Zhixuan Lai

Purpose: This study investigates three supply chain collaborative compliance strategies under the mandatory and voluntary carbon markets: carbon emission reduction technology collaborative (TC), certified emission reduction (CER) investment collaborative (IC) and a hybrid strategy. It examines their effects on supply chain operations and carbon emission reduction decisions to identify the optimal collaborative compliance strategy in integrated carbon market. Design/methodology/approach: We consider a supply chain consisting of a non-emission controlling supplier and an emission-controlling manufacturer. The model combines carbon emission allowance cap-and-trade and CER offset mechanism in integrated carbon market. Using game theory modeling, we derive optimal wholesale pricing, production quantity and emission reduction levels. We then compare the performance across non-collaborative, single and hybrid supply chain collaborative compliance strategies. Findings: Compared to the non-collaborative strategy, TC enhances manufacturer profit but may not benefit the supplier when collaborative costs are high; IC is less effective for supply chain members when CER prices are low. The supplier’s and manufacturer’s preferences for TC and IC mainly depend on the total investment cost of CER, the CER price and the market-clearing price. The hybrid strategy is preferred by the supplier when CER prices are high or TC costs are low and also preferred by the manufacturer under high CER prices always. Originality/value: This study aims to identify the optimal supply chain collaborative compliance strategy. The findings offer support for the production, carbon emission reduction decisions, as well as the design and optimization of the collaborative compliance contracts.

Purpose: Considering two types of subsidies for producers (supplier and manufacturer) and one for consumers based on product greenness and sales quantity, this study aims to formulate optimal supply chain green innovation and subsidy strategies, and to achieve this goal with the support of information systems.Design/methodology/approach: This study introduces a composite green-product supply chain where suppliers focus on green innovation for component greenness and manufacturers focus on green innovation for manufacturing process greenness. Game theory modeling is applied to investigate the differences of product greenness, supply chain members’ profit and social welfare under different government subsidy strategies.Findings: Increasing the unit greenness subsidy coefficient can boost product greenness and supply chain members’ profits, but does not always raise social welfare. When the government exclusively offers subsidies to producers, subsidies should be allocated to suppliers when there is a significant disparity in supply chain green innovation costs. Conversely, it is more beneficial to subsidize manufacturers. Consumer subsidies have the potential to enhance both environmental and economic performance in the supply chain compared with producer-exclusive subsidies, but may not always maximize social welfare when supply chain members have low unit costs associated with green innovation.Originality/value: This study examines the optimal decisions for green supply chain innovation and government subsidy strategies. Supply chain members and the government can use the information system to collect and evaluate the cost of upstream and downstream green innovation, and then develop reasonable collaborative green innovation and subsidy strategies.