Zhicheng Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Zhicheng Zhang has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hai-Tao Zheng
Tsinghua University
2 shared publications - Jieming Zhu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, China
2 shared publications - Bingzhe Wang
Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Deqing Zou
Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University, Shenzhen, China
1 shared publication - Fengyuan Lu
School of Intelligence Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication - Gang Wang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6688-6699
When Hard Negatives Hurt: Bridging the Generative Discriminative Gap in Hard Negative Synthesis for Retrieval
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6688-6699
Open AccessWhen Hard Negatives Hurt: Bridging the Generative Discriminative Gap in Hard Negative Synthesis for Retrieval
- Open Access
- 3 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4670-4681
ROMA: Recommendation-Oriented Language Model Adaptation Using Multi-Modal Multi-Domain Item Sequences
- 3 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4670-4681
Open AccessROMA: Recommendation-Oriented Language Model Adaptation Using Multi-Modal Multi-Domain Item Sequences
- Open Access
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4362-4373
Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed ''Joint Auction'', allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee (near-)dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform's revenue compared to the known baselines.
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4362-4373
Open AccessJoint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed ''Joint Auction'', allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee (near-)dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform's revenue compared to the known baselines.