ZKZiqiao Kong

Ziqiao Kong

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Ziqiao Kong has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Arash : Token-Efficient LLM-Assisted Crash Root Cause Analysis in Fuzz Driver Generation

    by Maoyi Xie, Kaixuan Li, Jingquan Ge, Wei Ma, Yuqiang Sun, Ziqiao Kong, Cen Zhang, Dongge Liu, Oliver Chang, Yang Liu

    Fuzz driver generation (FDG) has improved coverage and automation in modern fuzzing. Yet a persistent challenge remains: many crashes in generated drivers stem from incorrect API usage rather than genuine library defects. Consequently, root cause analysis (RCA) becomes essential for distinguishing true library bugs from driver-induced crashes. However, existing FDG systems lack dedicated RCA capabilities, whereas statistical RCA methods, representative of recent top-tier works (e.g., Aurora, Racing, and OptRCA), rely on simplifying assumptions, such as treating the first observable divergence as the true cause, which often fail to capture the underlying fault semantics in practice. In this article, we propose Arash , an RCA framework for fuzz driver crashes that couples semantic checking with token-efficient code slicing to enable precise and efficient analysis. Arash introduces two complementary components: (i) Fuzz Driver–Oriented Checker , which captures two dominant classes of API misuse in the fuzz driver, namely property- and extent-related crashes , and correlates these violations with crash traces and (ii) Parameter-Guided Code Slicing , which reduces token consumption and contextual noise by preserving only statements relevant to parameters involved in the crash. We implement and evaluate Arash across a diverse corpus of fuzz driver crashes. Arash achieves a recall rate of 85.3%, successfully analyzing cases that all other tools fail to handle, and outperforms the current state-of-the-art by 52.6% in diagnostic accuracy. Moreover, Arash is highly token efficient, achieving an average token reduction of 46.8% relative to a large language model (LLM) baseline that consumes windowed raw code context and 24.5% relative to a retrieval-augmented LLM baseline that retrieves full stack–frame functions. Integrated into OSS-Fuzz-Gen, so far 30 genuine library bugs identified by Arash have been confirmed by developers, including one assigned a CVE (CVE-2024-9143), demonstrating its substantial real-world impact in large-scale fuzzing workflows.


  • Open Access

    Belobog: Move Language Fuzzing Framework for Real-World Smart Contracts

    by Ziqiao Kong, Wanxu Xia, Zhengwei Li, Yi Lu, Pan Li, Liqun Yang, Yang Liu, Xiapu Luo, Shaohua Li

    Move is a resource-oriented programming language designed for secure and verifiable smart contract development and has been widely used in managing billions of digital assets in blockchains, such as Sui and Aptos.Move features a strong static type system and explicit resource semantics to enforce safety properties such as the prevention of data races, invalid asset transfers, and entry vulnerabilities. However, smart contracts written in Move may still contain certain vulnerabilities that are beyond the reach of its type system. It is thus essential to validate Move smart contracts. Unfortunately, due to its strong type system, existing smart contract fuzzers are ineffective in producing syntactically or semantically valid transactions to test Move smart contracts. This paper introduces the first fuzzing framework, Belobog, for Move smart contracts. Belobog is type-aware and ensures that all generated and mutated transactions are well-typed. More specifically, for a target Move smart contract, Belobog first constructs a dependency graph based on Move's type system, and then generates or mutates a transaction based on the graph trace derived from the dependency graph. In order to overcome the complex checks in Move smart contracts, we further design and implement a concolic executor in Belobog. We evaluated Belobog on 109 real-world Move smart contract projects. The experimental results show that Belobog is able to detect 100% critical and 79% major vulnerabilities manually audited by human experts. We further selected two recent notorious incidents in the Move ecosystem, i.e., Cetus and Nemo. Belobog successfully reproduced full exploits for both of them, without any prior knowledge. Moreover, we applied Belobog on three ongoing auditing projects and found 2 critical, 2 major, and 3 medium new vulnerabilities, all acknowledged by the project developers.

  • Open Access

    Reframing Paths as Logic: Semantic Segmentation for Vulnerability Detection

    by Zong Cao, Yuqiang Sun, Zhengzi Xu, Kaixuan Li, Yeqi Fu, Yiran Zhang, Ziqiao Kong, Yang Liu

    Path-sensitive vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free, integer overflows, and command injection, pose significant challenges for traditional static analysis tools, which often face trade-offs between precision, scalability, and interpretability. To address these challenges, we present SEVDF (Semantic-Enhanced Vulnerability Detection Framework), a novel methodology that integrates may-analysis taint propagation with large language models (LLMs) to detect path-related vulnerabilities in large C/C++ codebases. SEVDF begins by constructing a program dependency graph and performing a sound but incomplete taint analysis to extract all potential vulnerable paths. After segmentation, deduplication, feasibility check, and semantic summarization by LLMs, the vulnerable paths are reformed and confirmed with LLMs for their inter-procedural feasibility and semantic consistency. We evaluate SEVDF on the Juliet Test Suite (thirteen representative CWE categories) and a curated real-world dataset of 71 vulnerabilities across 9 projects. SEVDF consistently outperforms the default CodeQL rules, CodeQL rules with all unnecessary constraints removed, and three open-source detectors, which are Infer, Cppcheck and CodeChecker. SEVDF is able to achieve 100% precision on several CWEs while maintaining or improving recall on Juliet benchmark. Moreover, our segment-based design reduces the analysis workload for LLMs by 90.6% compared to direct-path prompting through Logic Unit deduplication, making SEVDF cost-effective for large-scale deployment. Finally, SEVDF uncovered and reported 29 0-day vulnerabilities (12 confirmed to date), including 3 CVEs in VirtualBox, demonstrating practical value.


  • Open Access

    Smart Contract Fuzzing Towards Profitable Vulnerabilities

    by Ziqiao Kong, Cen Zhang, Maoyi Xie, Ming Hu, Yue Xue, Ye Liu, Haijun Wang, Yang Liu

    Billions of dollars are transacted through smart contracts, making vulnerabilities a major financial risk. One focus in the security arms race is on profitable vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. Fuzzing is a key method for identifying these vulnerabilities. However, current solutions face two main limitations: 1. a lack of profit-centric techniques for expediting detection and, 2. insufficient automation in maximizing the profitability of discovered vulnerabilities, leaving the analysis to human experts. To address these gaps, we have developed VERITE, a profit-centric smart contract fuzzing framework that not only effectively detects those profitable vulnerabilities but also maximizes the exploited profits. VERITE has three key features: 1. DeFi action-based mutators for boosting the exploration of transactions with different fund flows; 2. potentially profitable candidates identification criteria, which checks whether the input has caused abnormal fund flow properties during testing; 3. a gradient descent-based profit maximization strategy for these identified candidates. VERITE is fully developed from scratch and evaluated on a dataset consisting of 61 exploited real-world DeFi projects with an average of over 1.1 million dollars loss. The results show that VERITE can automatically extract more than 18 million dollars in total and is significantly better than state-of-the-art fuzzer ItyFuzz in both detection (29/10) and exploitation (134 times more profits gained on average). Remarkably, in 12 targets, it gains more profits than real-world attacking exploits (1.01 to 11.45 times more). VERITE is also applied by auditors in contract auditing, where 6 (5 high severity) zero-day vulnerabilities are found with over $2,500 bounty rewards.


  • Open Access

    DeFort: Automatic Detection and Analysis of Price Manipulation Attacks in DeFi Applications

    by Maoyi Xie, Ming Hu, Ziqiao Kong, Cen Zhang, Yebo Feng, Haijun Wang, Yue Xue, Hao Zhang, Ye Liu, Yang Liu

    Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications facilitate tamper-proof transactions among multiple anonymous users, since attackers can access the smart contract bytecode directly, vulnerabilities in the transaction mechanism, contract code, or third-party components can be easily exploited to manipulate token prices, leading to financial losses. Since price manipulation often relies on specific states and complex trading sequences, existing detection tools have limitations in addressing this problem. In addition, to swiftly identify the root cause of an attack and implement targeted defense and remediation measures, auditors typically prioritize understanding the methodology behind the attack, emphasizing 'how' it occurred rather than simply confirming its existence. To address these problems, this paper presents a novel automatic price manipulation detection and analysis framework, named DeFort, which contains a price manipulation behavior model to guide on-chain detection, multiple price monitoring strategies to detect pools with abnormal token prices, and various profit calculation mechanisms to confirm attacks. Based on behavioral models, DeFort can automatically locate transactions and functions that cause abnormal price fluctuations and identify attackers and victims. Experimental results demonstrate that DeFort can outperform state-of-the-art price manipulation detection methods. Furthermore, after monitoring 441 real-world projects for two months, DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.