Sabin Lessard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sabin Lessard has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Cong Li
School of Ecology and Environment, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China
2 shared publications- Dhaker Kroumi
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
2 shared publications Éloi Martin
Département de Mathématiques et de Statistique, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada
2 shared publications- John Wakeley
Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
1 shared publication - Josiane Courteau
PRIMUS Group, Clinical Research Center, Sherbrooke University Hospital, Sherbrooke (QC), Canada
1 shared publication - Terry Easlick
Département de Mathématiques et de Statistique, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
A classification of structured coalescent processes with migration, conditional on the population pedigree
Recent analyses of the effects that organismal genealogies or pedigrees of populations have on times to common ancestry for samples of genetic data are extended to cases of population subdivision and migration. Traditional coalescent models marginalize over pedigrees. A finding of a ‘pedigree effect’ implies that data analysis and interpretation should not be based on the corresponding traditional coalescent model but rather on a coalescent model obtained by conditioning on the pedigree. We apply a straightforward test based on the distribution of pairwise coalescence times to four previously described scenarios of subdivision and migration. These scenarios are defined by the relative magnitudes of four parameters: the number of the local populations or demes, the deme size, the migration fraction, and the probability that migration can occur at all. We find pedigree effects in three scenarios. In two, the effect is weak if the deme size is large. The one scenario without a pedigree effect corresponds to the well known structured-coalescent model. The one scenario with a persistent pedigree effect even in the limit as the deme size tends to infinity involves long periods without gene flow interrupted by pulses of migration. We illustrate our results using simulations and numerical analysis.
Open AccessA classification of structured coalescent processes with migration, conditional on the population pedigree
Recent analyses of the effects that organismal genealogies or pedigrees of populations have on times to common ancestry for samples of genetic data are extended to cases of population subdivision and migration. Traditional coalescent models marginalize over pedigrees. A finding of a ‘pedigree effect’ implies that data analysis and interpretation should not be based on the corresponding traditional coalescent model but rather on a coalescent model obtained by conditioning on the pedigree. We apply a straightforward test based on the distribution of pairwise coalescence times to four previously described scenarios of subdivision and migration. These scenarios are defined by the relative magnitudes of four parameters: the number of the local populations or demes, the deme size, the migration fraction, and the probability that migration can occur at all. We find pedigree effects in three scenarios. In two, the effect is weak if the deme size is large. The one scenario without a pedigree effect corresponds to the well known structured-coalescent model. The one scenario with a persistent pedigree effect even in the limit as the deme size tends to infinity involves long periods without gene flow interrupted by pulses of migration. We illustrate our results using simulations and numerical analysis.
- 10 June 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 111 (6) , 064304
Differential migration in a finite-island model and the evolution of cooperation
In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in a haploid population subdivided into d demes, each composed of N≥2 individuals interacting according to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Using a discrete-time Moran process with migration of offspring, we analyze the fixation probability ρ_{C} of a single cooperative mutant. Our model incorporates a baseline migration probability m, with cooperators exhibiting an additional migration tendency proportional to the local frequency of defectors. Using a two-time-scale approach, we derive a diffusion approximation valid for a large number of demes d to analytically determine ρ_{C}. We show that, in the absence of differential migration and for a single-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the fixation of cooperation remains generally disfavored by selection in the sense that ρ_{C}<1/(Nd) even as the baseline migration probability increases. In contrast, in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, selection favors the fixation of cooperation when the number of repetitions n exceeds a critical threshold n^{*}, which is inversely related to m and N. The probability of fixation ρ_{C} increases as the level of differential migration increases, setting a threshold beyond which the fixation of cooperation is favored even in a single-round game. This threshold is modulated by the size of the deme, the probability of baseline migration and the cost of cooperation, with larger demes and a higher probability of baseline migration requiring a higher differential migration level. Numerical simulations validate the accuracy of our diffusion approximation, showing strong agreement with the simulated fixation probabilities for large d. These findings highlight the pivotal role of repeated interactions, migration strategies, and population structure in promoting the evolution of cooperation.
- 10 June 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 111 (6) , 064304
Differential migration in a finite-island model and the evolution of cooperation
In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in a haploid population subdivided into d demes, each composed of N≥2 individuals interacting according to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Using a discrete-time Moran process with migration of offspring, we analyze the fixation probability ρ_{C} of a single cooperative mutant. Our model incorporates a baseline migration probability m, with cooperators exhibiting an additional migration tendency proportional to the local frequency of defectors. Using a two-time-scale approach, we derive a diffusion approximation valid for a large number of demes d to analytically determine ρ_{C}. We show that, in the absence of differential migration and for a single-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the fixation of cooperation remains generally disfavored by selection in the sense that ρ_{C}<1/(Nd) even as the baseline migration probability increases. In contrast, in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, selection favors the fixation of cooperation when the number of repetitions n exceeds a critical threshold n^{*}, which is inversely related to m and N. The probability of fixation ρ_{C} increases as the level of differential migration increases, setting a threshold beyond which the fixation of cooperation is favored even in a single-round game. This threshold is modulated by the size of the deme, the probability of baseline migration and the cost of cooperation, with larger demes and a higher probability of baseline migration requiring a higher differential migration level. Numerical simulations validate the accuracy of our diffusion approximation, showing strong agreement with the simulated fixation probabilities for large d. These findings highlight the pivotal role of repeated interactions, migration strategies, and population structure in promoting the evolution of cooperation.
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1214-1242
Two Timescales in Stochastic Evolutionary Games
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1214-1242
Two Timescales in Stochastic Evolutionary Games
- Open Access
Two timescales in stochastic evolutionary games
Convergence of discrete-time Markov chains with two timescales is a powerful tool to study stochastic evolutionary games in subdivided populations. Focusing on linear games within demes, convergence to a diffusion process for the strategy frequencies as the population size increases yields a strong-migration limit. The same limit is obtained for a linear game in a well-mixed population with effective payoffs that depend on reproductive values and identity measures between individuals. The first-order effect of selection on the fixation probability of a strategy introduced as a single mutant can be calculated by using the diffusion approximation, or alternatively by summing the successive expected changes in the mutant strategy frequency that involve expected coalescence times of ancestral lines under neutrality. These can be approached by resorting to the existence of two timescales in the genealogical process. Keeping the population size fixed but letting the intensity of migration go to zero, convergence to a continuous-time Markov chain after instantaneous initial transitions yields a low-migration limit that depends on fixation probabilities within demes in the absence of migration. In the limit of small uniform dispersal, the fixation probability of a mutant strategy in the whole population exceeds its initial frequency if it is risk-dominant over the other strategy with respect to the overall average payoffs in pairwise interactions. Finally, in the low-mutation limit in the presence of recurrent mutation, the average abundance of a strategy in the long run is determined by the fixation probabilities of both strategies when introduced as single mutants in a deme chosen at random.
Open AccessTwo timescales in stochastic evolutionary games
Convergence of discrete-time Markov chains with two timescales is a powerful tool to study stochastic evolutionary games in subdivided populations. Focusing on linear games within demes, convergence to a diffusion process for the strategy frequencies as the population size increases yields a strong-migration limit. The same limit is obtained for a linear game in a well-mixed population with effective payoffs that depend on reproductive values and identity measures between individuals. The first-order effect of selection on the fixation probability of a strategy introduced as a single mutant can be calculated by using the diffusion approximation, or alternatively by summing the successive expected changes in the mutant strategy frequency that involve expected coalescence times of ancestral lines under neutrality. These can be approached by resorting to the existence of two timescales in the genealogical process. Keeping the population size fixed but letting the intensity of migration go to zero, convergence to a continuous-time Markov chain after instantaneous initial transitions yields a low-migration limit that depends on fixation probabilities within demes in the absence of migration. In the limit of small uniform dispersal, the fixation probability of a mutant strategy in the whole population exceeds its initial frequency if it is risk-dominant over the other strategy with respect to the overall average payoffs in pairwise interactions. Finally, in the low-mutation limit in the presence of recurrent mutation, the average abundance of a strategy in the long run is determined by the fixation probabilities of both strategies when introduced as single mutants in a deme chosen at random.
- Open Access
- 28 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 592, 111891
Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
- 28 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 592, 111891
Open AccessEvolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 11 (4) , 295-334
Evolutionary game with stochastic payoffs in a finite island model
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $ d $ demes, each containing $ N $ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and recolonization with some fixed probability $ m $ after reproduction and selection among offspring. Within each deme, offspring engage in random pairwise interactions, and the payoffs are assumed to have means and variances proportional to the inverse of the population size. By verifying the conditions given in Ethier and Nagylaki (1980) to approximate Markov chains with two timescales, we establish that the discrete-time evolutionary dynamics with $ Nd $ generations as unit of time converges to a continuous-time diffusion as $ d\rightarrow \infty $. The infinitesimal mean and variance of this diffusion are expressed in terms of the population-scaled means and variances of the payoffs besides identity-by-descent measures between offspring in the same deme in a neutral population. We show that the probability for a strategy to fix in the population starting from an initial frequency $ (Nd)^{-1} $ generally increases as the payoffs to that strategy exhibit less variability or the payoffs to the other strategy more variability. As a result, differences in variability can make this fixation probability for cooperation larger than the corresponding one for defection. As the deme-scaled extinction rate $ \nu = mN $ decreases for $ N $ large enough and $ m $ small enough, creating a higher level of identity among offspring within demes, the differences between the population-scaled variances of the payoffs for interacting offspring of different types increases this effect to a greater extent than the differences for interacting offspring of the same type. Furthermore, assuming no variability in the payoffs to cooperation, we explore in more details the relationships between the levels of variability in the payoffs to defection as functions of $ \nu $ that are necessary for the fixation probability of cooperation to be above $ (Nd)^{-1} $, the corresponding fixation probability of defection to be below $ (Nd)^{-1} $, and the former fixation probability to exceed the latter.- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 11 (4) , 295-334
Evolutionary game with stochastic payoffs in a finite island model
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $ d $ demes, each containing $ N $ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and recolonization with some fixed probability $ m $ after reproduction and selection among offspring. Within each deme, offspring engage in random pairwise interactions, and the payoffs are assumed to have means and variances proportional to the inverse of the population size. By verifying the conditions given in Ethier and Nagylaki (1980) to approximate Markov chains with two timescales, we establish that the discrete-time evolutionary dynamics with $ Nd $ generations as unit of time converges to a continuous-time diffusion as $ d\rightarrow \infty $. The infinitesimal mean and variance of this diffusion are expressed in terms of the population-scaled means and variances of the payoffs besides identity-by-descent measures between offspring in the same deme in a neutral population. We show that the probability for a strategy to fix in the population starting from an initial frequency $ (Nd)^{-1} $ generally increases as the payoffs to that strategy exhibit less variability or the payoffs to the other strategy more variability. As a result, differences in variability can make this fixation probability for cooperation larger than the corresponding one for defection. As the deme-scaled extinction rate $ \nu = mN $ decreases for $ N $ large enough and $ m $ small enough, creating a higher level of identity among offspring within demes, the differences between the population-scaled variances of the payoffs for interacting offspring of different types increases this effect to a greater extent than the differences for interacting offspring of the same type. Furthermore, assuming no variability in the payoffs to cooperation, we explore in more details the relationships between the levels of variability in the payoffs to defection as functions of $ \nu $ that are necessary for the fixation probability of cooperation to be above $ (Nd)^{-1} $, the corresponding fixation probability of defection to be below $ (Nd)^{-1} $, and the former fixation probability to exceed the latter.- 6 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 1194-1218
Assortment by Group Founders Always Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation Under Global Selection But Can Oppose it Under Local Selection
- 6 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 1194-1218
Assortment by Group Founders Always Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation Under Global Selection But Can Oppose it Under Local Selection
- 19 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 148, 46-48
On the sign of the average effect of an allele
- 19 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 148, 46-48
On the sign of the average effect of an allele
- 15 April 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (4) , 044403
Stochastic replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability
To develop the concept of evolutionary stability in a stochastic environment, we investigate the continuous-time dynamics of a two-phenotype linear evolutionary game with generally correlated random payoffs in pairwise interactions. By using the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure and Itô's formula, we deduce a stochastic differential equation for the phenotype frequencies that extends the replicator equation, called the stochastic replicator equation. We give conditions for stochastic stability of a fixation state or a constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the stochastic dynamics of the two phenotypes. We show that, if a fixation state is stochastically stable, then the pure strategy corresponding to this fixation state must be stochastically evolutionarily stable with respect to mixed strategies. However, this is not the case for a mixed strategy that corresponds to a stochastically stable constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the two phenotypes.
- 15 April 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (4) , 044403
Stochastic replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability
To develop the concept of evolutionary stability in a stochastic environment, we investigate the continuous-time dynamics of a two-phenotype linear evolutionary game with generally correlated random payoffs in pairwise interactions. By using the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure and Itô's formula, we deduce a stochastic differential equation for the phenotype frequencies that extends the replicator equation, called the stochastic replicator equation. We give conditions for stochastic stability of a fixation state or a constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the stochastic dynamics of the two phenotypes. We show that, if a fixation state is stochastically stable, then the pure strategy corresponding to this fixation state must be stochastically evolutionarily stable with respect to mixed strategies. However, this is not the case for a mixed strategy that corresponds to a stochastically stable constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the two phenotypes.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 142, 91-99
Inclusive fitness and Hamilton’s rule in a stochastic environment
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 142, 91-99
Inclusive fitness and Hamilton’s rule in a stochastic environment