that while very few firms (6%) cut dividends, the majority (68%) make significant cuts in investment relative to expected levels. Investment cuts make up for approximately half of the shortfall, with the other half being covered primarily by debt financing. Net equity issues, reductions in cash balances and asset sales account for a trivial percentage of the shortfall. Our findings challenge several widely-held views in the corporate finance literature.