Mingxi Ye
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mingxi Ye has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zibin Zheng
Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China
10 shared publications - Yuhong Nan
Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
9 shared publications - Zhijie Zhong
Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
5 shared publications - Jianzhong Su
Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
4 shared publications - Peilin Zheng
Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
4 shared publications - Yuming Xiao
Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 316-337
RPCSpecter: Detecting Blockchain RPC Bugs through a Specification-Driven, Constraint-Aware Fuzzing Approach
Blockchain Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) serve as the primary interface for interaction between decentralized applications and blockchain networks. Despite their critical role, existing RPC implementations are prone to bugs that are often challenging to detect using traditional testing methods. In this paper, we introduce RPCSpecter, an automated framework for constraint-aware fuzz testing of blockchain RPC implementations. The core of RPCSpecter is a three-stage process: (1) Constraint Extraction, where implicit semantic dependencies from the documented RPC specifications are parsed and converted into executable constraints, (2) Constraint-Guided Mutation, which generates diverse and semantically valid test inputs based on these constraints, and (3) Bidirectional Assertion, which validates both valid and invalid RPC responses through dynamic checks and self-learning mechanisms. We evaluate RPCSpecter on both Ethereum and Solana, two predominant platforms in the Blockchain ecosystem, covering 6 clients, including Geth, Besu and Agave. The results show that RPCSpecter uncovers a total of 26 previously unknown bugs, including critical errors that are undetectable by existing fuzzers or manual testing, as well as multiple silent semantic inconsistencies. In particular, 4 of them have been acknowledged, and one of the bugs affecting three major Ethereum clients is confirmed as a vulnerability, with a $3,000 bounty award. Additionally, we demonstrate how RPCSpecter's constraint-driven approach significantly improves the efficiency and effectiveness of fuzz testing by systematically guiding mutation to explore boundary conditions and rare edge cases. Our research provides a more robust, scalable, and automated solution for enhancing the reliability and security of blockchain RPC implementations.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 316-337
Open AccessRPCSpecter: Detecting Blockchain RPC Bugs through a Specification-Driven, Constraint-Aware Fuzzing Approach
Blockchain Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) serve as the primary interface for interaction between decentralized applications and blockchain networks. Despite their critical role, existing RPC implementations are prone to bugs that are often challenging to detect using traditional testing methods. In this paper, we introduce RPCSpecter, an automated framework for constraint-aware fuzz testing of blockchain RPC implementations. The core of RPCSpecter is a three-stage process: (1) Constraint Extraction, where implicit semantic dependencies from the documented RPC specifications are parsed and converted into executable constraints, (2) Constraint-Guided Mutation, which generates diverse and semantically valid test inputs based on these constraints, and (3) Bidirectional Assertion, which validates both valid and invalid RPC responses through dynamic checks and self-learning mechanisms. We evaluate RPCSpecter on both Ethereum and Solana, two predominant platforms in the Blockchain ecosystem, covering 6 clients, including Geth, Besu and Agave. The results show that RPCSpecter uncovers a total of 26 previously unknown bugs, including critical errors that are undetectable by existing fuzzers or manual testing, as well as multiple silent semantic inconsistencies. In particular, 4 of them have been acknowledged, and one of the bugs affecting three major Ethereum clients is confirmed as a vulnerability, with a $3,000 bounty award. Additionally, we demonstrate how RPCSpecter's constraint-driven approach significantly improves the efficiency and effectiveness of fuzz testing by systematically guiding mutation to explore boundary conditions and rare edge cases. Our research provides a more robust, scalable, and automated solution for enhancing the reliability and security of blockchain RPC implementations.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 2259-2281
V2E: Validating Smart Contract Vulnerabilities through Profit-Driven Exploit Generation and Execution
Smart contracts are a critical component of blockchain systems. Due to the large amount of digital assets carried by smart contracts, their security is of critical importance. Although numerous tools have been developed for detecting smart contract vulnerability, their effectiveness remains limited, particularly due to the high false positives included in the reported results. Therefore, developers and auditors are often overwhelmed with manually verifying the reported issues. A fundamental reason behind this is that while a reported vulnerability satisfies specific vulnerable patterns, it may not actually be exploitable, either because the vulnerable code cannot be triggered or it does not result in any financial loss. In this paper, we propose V2E, a new framework for validating whether a reported vulnerability is truly exploitable. The core idea of V2E is to automatically generate executable Proof-of-Concept Exploit (PoC for short), and then assess if the vulnerability could be triggered and incur any real damage (i.e., causing financial loss) by the PoC. While LLMs have shown proficiency in PoC generation, achieving our task is by no means trivial. In detail, it is difficult for LLM to: (1) generate and update PoC to trigger a specific vulnerability, (2) evaluate the PoC’s effectiveness to validate exploitable vulnerability. To this end, V2E automates the whole process through a novel combination of PoC generation, validation, and refinement: (1) Firstly, V2E generates targeted PoCs by analyzing potential vulnerability paths. (2) Then, V2E verifies the validity of PoCs through triggerability and profitability analysis. (3) In addition, V2E iteratively refines the generated PoC based on PoC execution feedback, therefore, increasing the chance to confirm the vulnerability. Evaluation on 264 manually labeled contracts shows that V2E outperforms the baseline approach. Particularly, V2E successfully identifies 102 out of 124 exploitable vulnerabilities, achieving a precision of 91.9% and a recall of 82.3%. In addition, it successfully eliminates 71 out of 140 false alarms (50.7%). Besides, V2E effectively enhances the performance of SOTA tools. It reduces the false positive rates of Slither by 76.9%, Mythril by 56.9% and Confuzzius by 65%.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 2259-2281
Open AccessV2E: Validating Smart Contract Vulnerabilities through Profit-Driven Exploit Generation and Execution
Smart contracts are a critical component of blockchain systems. Due to the large amount of digital assets carried by smart contracts, their security is of critical importance. Although numerous tools have been developed for detecting smart contract vulnerability, their effectiveness remains limited, particularly due to the high false positives included in the reported results. Therefore, developers and auditors are often overwhelmed with manually verifying the reported issues. A fundamental reason behind this is that while a reported vulnerability satisfies specific vulnerable patterns, it may not actually be exploitable, either because the vulnerable code cannot be triggered or it does not result in any financial loss. In this paper, we propose V2E, a new framework for validating whether a reported vulnerability is truly exploitable. The core idea of V2E is to automatically generate executable Proof-of-Concept Exploit (PoC for short), and then assess if the vulnerability could be triggered and incur any real damage (i.e., causing financial loss) by the PoC. While LLMs have shown proficiency in PoC generation, achieving our task is by no means trivial. In detail, it is difficult for LLM to: (1) generate and update PoC to trigger a specific vulnerability, (2) evaluate the PoC’s effectiveness to validate exploitable vulnerability. To this end, V2E automates the whole process through a novel combination of PoC generation, validation, and refinement: (1) Firstly, V2E generates targeted PoCs by analyzing potential vulnerability paths. (2) Then, V2E verifies the validity of PoCs through triggerability and profitability analysis. (3) In addition, V2E iteratively refines the generated PoC based on PoC execution feedback, therefore, increasing the chance to confirm the vulnerability. Evaluation on 264 manually labeled contracts shows that V2E outperforms the baseline approach. Particularly, V2E successfully identifies 102 out of 124 exploitable vulnerabilities, achieving a precision of 91.9% and a recall of 82.3%. In addition, it successfully eliminates 71 out of 140 false alarms (50.7%). Besides, V2E effectively enhances the performance of SOTA tools. It reduces the false positive rates of Slither by 76.9%, Mythril by 56.9% and Confuzzius by 65%.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3392-3414
ChainDelta: Automatic Patch-Based Exploit Generation for Ethereum with Fuzzing Agents
Given the critical nature of Ethereum, exploiting 1-day vulnerabilities that are patched but not yet widely deployed is essential. Meanwhile, Automatic Patch-based Exploit Generation (APEG) is a promising technique for this, as it helps developers understand root causes, verify fixes in downstream forks, and detect incomplete patches. However, existing exploit generation tools can not work well for vulnerabilities on Ethereum due to three key unique challenges: (1) navigating complex and cross-language exploit paths hidden within patches, (2) synthesizing complicated and stateful environment configurations, and (3) handling non-deterministic inconsistencies between blockchain nodes that lead to false alarms. To address these challenges, we introduce ChainDelta , a novel fuzzing agent framework driven by Large Language Models to automatically generate exploits based on Ethereum security patches. ChainDelta consists of three core modules: a directed fuzzer utilizes call graph analysis to guide testing towards vulnerable code based on the patch information; an agent-based environment fuzzer acts as an expert to automatically set up the necessary blockchain states to trigger vulnerabilities; and finally, a state-aware sanitizer performs differential analysis while monitoring the blockchain transient state to distinguish true inconsistencies from benign non-determinism. We evaluate ChainDelta on a diverse benchmark with real-world patches, covering a wide range of types such as data racing and denial-of-service. ChainDelta successfully generated exploits with a 64% success rate and only a 15.8% false positive rate. An ablation study confirms the contribution of each module to the overall performance. To demonstrate its practical impacts, we conducted a real-world auditing campaign on top of ChainDelta , leading to the discovery of four previously undisclosed vulnerabilities with bug bounties.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3392-3414
Open AccessChainDelta: Automatic Patch-Based Exploit Generation for Ethereum with Fuzzing Agents
Given the critical nature of Ethereum, exploiting 1-day vulnerabilities that are patched but not yet widely deployed is essential. Meanwhile, Automatic Patch-based Exploit Generation (APEG) is a promising technique for this, as it helps developers understand root causes, verify fixes in downstream forks, and detect incomplete patches. However, existing exploit generation tools can not work well for vulnerabilities on Ethereum due to three key unique challenges: (1) navigating complex and cross-language exploit paths hidden within patches, (2) synthesizing complicated and stateful environment configurations, and (3) handling non-deterministic inconsistencies between blockchain nodes that lead to false alarms. To address these challenges, we introduce ChainDelta , a novel fuzzing agent framework driven by Large Language Models to automatically generate exploits based on Ethereum security patches. ChainDelta consists of three core modules: a directed fuzzer utilizes call graph analysis to guide testing towards vulnerable code based on the patch information; an agent-based environment fuzzer acts as an expert to automatically set up the necessary blockchain states to trigger vulnerabilities; and finally, a state-aware sanitizer performs differential analysis while monitoring the blockchain transient state to distinguish true inconsistencies from benign non-determinism. We evaluate ChainDelta on a diverse benchmark with real-world patches, covering a wide range of types such as data racing and denial-of-service. ChainDelta successfully generated exploits with a 64% success rate and only a 15.8% false positive rate. An ablation study confirms the contribution of each module to the overall performance. To demonstrate its practical impacts, we conducted a real-world auditing campaign on top of ChainDelta , leading to the discovery of four previously undisclosed vulnerabilities with bug bounties.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3463-3485
Odyssey: Hunting Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with Fine-Grained State Modeling and Exploration
With the rapid development of decentralized applications, many malicious actors exploit smart contract vulnerabilities for launching attacks. Moreover, as smart contracts utilize more state variables to support complex functionalities, some vulnerabilities require specific states to trigger (marked as vulnerable states), bringing new challenges to the vulnerability detection task. Although many smart contract fuzzers have been proposed for this task, they face limitations due to their inability to efficiently explore smart contract states. To address this challenge, we propose a novel fuzzer, Odyssey, with fine-grained state modeling and exploration, which increases the probability of reaching vulnerable states. We improve the efficacy of the fuzzer with two key mechanisms: (1) modeling an essential state space consisting of the variables related to sensitive operations to compress the exploration scope; (2) designing state-aware exploration strategies to identify test seeds that cover new state scope or cause new state transitions, to improve the efficiency of exploration. To evaluate the performance in vulnerability detection, we adopt Odyssey to a labeled benchmark consisting of 130 vulnerable contracts. Odyssey detects at least 70% more vulnerabilities than other fuzzers. Moreover, we evaluate Odyssey on a dataset that consists of 143 DApps (involving 437 contracts) from real-world security incidents. The experimental results demonstrate that state-aware feedback enhances the ability of Odyssey in state exploration by achieving 19% higher state coverage. Meanwhile, Odyssey totally finds 15 exploits of vulnerabilities from real-world attacks, showing its advantage in detecting real-world vulnerabilities.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3463-3485
Open AccessOdyssey: Hunting Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with Fine-Grained State Modeling and Exploration
With the rapid development of decentralized applications, many malicious actors exploit smart contract vulnerabilities for launching attacks. Moreover, as smart contracts utilize more state variables to support complex functionalities, some vulnerabilities require specific states to trigger (marked as vulnerable states), bringing new challenges to the vulnerability detection task. Although many smart contract fuzzers have been proposed for this task, they face limitations due to their inability to efficiently explore smart contract states. To address this challenge, we propose a novel fuzzer, Odyssey, with fine-grained state modeling and exploration, which increases the probability of reaching vulnerable states. We improve the efficacy of the fuzzer with two key mechanisms: (1) modeling an essential state space consisting of the variables related to sensitive operations to compress the exploration scope; (2) designing state-aware exploration strategies to identify test seeds that cover new state scope or cause new state transitions, to improve the efficiency of exploration. To evaluate the performance in vulnerability detection, we adopt Odyssey to a labeled benchmark consisting of 130 vulnerable contracts. Odyssey detects at least 70% more vulnerabilities than other fuzzers. Moreover, we evaluate Odyssey on a dataset that consists of 143 DApps (involving 437 contracts) from real-world security incidents. The experimental results demonstrate that state-aware feedback enhances the ability of Odyssey in state exploration by achieving 19% higher state coverage. Meanwhile, Odyssey totally finds 15 exploits of vulnerabilities from real-world attacks, showing its advantage in detecting real-world vulnerabilities.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. PP (00985589) , 1-15
Towards Understanding Functional Bugs in EVM-based Blockchain Systems
Functional bugs within blockchain systems have led to financial losses exceeding millions of dollars. Blockchain systems, such as Ethereum, play a critical role in supporting decentralized applications and managing significant financial assets. Despite the urgent need for enhanced security, relatively few studies have systematically investigated the functional bugs specific to blockchain systems. Unlike in conventional software, functional bugs in blockchain systems are often domain-specific and linked to core blockchain functionalities, necessitating a comprehensive understanding. In this study, we conduct a systematic analysis of functional bugs in Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)-based blockchain systems. We focus on the EVM-based architecture, as it is one of the most widely adopted models for blockchain systems. Specifically, we analyze bug-related issues reported in the GitHub repositories of leading blockchain systems, building a dataset of 205 real-world bugs classified into 18 categories. We investigate these collected bugs with respect to their taxonomies, root causes, and detection methods. From this analysis, we summarize eight key findings for enhancing blockchain security. The discovery of seven previously unknown bugs, yielding approximately $12,000 in bug bounties, demonstrates the practical impact of this work. A further investigation of state-of-the-art tools highlights the limitations of existing detection and analysis research.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. PP (00985589) , 1-15
Towards Understanding Functional Bugs in EVM-based Blockchain Systems
Functional bugs within blockchain systems have led to financial losses exceeding millions of dollars. Blockchain systems, such as Ethereum, play a critical role in supporting decentralized applications and managing significant financial assets. Despite the urgent need for enhanced security, relatively few studies have systematically investigated the functional bugs specific to blockchain systems. Unlike in conventional software, functional bugs in blockchain systems are often domain-specific and linked to core blockchain functionalities, necessitating a comprehensive understanding. In this study, we conduct a systematic analysis of functional bugs in Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)-based blockchain systems. We focus on the EVM-based architecture, as it is one of the most widely adopted models for blockchain systems. Specifically, we analyze bug-related issues reported in the GitHub repositories of leading blockchain systems, building a dataset of 205 real-world bugs classified into 18 categories. We investigate these collected bugs with respect to their taxonomies, root causes, and detection methods. From this analysis, we summarize eight key findings for enhancing blockchain security. The discovery of seven previously unknown bugs, yielding approximately $12,000 in bug bounties, demonstrates the practical impact of this work. A further investigation of state-of-the-art tools highlights the limitations of existing detection and analysis research.
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3661-3672
Is My RPC Response Reliable? Detecting RPC Bugs in Blockchain Client under Context
Blockchain clients are fundamental software for running blockchain nodes. They provide users with various RPC (Remote Procedure Call) interfaces to interact with the blockchain. These RPC methods are expected to follow the same specification across different blockchain nodes, providing users with seamless interaction. However, there have been continuous reports on various RPC bugs that can cause unexpected responses or even Denial of Service weaknesses. Existing studies on blockchain RPC bug detection mainly focus on generating the RPC method calls for testing blockchain clients. However, a wide range of the reported RPC bugs are triggered in various blockchain contexts. To the best of our knowledge, little attention is paid to generating proper contexts that can trigger these context-dependent RPC bugs. In this work, we propose EthCRAFT, a Context-aware RPC Analysis and Fuzzing Tool for client RPC bug detection. EthCRAFT first proposes to explore the state transition program space of blockchain clients and generate various transactions to construct the context. EthCRAFT then designs a context-aware RPC method call generation method to send RPC calls to the blockchain clients. The responses of five different client implementations are used as cross-referencing oracles to detect the RPC bugs. We evaluate EthCRAFT on real-world RPC bugs collected from the GitHub issues of Ethereum client implementations. Experiment results show that EthCRAFT outperforms existing client RPC detectors by detecting more RPC bugs. Moreover, EthCRAFT has found six new bugs in major Ethereum clients and reported them to the developers. One of the bug fixes has been written into breaking changes in the client’s updates. Three of our bug reports have been offered a vulnerability bounty by the Ethereum Foundation.
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3661-3672
Open AccessIs My RPC Response Reliable? Detecting RPC Bugs in Blockchain Client under Context
Blockchain clients are fundamental software for running blockchain nodes. They provide users with various RPC (Remote Procedure Call) interfaces to interact with the blockchain. These RPC methods are expected to follow the same specification across different blockchain nodes, providing users with seamless interaction. However, there have been continuous reports on various RPC bugs that can cause unexpected responses or even Denial of Service weaknesses. Existing studies on blockchain RPC bug detection mainly focus on generating the RPC method calls for testing blockchain clients. However, a wide range of the reported RPC bugs are triggered in various blockchain contexts. To the best of our knowledge, little attention is paid to generating proper contexts that can trigger these context-dependent RPC bugs. In this work, we propose EthCRAFT, a Context-aware RPC Analysis and Fuzzing Tool for client RPC bug detection. EthCRAFT first proposes to explore the state transition program space of blockchain clients and generate various transactions to construct the context. EthCRAFT then designs a context-aware RPC method call generation method to send RPC calls to the blockchain clients. The responses of five different client implementations are used as cross-referencing oracles to detect the RPC bugs. We evaluate EthCRAFT on real-world RPC bugs collected from the GitHub issues of Ethereum client implementations. Experiment results show that EthCRAFT outperforms existing client RPC detectors by detecting more RPC bugs. Moreover, EthCRAFT has found six new bugs in major Ethereum clients and reported them to the developers. One of the bug fixes has been written into breaking changes in the client’s updates. Three of our bug reports have been offered a vulnerability bounty by the Ethereum Foundation.
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (12) , 3267-3283
ASTRO: Detecting Access Control Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts via Graph Similarity Comparison
Smart contracts are programs running on blockchains, managing substantial volumes of wealth stored within the blockchain platforms. To safeguard these assets, developers design and implement access control policies. However, incomplete and incorrect access control policies allow malicious attackers to gain unauthorized access and exploit additional assets. Previous tools for detecting access control vulnerabilities in smart contracts rely on predefined patterns, specifications, or mining access control policies from historical transactions. However, these methods are constrained due to their predetermined nature and the diversity and complexity of smart contracts. In this paper, we present ASTRO, a new framework employing code similarity to detect access control vulnerabilities in smart contracts. In contrast to prior approaches that heavily rely on predefined, vulnerable code samples, ASTRO detects whether a target contract has access control vulnerabilities by comparing it against a database of audited contracts. Moreover, to mitigate the impact of language-specific features (e.g., diverse conditional statements and modifiers) and writing style characteristics, we integrate pruning and normalization techniques. We evaluate ASTRO on a total of 22 smart contracts with assigned access control CVEs and those attacked because of access control vulnerabilities from the past two years. Evaluation results demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art tools (i.e., AChecker, SpCon), ASTRO surpasses all tools in recall and achieves an improvement in recall by at least 2.8 times. In addition, ASTRO achieves a precision of 78.33% on a dataset consisting of real-wild contracts. Furthermore, ASTRO successfully identified 19 exploitable vulnerable contract that can be used to directly gain access to the contract’s permissions and obtain benefits.
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (12) , 3267-3283
ASTRO: Detecting Access Control Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts via Graph Similarity Comparison
Smart contracts are programs running on blockchains, managing substantial volumes of wealth stored within the blockchain platforms. To safeguard these assets, developers design and implement access control policies. However, incomplete and incorrect access control policies allow malicious attackers to gain unauthorized access and exploit additional assets. Previous tools for detecting access control vulnerabilities in smart contracts rely on predefined patterns, specifications, or mining access control policies from historical transactions. However, these methods are constrained due to their predetermined nature and the diversity and complexity of smart contracts. In this paper, we present ASTRO, a new framework employing code similarity to detect access control vulnerabilities in smart contracts. In contrast to prior approaches that heavily rely on predefined, vulnerable code samples, ASTRO detects whether a target contract has access control vulnerabilities by comparing it against a database of audited contracts. Moreover, to mitigate the impact of language-specific features (e.g., diverse conditional statements and modifiers) and writing style characteristics, we integrate pruning and normalization techniques. We evaluate ASTRO on a total of 22 smart contracts with assigned access control CVEs and those attacked because of access control vulnerabilities from the past two years. Evaluation results demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art tools (i.e., AChecker, SpCon), ASTRO surpasses all tools in recall and achieves an improvement in recall by at least 2.8 times. In addition, ASTRO achieves a precision of 78.33% on a dataset consisting of real-wild contracts. Furthermore, ASTRO successfully identified 19 exploitable vulnerable contract that can be used to directly gain access to the contract’s permissions and obtain benefits.
- Open Access
- 27 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 33 (7) , 1-20
FunFuzz: A Function-Oriented Fuzzer for Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection with High Effectiveness and Efficiency
With the increasing popularity of Decentralized Applications (DApps) in blockchain, securing smart contracts has been a long-term, high-priority subject in the domain. Among the various research directions for vulnerability detection, fuzzing has received extensive attention because of its high effectiveness. However, with the increasing complexity of smart contracts, existing fuzzers may waste substantial time exploring locations irrelevant to smart contract vulnerabilities. In this article, we present FunFuzz, a function-oriented fuzzer, which is dedicatedly tailored for detecting smart contract vulnerability with high effectiveness and efficiency. The key observation in our research is that most smart contract vulnerabilities exist in specific functions rather than randomly distributed in all program code like other traditional software. To this end, unlike traditional fuzzers which mainly target code coverage, FunFuzz identifies risky functions while pruning non-risky ones in smart contracts. In this way, it significantly narrows down the exploration scope during the fuzzing process. In addition, FunFuzz employs three unique strategies to direct itself toward effectively discovering vulnerabilities specific to smart contracts (e.g., reentrancy, block dependency, and gasless send). Extensive experiments on 170 real-world contracts demonstrate that FunFuzz outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
- 27 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 33 (7) , 1-20
Open AccessFunFuzz: A Function-Oriented Fuzzer for Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection with High Effectiveness and Efficiency
With the increasing popularity of Decentralized Applications (DApps) in blockchain, securing smart contracts has been a long-term, high-priority subject in the domain. Among the various research directions for vulnerability detection, fuzzing has received extensive attention because of its high effectiveness. However, with the increasing complexity of smart contracts, existing fuzzers may waste substantial time exploring locations irrelevant to smart contract vulnerabilities. In this article, we present FunFuzz, a function-oriented fuzzer, which is dedicatedly tailored for detecting smart contract vulnerability with high effectiveness and efficiency. The key observation in our research is that most smart contract vulnerabilities exist in specific functions rather than randomly distributed in all program code like other traditional software. To this end, unlike traditional fuzzers which mainly target code coverage, FunFuzz identifies risky functions while pruning non-risky ones in smart contracts. In this way, it significantly narrows down the exploration scope during the fuzzing process. In addition, FunFuzz employs three unique strategies to direct itself toward effectively discovering vulnerabilities specific to smart contracts (e.g., reentrancy, block dependency, and gasless send). Extensive experiments on 170 real-world contracts demonstrate that FunFuzz outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 794-805
Midas: Mining Profitable Exploits in On-Chain Smart Contracts via Feedback-Driven Fuzzing and Differential Analysis
In the context of boosting smart contract applications, prioritizing their security becomes paramount. Smart contract exploits often result in notable financial losses. Ensuring their security is by no means trivial. Rather than resulting in program crashes, most attacks in on-chain smart contracts aim to induce financial loss, referred to as profitable exploits. By constructing seemingly innocuous inputs, profitable exploits try to extract extra profit or compromise the interests of others. However, due to the complexity of call chains in on-chain smart contracts and the need for effective oracles for profitable exploits, smart contract fuzzing suffers from low efficiency and low effectiveness in finding profitable exploits. In this paper, we present Midas, a novel feedback-driven fuzzing framework to mine profitable exploits in on-chain smart contracts effectively. Midas consists of two modules: diverse validity fuzzing and profitable transaction identification. The diverse validity fuzzing module applies two waypoints to efficiently generate valid transactions, addressing the complexity of on-chain smart contract call chains. The profitable transaction identification module applies differential analysis to effectively identify profitable exploits, addressing the limitation of ad-hoc oracles. Evaluation of Midas over on-chain smart contracts showed it effectively identified 40 real-world exploits with a precision of 80%, outperforming state-of-the-art tools (i.e., ItyFuzz and Slither) in both efficiency and effectiveness. Particularly, Midas effectively mines five unknown exploits in valuable smart contracts, and two of them have already been confirmed by their DApp developers.
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 794-805
Open AccessMidas: Mining Profitable Exploits in On-Chain Smart Contracts via Feedback-Driven Fuzzing and Differential Analysis
In the context of boosting smart contract applications, prioritizing their security becomes paramount. Smart contract exploits often result in notable financial losses. Ensuring their security is by no means trivial. Rather than resulting in program crashes, most attacks in on-chain smart contracts aim to induce financial loss, referred to as profitable exploits. By constructing seemingly innocuous inputs, profitable exploits try to extract extra profit or compromise the interests of others. However, due to the complexity of call chains in on-chain smart contracts and the need for effective oracles for profitable exploits, smart contract fuzzing suffers from low efficiency and low effectiveness in finding profitable exploits. In this paper, we present Midas, a novel feedback-driven fuzzing framework to mine profitable exploits in on-chain smart contracts effectively. Midas consists of two modules: diverse validity fuzzing and profitable transaction identification. The diverse validity fuzzing module applies two waypoints to efficiently generate valid transactions, addressing the complexity of on-chain smart contract call chains. The profitable transaction identification module applies differential analysis to effectively identify profitable exploits, addressing the limitation of ad-hoc oracles. Evaluation of Midas over on-chain smart contracts showed it effectively identified 40 real-world exploits with a precision of 80%, outperforming state-of-the-art tools (i.e., ItyFuzz and Slither) in both efficiency and effectiveness. Particularly, Midas effectively mines five unknown exploits in valuable smart contracts, and two of them have already been confirmed by their DApp developers.
- Top Cited Papers
- 29 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 50 (6) , 1360-1373
DAppSCAN: Building Large-Scale Datasets for Smart Contract Weaknesses in DApp Projects
The Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry) is a widely recognized list of smart contract weaknesses specific to the Ethereum platform. Despite the SWC Registry not being updated with new entries since 2020, the sustained development of smart contract analysis tools for detecting SWC-listed weaknesses highlights their ongoing significance in the field. However, evaluating these tools has proven challenging due to the absence of a large, unbiased, real-world dataset. To address this problem, we aim to build a large-scale SWC weakness dataset from real-world DApp projects. We recruited 22 participants and spent 44 person-months analyzing 1,199 open-source audit reports from 29 security teams. In total, we identified 9,154 weaknesses and developed two distinct datasets, i.e., DAPPSCAN-SOURCE and DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE. The DAPPSCAN-SOURCE dataset comprises 39,904 Solidity files, featuring 1,618 SWC weaknesses sourced from 682 real-world DApp projects. However, the Solidity files in this dataset may not be directly compilable for further analysis. To facilitate automated analysis, we developed a tool capable of automatically identifying dependency relationships within DApp projects and completing missing public libraries. Using this tool, we created DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE dataset, which consists of 6,665 compiled smart contract with 888 SWC weaknesses. Based on DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE, we conducted an empirical study to evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art smart contract weakness detection tools. The evaluation results revealed sub-par performance for these tools in terms of both effectiveness and success detection rate, indicating that future development should prioritize real-world datasets over simplistic toy contracts.
- 29 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 50 (6) , 1360-1373
Top Cited PapersDAppSCAN: Building Large-Scale Datasets for Smart Contract Weaknesses in DApp Projects
The Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry) is a widely recognized list of smart contract weaknesses specific to the Ethereum platform. Despite the SWC Registry not being updated with new entries since 2020, the sustained development of smart contract analysis tools for detecting SWC-listed weaknesses highlights their ongoing significance in the field. However, evaluating these tools has proven challenging due to the absence of a large, unbiased, real-world dataset. To address this problem, we aim to build a large-scale SWC weakness dataset from real-world DApp projects. We recruited 22 participants and spent 44 person-months analyzing 1,199 open-source audit reports from 29 security teams. In total, we identified 9,154 weaknesses and developed two distinct datasets, i.e., DAPPSCAN-SOURCE and DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE. The DAPPSCAN-SOURCE dataset comprises 39,904 Solidity files, featuring 1,618 SWC weaknesses sourced from 682 real-world DApp projects. However, the Solidity files in this dataset may not be directly compilable for further analysis. To facilitate automated analysis, we developed a tool capable of automatically identifying dependency relationships within DApp projects and completing missing public libraries. Using this tool, we created DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE dataset, which consists of 6,665 compiled smart contract with 888 SWC weaknesses. Based on DAPPSCAN-BYTECODE, we conducted an empirical study to evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art smart contract weakness detection tools. The evaluation results revealed sub-par performance for these tools in terms of both effectiveness and success detection rate, indicating that future development should prioritize real-world datasets over simplistic toy contracts.