Benedikt Valentin Meylahn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Benedikt Valentin Meylahn has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michel Mandjes
Mathematical Institute, Leiden University, 2311 EZ Leiden, Netherlands; and Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics, University of Amsterdam, 1012 WP Amsterdam, Netherlands
2 shared publications Arnoud V. Den Boer
Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication- Arnoud Victor Den Boer
University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication - Christa Searle
Centre for Logistics and Sustainability, Edinburgh Business School, Heriot-Watt University
1 shared publication - Janusz Martin Meylahn
Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, 7522 NB Enschede, Netherlands
1 shared publication - Koen De Turck
Department Telin, Ghent University, B-9000 Gent, Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 668
Trust in society: A stochastic compartmental model
- 6 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 668
Open AccessTrust in society: A stochastic compartmental model
- Open Access
Multi-agent reinforcement learning in the all-or-nothing public goods game on networks
We study interpersonal trust by means of the all-or-nothing public goods game between agents on a network. The agents are endowed with the simple yet adaptive learning rule, exponential moving average, by which they estimate the behavior of their neighbors in the network. Theoretically we show that in the long-time limit this multi-agent reinforcement learning process always eventually results in indefinite contribution to the public good or indefinite defection (no agent contributing to the public good). However, by simulation of the pre-limit behavior, we see that on complex network structures there may be mixed states in which the process seems to stabilize before actual convergence to states in which agent beliefs and actions are all the same. In these metastable states the local network characteristics can determine whether agents have high or low trust in their neighbors. More generally it is found that more dense networks result in lower rates of contribution to the public good. This has implications for how one can spread global contribution toward a public good by enabling smaller local interactions.
Open AccessMulti-agent reinforcement learning in the all-or-nothing public goods game on networks
We study interpersonal trust by means of the all-or-nothing public goods game between agents on a network. The agents are endowed with the simple yet adaptive learning rule, exponential moving average, by which they estimate the behavior of their neighbors in the network. Theoretically we show that in the long-time limit this multi-agent reinforcement learning process always eventually results in indefinite contribution to the public good or indefinite defection (no agent contributing to the public good). However, by simulation of the pre-limit behavior, we see that on complex network structures there may be mixed states in which the process seems to stabilize before actual convergence to states in which agent beliefs and actions are all the same. In these metastable states the local network characteristics can determine whether agents have high or low trust in their neighbors. More generally it is found that more dense networks result in lower rates of contribution to the public good. This has implications for how one can spread global contribution toward a public good by enabling smaller local interactions.
- Open Access
- 17 December 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 19 (12) , e0313951
How social reinforcement learning can lead to metastable polarisation and the voter model
Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion such as repulsive interactions or bounded confidence). An exception is a recent simulation study showing that polarization is persistent when agents form their opinions using social reinforcement learning. Our goal is to highlight the usefulness of reinforcement learning in the context of modeling opinion dynamics, but that caution is required when selecting the tools used to study such a model. We show that the polarization observed in the model of the simulation study cannot persist indefinitely, and exhibits consensus asymptotically with probability one. By constructing a link between the reinforcement learning model and the voter model, we argue that the observed polarization is metastable. Finally, we show that a slight modification in the learning process of the agents changes the model from being non-ergodic to being ergodic. Our results show that reinforcement learning may be a powerful method for modelling polarization in opinion dynamics, but that the tools (objects to study such as the stationary distribution, or time to absorption for example) appropriate for analysing such models crucially depend on their properties (such as ergodicity, or transience). These properties are determined by the details of the learning process and may be difficult to identify based solely on simulations.
- 17 December 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 19 (12) , e0313951
Open AccessHow social reinforcement learning can lead to metastable polarisation and the voter model
Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion such as repulsive interactions or bounded confidence). An exception is a recent simulation study showing that polarization is persistent when agents form their opinions using social reinforcement learning. Our goal is to highlight the usefulness of reinforcement learning in the context of modeling opinion dynamics, but that caution is required when selecting the tools used to study such a model. We show that the polarization observed in the model of the simulation study cannot persist indefinitely, and exhibits consensus asymptotically with probability one. By constructing a link between the reinforcement learning model and the voter model, we argue that the observed polarization is metastable. Finally, we show that a slight modification in the learning process of the agents changes the model from being non-ergodic to being ergodic. Our results show that reinforcement learning may be a powerful method for modelling polarization in opinion dynamics, but that the tools (objects to study such as the stationary distribution, or time to absorption for example) appropriate for analysing such models crucially depend on their properties (such as ergodicity, or transience). These properties are determined by the details of the learning process and may be difficult to identify based solely on simulations.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Network Science
- Vol. 12 (4) , 339-365
Opinion dynamics beyond social influence
We present an opinion dynamics model framework discarding two common assumptions in the literature: (a) that there is direct influence between beliefs of neighboring agents, and (b) that agent belief is static in the absence of social influence. Agents in our framework learn from random experiences which possibly reinforce their belief. Agents determine whether they switch opinions by comparing their belief to a threshold. Subsequently, influence of an alter on an ego is not direct incorporation of the alter’s belief into the ego’s but by adjusting the ego’s decision-making criteria. We provide an instance from the framework in which social influence between agents generalizes majority rules updating. We conduct a sensitivity analysis as well as a pair of experiments concerning heterogeneous population parameters. We conclude that the framework is capable of producing consensus, polarization and fragmentation with only assimilative forces between agents which typically, in other models, lead exclusively to consensus.
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Network Science
- Vol. 12 (4) , 339-365
Open AccessOpinion dynamics beyond social influence
We present an opinion dynamics model framework discarding two common assumptions in the literature: (a) that there is direct influence between beliefs of neighboring agents, and (b) that agent belief is static in the absence of social influence. Agents in our framework learn from random experiences which possibly reinforce their belief. Agents determine whether they switch opinions by comparing their belief to a threshold. Subsequently, influence of an alter on an ego is not direct incorporation of the alter’s belief into the ego’s but by adjusting the ego’s decision-making criteria. We provide an instance from the framework in which social influence between agents generalizes majority rules updating. We conduct a sensitivity analysis as well as a pair of experiments concerning heterogeneous population parameters. We conclude that the framework is capable of producing consensus, polarization and fragmentation with only assimilative forces between agents which typically, in other models, lead exclusively to consensus.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2024
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 34 (6)
Interpersonal trust: Asymptotic analysis of a stochastic coordination game with multi-agent learning
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up with high trust or low trust. We model this by a discrete time, stochastic coordination game with pairwise interactions occurring at random in a finite population. Agents learn about the behavior of the population using a weighted average of what they have observed in past interactions. This learning rule, called an “exponential moving average,” has one parameter that determines the weight of the most recent observation and may, thus, be interpreted as the agent’s memory. We prove analytically that in the long run, the whole population always either trusts or doubts with the probability one. This remains true when the expectation of the dynamics would indicate otherwise. By simulation, we study the impact of the distribution of the payoff matrix and of the memory of the agents. We find that as the agent memory increases (i.e., the most recent observation weighs less), the actual dynamics increasingly resemble the expectation of the process. We conclude that it is possible that a population may converge upon high or low trust between its citizens simply by chance, though the game parameters (context of the society) may be quite telling.
- 1 June 2024
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 34 (6)
Open AccessInterpersonal trust: Asymptotic analysis of a stochastic coordination game with multi-agent learning
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up with high trust or low trust. We model this by a discrete time, stochastic coordination game with pairwise interactions occurring at random in a finite population. Agents learn about the behavior of the population using a weighted average of what they have observed in past interactions. This learning rule, called an “exponential moving average,” has one parameter that determines the weight of the most recent observation and may, thus, be interpreted as the agent’s memory. We prove analytically that in the long run, the whole population always either trusts or doubts with the probability one. This remains true when the expectation of the dynamics would indicate otherwise. By simulation, we study the impact of the distribution of the payoff matrix and of the memory of the agents. We find that as the agent memory increases (i.e., the most recent observation weighs less), the actual dynamics increasingly resemble the expectation of the process. We conclude that it is possible that a population may converge upon high or low trust between its citizens simply by chance, though the game parameters (context of the society) may be quite telling.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 48 (4) , 424-478
Trusting: Alone and together
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
- Vol. 48 (4) , 424-478
Open AccessTrusting: Alone and together