BMBenedikt Valentin Meylahn

Benedikt Valentin Meylahn

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Benedikt Valentin Meylahn has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Multi-agent reinforcement learning in the all-or-nothing public goods game on networks

    by Benedikt Valentin Meylahn

    We study interpersonal trust by means of the all-or-nothing public goods game between agents on a network. The agents are endowed with the simple yet adaptive learning rule, exponential moving average, by which they estimate the behavior of their neighbors in the network. Theoretically we show that in the long-time limit this multi-agent reinforcement learning process always eventually results in indefinite contribution to the public good or indefinite defection (no agent contributing to the public good). However, by simulation of the pre-limit behavior, we see that on complex network structures there may be mixed states in which the process seems to stabilize before actual convergence to states in which agent beliefs and actions are all the same. In these metastable states the local network characteristics can determine whether agents have high or low trust in their neighbors. More generally it is found that more dense networks result in lower rates of contribution to the public good. This has implications for how one can spread global contribution toward a public good by enabling smaller local interactions.

  • Open Access

    How social reinforcement learning can lead to metastable polarisation and the voter model

    by Benedikt V. Meylahn, Janusz M. Meylahn

    Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion such as repulsive interactions or bounded confidence). An exception is a recent simulation study showing that polarization is persistent when agents form their opinions using social reinforcement learning. Our goal is to highlight the usefulness of reinforcement learning in the context of modeling opinion dynamics, but that caution is required when selecting the tools used to study such a model. We show that the polarization observed in the model of the simulation study cannot persist indefinitely, and exhibits consensus asymptotically with probability one. By constructing a link between the reinforcement learning model and the voter model, we argue that the observed polarization is metastable. Finally, we show that a slight modification in the learning process of the agents changes the model from being non-ergodic to being ergodic. Our results show that reinforcement learning may be a powerful method for modelling polarization in opinion dynamics, but that the tools (objects to study such as the stationary distribution, or time to absorption for example) appropriate for analysing such models crucially depend on their properties (such as ergodicity, or transience). These properties are determined by the details of the learning process and may be difficult to identify based solely on simulations.


  • Open Access

    Opinion dynamics beyond social influence

    by Benedikt V Meylahn, Christa Searle

    We present an opinion dynamics model framework discarding two common assumptions in the literature: (a) that there is direct influence between beliefs of neighboring agents, and (b) that agent belief is static in the absence of social influence. Agents in our framework learn from random experiences which possibly reinforce their belief. Agents determine whether they switch opinions by comparing their belief to a threshold. Subsequently, influence of an alter on an ego is not direct incorporation of the alter’s belief into the ego’s but by adjusting the ego’s decision-making criteria. We provide an instance from the framework in which social influence between agents generalizes majority rules updating. We conduct a sensitivity analysis as well as a pair of experiments concerning heterogeneous population parameters. We conclude that the framework is capable of producing consensus, polarization and fragmentation with only assimilative forces between agents which typically, in other models, lead exclusively to consensus.


  • Open Access

    Interpersonal trust: Asymptotic analysis of a stochastic coordination game with multi-agent learning

    by Benedikt V. Meylahn, Arnoud V. Den Boer, Michel Mandjes

    We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up with high trust or low trust. We model this by a discrete time, stochastic coordination game with pairwise interactions occurring at random in a finite population. Agents learn about the behavior of the population using a weighted average of what they have observed in past interactions. This learning rule, called an “exponential moving average,” has one parameter that determines the weight of the most recent observation and may, thus, be interpreted as the agent’s memory. We prove analytically that in the long run, the whole population always either trusts or doubts with the probability one. This remains true when the expectation of the dynamics would indicate otherwise. By simulation, we study the impact of the distribution of the payoff matrix and of the memory of the agents. We find that as the agent memory increases (i.e., the most recent observation weighs less), the actual dynamics increasingly resemble the expectation of the process. We conclude that it is possible that a population may converge upon high or low trust between its citizens simply by chance, though the game parameters (context of the society) may be quite telling.


  • Open Access

    Trusting: Alone and together

    by Benedikt V. Meylahn, Arnoud V. Den Boer, Michel Mandjes