Kristen Sobeck
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kristen Sobeck has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Robert Breunig
Tax and Transfer Policy Institute, Crawford School of Public Policy Australian National University Canberra ACT Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 102 (338) , 369-396
Does Decreasing the Generosity of Payments to Single Parents Have Employment and Earnings Effects? Evidence from Australian Administrative Data*
We examine the impact of two changes to Australia's Parenting Payment Single (PPS) program, a welfare payment for low‐income single mothers. One change lowered the age of the youngest child cut off for program eligibility, forcing new welfare entrants onto the less generous Newstart (unemployment) payment. A second change increased job search requirements for those on PPS. We use a difference‐in‐difference strategy which exploits the rule changes combined with an unannounced end to grandfathering provisions to disentangle the two effects. We find little effect of the increased job search requirements. The decreased generosity of the program has a small negative impact on single mothers' employment rate and it produces a large decrease in the share of single mothers who rely on welfare. Around 35 per cent of single mothers who ever received PPS between 2011 and 2016 eliminated their use of welfare. Due to the decreased generosity of the welfare payments received by the majority of single mothers who remained on income support, single mothers had lower incomes, on average, after the policy changes.
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 102 (338) , 369-396
Open AccessDoes Decreasing the Generosity of Payments to Single Parents Have Employment and Earnings Effects? Evidence from Australian Administrative Data*
We examine the impact of two changes to Australia's Parenting Payment Single (PPS) program, a welfare payment for low‐income single mothers. One change lowered the age of the youngest child cut off for program eligibility, forcing new welfare entrants onto the less generous Newstart (unemployment) payment. A second change increased job search requirements for those on PPS. We use a difference‐in‐difference strategy which exploits the rule changes combined with an unannounced end to grandfathering provisions to disentangle the two effects. We find little effect of the increased job search requirements. The decreased generosity of the program has a small negative impact on single mothers' employment rate and it produces a large decrease in the share of single mothers who rely on welfare. Around 35 per cent of single mothers who ever received PPS between 2011 and 2016 eliminated their use of welfare. Due to the decreased generosity of the welfare payments received by the majority of single mothers who remained on income support, single mothers had lower incomes, on average, after the policy changes.
- Open Access
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 100 (331) , 462-490
Greedy Jobs, Labour Market Institutions, and the Gender Pay Gap*
Previous research argues that occupational gender pay gaps arise from greedy jobs within occupations. Greedy jobs involve working long and unpredictable hours in jobs where individuals are not easily substitutable. They engender compensating differentials resulting in an earnings‐to‐hours elasticity that often exceeds 1. This paper shows that greedy jobs also exist in Australia, where labour market institutions differ substantially from those in the United States. It shows that occupational gender earnings gaps are highest in occupations where greedy jobs proliferate. Wage‐setting institutions engender heterogeneous effects on occupational gender earnings gaps. Relative to the United States, occupational gender earnings gaps are smaller in Australia, consistent with evidence that labour market institutions compress the earnings distribution. Within occupations, the use of collective agreements attenuates the size of occupational gender earnings gaps, while the use of individual agreements increases them. Not surprisingly, individuals employed in greedy occupations predominantly use individual agreements to negotiate pay.
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 100 (331) , 462-490
Open AccessGreedy Jobs, Labour Market Institutions, and the Gender Pay Gap*
Previous research argues that occupational gender pay gaps arise from greedy jobs within occupations. Greedy jobs involve working long and unpredictable hours in jobs where individuals are not easily substitutable. They engender compensating differentials resulting in an earnings‐to‐hours elasticity that often exceeds 1. This paper shows that greedy jobs also exist in Australia, where labour market institutions differ substantially from those in the United States. It shows that occupational gender earnings gaps are highest in occupations where greedy jobs proliferate. Wage‐setting institutions engender heterogeneous effects on occupational gender earnings gaps. Relative to the United States, occupational gender earnings gaps are smaller in Australia, consistent with evidence that labour market institutions compress the earnings distribution. Within occupations, the use of collective agreements attenuates the size of occupational gender earnings gaps, while the use of individual agreements increases them. Not surprisingly, individuals employed in greedy occupations predominantly use individual agreements to negotiate pay.