Anastasia Dimakopoulou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Anastasia Dimakopoulou has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ioannis K. Dagkinis
Department of Shipping Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, Chios, Greece
1 shared publication - Iosif Progoulakis
Department of Shipping Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, 2a Korai Street, 82132 Chios, Greece
1 shared publication - Konstantinos Rantos
Department of Informatics, Democritus University of Thrace, 65404 Kavala, Greece
1 shared publication - Nikitas Nikitakos
Department of Shipping Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, Korai 2a, GR82132 Chios, Greece
1 shared publication - Panagiotis M. Psomas
Univ Aegean, Sch Engn, Dept Financial & Management Engn, Kountouriotou 41, GR-82100 Chios, Greece
1 shared publication - Theodoros Lilas
Department of Shipping Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean, Korai 2a, 82132 Chios, Greece
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 October 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Marine Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (10) , 1757
Cyber–Physical Security Assessment for Maritime Vessels: Study on Drillship DP System Using American Petroleum Institute Security Risk Analysis and Bow-Tie Analysis
The maritime industry’s increasing integration of IT/OT systems into vessel operations has significantly elevated its exposure to cyber–physical threats, making the development of effective cyber risk management strategies a necessity. This paper provides an outlook of the current landscape of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities for the maritime sector and vessels. An outline of the relevant governmental and industry directives, standards, and guidelines for cyber security in maritime vessels is given. Considering maritime vessels as critical elements of the maritime critical infrastructure sector, a number of relevant cyber–physical security assessment methods are presented. Bridging cyber–physical security, process safety, and security, API SRA (American Petroleum Institute Security Risk Analysis) and BTA (Bow-Tie Analysis) are presented as the most applicable cyber–physical security assessment methods for complex maritime vessels, such as an offshore oil and gas drillship. The scenario of a cyber-attack on the Dynamic Positioning (DP) system of a drillship is presented with the use of API SRA and BTA. The difficulties in the implementation of NIST CSF v2.0 and IACS UR E26 and UR E27 in the maritime sector are also discussed. The need for intensified research on and the formulation of bespoke cyber security measures to mitigate the evolving cyber threats within the maritime domain is highlighted. The need for the allocation of training and resources for the reinforcement of the capacity of a maritime vessel’s crew in the mitigation of cyber threats and safe maritime operations is emphasized.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Marine Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (10) , 1757
Open AccessCyber–Physical Security Assessment for Maritime Vessels: Study on Drillship DP System Using American Petroleum Institute Security Risk Analysis and Bow-Tie Analysis
The maritime industry’s increasing integration of IT/OT systems into vessel operations has significantly elevated its exposure to cyber–physical threats, making the development of effective cyber risk management strategies a necessity. This paper provides an outlook of the current landscape of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities for the maritime sector and vessels. An outline of the relevant governmental and industry directives, standards, and guidelines for cyber security in maritime vessels is given. Considering maritime vessels as critical elements of the maritime critical infrastructure sector, a number of relevant cyber–physical security assessment methods are presented. Bridging cyber–physical security, process safety, and security, API SRA (American Petroleum Institute Security Risk Analysis) and BTA (Bow-Tie Analysis) are presented as the most applicable cyber–physical security assessment methods for complex maritime vessels, such as an offshore oil and gas drillship. The scenario of a cyber-attack on the Dynamic Positioning (DP) system of a drillship is presented with the use of API SRA and BTA. The difficulties in the implementation of NIST CSF v2.0 and IACS UR E26 and UR E27 in the maritime sector are also discussed. The need for intensified research on and the formulation of bespoke cyber security measures to mitigate the evolving cyber threats within the maritime domain is highlighted. The need for the allocation of training and resources for the reinforcement of the capacity of a maritime vessel’s crew in the mitigation of cyber threats and safe maritime operations is emphasized.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Marine Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (6) , 919
Comprehensive Analysis of Maritime Cybersecurity Landscape Based on the NIST CSF v2.0
As technology advances and digitalization becomes more prevalent in the industry, the cyber threats to maritime systems and operations have significantly increased. The maritime sector relies heavily on interconnected networks, communication systems, and sophisticated technologies for its operations, making it an attractive target for cybercriminals, nation-states, and other threat actors. Safeguarding the maritime sector against cyber threats is crucial to ensuring the safety, integrity, and efficiency of maritime operations as well as for protecting sensitive information and global trade. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has played a significant role in addressing cybersecurity issues, leading to the implementation of regulations aimed at risk reduction. This paper delves into the realm of cybersecurity within the maritime industry, offering an in-depth analysis of its various aspects through an extensive literature review based on the latest Version 2.0 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) functional areas. The primary objective is to establish a connection between research and NIST’s functions and categories, thereby presenting a nascent perspective and identifying existing security research gaps. Through the adoption of this strategic approach, the present paper aims to cultivate a forward-looking and proactive state of maturity in anticipation of future developments within the maritime industry. The outcomes of this research can provide valuable reference points in academic discourse, potentially leading to new hypotheses, and fuel innovation in developing advanced cybersecurity measures within the maritime industry.
- 30 May 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Marine Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (6) , 919
Open AccessComprehensive Analysis of Maritime Cybersecurity Landscape Based on the NIST CSF v2.0
As technology advances and digitalization becomes more prevalent in the industry, the cyber threats to maritime systems and operations have significantly increased. The maritime sector relies heavily on interconnected networks, communication systems, and sophisticated technologies for its operations, making it an attractive target for cybercriminals, nation-states, and other threat actors. Safeguarding the maritime sector against cyber threats is crucial to ensuring the safety, integrity, and efficiency of maritime operations as well as for protecting sensitive information and global trade. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has played a significant role in addressing cybersecurity issues, leading to the implementation of regulations aimed at risk reduction. This paper delves into the realm of cybersecurity within the maritime industry, offering an in-depth analysis of its various aspects through an extensive literature review based on the latest Version 2.0 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) functional areas. The primary objective is to establish a connection between research and NIST’s functions and categories, thereby presenting a nascent perspective and identifying existing security research gaps. Through the adoption of this strategic approach, the present paper aims to cultivate a forward-looking and proactive state of maturity in anticipation of future developments within the maritime industry. The outcomes of this research can provide valuable reference points in academic discourse, potentially leading to new hypotheses, and fuel innovation in developing advanced cybersecurity measures within the maritime industry.