Mingyao Shao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mingyao Shao has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yongbin Zhou
Nanjing University of Science and Technology
1 shared publication - Yuejun Liu
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 548-559
Pairwise and Parallel: Enhancing the Key Mismatch Attacks on Kyber and Beyond
Misuse resilience is an important research topic in the NIST PQC standardization process. Key mismatch attacks are a major type of misuse attack. In key mismatch attacks, the adversary aims to recover the reused secret key by sending special ciphertexts to the target party and observing whether the shared key matches his guesses or not. In this paper, we propose pairwise-parallel key mismatch attacks. The strategy is to recover partial information about multiple coefficient-pairs of the secret key in a parallel way per query. We realize the multi-value key mismatch oracle in a key exchange scenario and experimentally validate our proposed attacks. Our attacks greatly reduce the number of queries required to recover the full secret key. Specifically, compared with state-of-the-art key mismatch attacks on CPA-secure Kyber, our attacks reduce the number of queries by 95% with computational complexity of 232. Then we employ the post-processing with lattice reduction to further minimize the number of queries. The results show we only need 78 queries to recover the full secret key of Kyber1024 with a lattice reduction cost of 232. Moreover, our proposed pairwise-parallel attack method can be applied to improve the PC oracle-based SCA against CCA-secure Kyber, reducing the number of queries/traces by 16.67%. Futhermore, the proposed attacks can be applied to Saber and other lattice-based KEMs.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 548-559
Open AccessPairwise and Parallel: Enhancing the Key Mismatch Attacks on Kyber and Beyond
Misuse resilience is an important research topic in the NIST PQC standardization process. Key mismatch attacks are a major type of misuse attack. In key mismatch attacks, the adversary aims to recover the reused secret key by sending special ciphertexts to the target party and observing whether the shared key matches his guesses or not. In this paper, we propose pairwise-parallel key mismatch attacks. The strategy is to recover partial information about multiple coefficient-pairs of the secret key in a parallel way per query. We realize the multi-value key mismatch oracle in a key exchange scenario and experimentally validate our proposed attacks. Our attacks greatly reduce the number of queries required to recover the full secret key. Specifically, compared with state-of-the-art key mismatch attacks on CPA-secure Kyber, our attacks reduce the number of queries by 95% with computational complexity of 232. Then we employ the post-processing with lattice reduction to further minimize the number of queries. The results show we only need 78 queries to recover the full secret key of Kyber1024 with a lattice reduction cost of 232. Moreover, our proposed pairwise-parallel attack method can be applied to improve the PC oracle-based SCA against CCA-secure Kyber, reducing the number of queries/traces by 16.67%. Futhermore, the proposed attacks can be applied to Saber and other lattice-based KEMs.