Weian Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Weian Li has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Qi Qi
Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, Beijing Key Laboratory of Research on Large Models and Intelligent Governance, Beijing, China, and Engineering Research Center of Next-Generation Intelligent Search and Recommendation, MOE, Beijing, China
4 shared publications - Zhen Zhang
Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Bingzhe Wang
Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Changyuan Yu
Baidu Inc., Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Kun Huang
Meituan Inc., Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Ningyuan Li
Peking University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Information and Computation
- Vol. 307
Competition among parallel contests
- 3 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Information and Computation
- Vol. 307
Competition among parallel contests
- Open Access
- 13 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2463-2472
Hybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search
- 13 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2463-2472
Open AccessHybrid Advertising in the Sponsored Search
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1977-1991
A Context-Aware Framework for Integrating Ad Auctions and Recommendations
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1977-1991
Open AccessA Context-Aware Framework for Integrating Ad Auctions and Recommendations
- Open Access
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4362-4373
Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed ''Joint Auction'', allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee (near-)dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform's revenue compared to the known baselines.
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4362-4373
Open AccessJoint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed ''Joint Auction'', allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee (near-)dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform's revenue compared to the known baselines.