Raz
Research Subjects
Raz has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Farshad Khorrami
New York University
2 shared publications - Prashanth Krishnamurthy
New York University
2 shared publications - Ramesh Karri
ECE, New York University
2 shared publications - Hammond Pearce
University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
1 shared publication - Joshua Trujillo
Department of Energy’s Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, MO 64147, USA
1 shared publication Meet Udeshi
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Ransomware 3.0: Self-Composing and LLM-Orchestrated
Using automated reasoning, code synthesis, and contextual decision-making, we introduce a new threat that exploits large language models (LLMs) to autonomously plan, adapt, and execute the ransomware attack lifecycle. Ransomware 3.0 represents the first threat model and research prototype of LLM-orchestrated ransomware. Unlike conventional malware, the prototype only requires natural language prompts embedded in the binary; malicious code is synthesized dynamically by the LLM at runtime, yielding polymorphic variants that adapt to the execution environment. The system performs reconnaissance, payload generation, and personalized extortion, in a closed-loop attack campaign without human involvement. We evaluate this threat across personal, enterprise, and embedded environments using a phase-centric methodology that measures quantitative fidelity and qualitative coherence in each attack phase. We show that open source LLMs can generate functional ransomware components and sustain closed-loop execution across diverse environments. Finally, we present behavioral signals and multi-level telemetry of Ransomware 3.0 through a case study to motivate future development of better defenses and policy enforcements to address novel AI-enabled ransomware attacks.
Open AccessRansomware 3.0: Self-Composing and LLM-Orchestrated
Using automated reasoning, code synthesis, and contextual decision-making, we introduce a new threat that exploits large language models (LLMs) to autonomously plan, adapt, and execute the ransomware attack lifecycle. Ransomware 3.0 represents the first threat model and research prototype of LLM-orchestrated ransomware. Unlike conventional malware, the prototype only requires natural language prompts embedded in the binary; malicious code is synthesized dynamically by the LLM at runtime, yielding polymorphic variants that adapt to the execution environment. The system performs reconnaissance, payload generation, and personalized extortion, in a closed-loop attack campaign without human involvement. We evaluate this threat across personal, enterprise, and embedded environments using a phase-centric methodology that measures quantitative fidelity and qualitative coherence in each attack phase. We show that open source LLMs can generate functional ransomware components and sustain closed-loop execution across diverse environments. Finally, we present behavioral signals and multi-level telemetry of Ransomware 3.0 through a case study to motivate future development of better defenses and policy enforcements to address novel AI-enabled ransomware attacks.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Information
- Vol. 15 (7) , 395
FEINT: Automated Framework for Efficient INsertion of Templates/Trojans into FPGAs
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) play a significant and evolving role in various industries and applications in the current technological landscape. They are widely known for their flexibility, rapid prototyping, reconfigurability, and design development features. FPGA designs are often constructed as compositions of interconnected modules that implement the various features/functionalities required in an application. This work develops a novel tool FEINT, which facilitates this module composition process and automates the design-level modifications required when introducing new modules into an existing design. The proposed methodology is architected as a “template” insertion tool that operates based on a user-provided configuration script to introduce dynamic design features as plugins at different stages of the FPGA design process to facilitate rapid prototyping, composition-based design evolution, and system customization. FEINT can be useful in applications where designers need to tailor system behavior without requiring expert FPGA programming skills or significant manual effort. For example, FEINT can help insert defensive monitoring, adversarial Trojan, and plugin-based functionality enhancement features. FEINT is scalable, future-proof, and cross-platform without a dependence on vendor-specific file formats, thus ensuring compatibility with FPGA families and tool versions and being integrable with commercial tools. To assess FEINT’s effectiveness, our tests covered the injection of various types of templates/modules into FPGA designs. For example, in the Trojan insertion context, our tests consider diverse Trojan behaviors and triggers, including key leakage and denial of service Trojans. We evaluated FEINT’s applicability to complex designs by creating an FPGA design that features a MicroBlaze soft-core processor connected to an AES-accelerator via an AXI-bus interface. FEINT can successfully and efficiently insert various templates into this design at different FPGA design stages.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Information
- Vol. 15 (7) , 395
Open AccessFEINT: Automated Framework for Efficient INsertion of Templates/Trojans into FPGAs
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) play a significant and evolving role in various industries and applications in the current technological landscape. They are widely known for their flexibility, rapid prototyping, reconfigurability, and design development features. FPGA designs are often constructed as compositions of interconnected modules that implement the various features/functionalities required in an application. This work develops a novel tool FEINT, which facilitates this module composition process and automates the design-level modifications required when introducing new modules into an existing design. The proposed methodology is architected as a “template” insertion tool that operates based on a user-provided configuration script to introduce dynamic design features as plugins at different stages of the FPGA design process to facilitate rapid prototyping, composition-based design evolution, and system customization. FEINT can be useful in applications where designers need to tailor system behavior without requiring expert FPGA programming skills or significant manual effort. For example, FEINT can help insert defensive monitoring, adversarial Trojan, and plugin-based functionality enhancement features. FEINT is scalable, future-proof, and cross-platform without a dependence on vendor-specific file formats, thus ensuring compatibility with FPGA families and tool versions and being integrable with commercial tools. To assess FEINT’s effectiveness, our tests covered the injection of various types of templates/modules into FPGA designs. For example, in the Trojan insertion context, our tests consider diverse Trojan behaviors and triggers, including key leakage and denial of service Trojans. We evaluated FEINT’s applicability to complex designs by creating an FPGA design that features a MicroBlaze soft-core processor connected to an AES-accelerator via an AXI-bus interface. FEINT can successfully and efficiently insert various templates into this design at different FPGA design stages.