Baofu Han
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Baofu Han has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bing Li
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
4 shared publications - Hao Zhang
School of Microelectronics, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
3 shared publications - Raja Jurdak
Queensland University of Technology
3 shared publications - Chau Yuen
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications - Katinka Wolter
Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications - Pan Feng
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Vol. 22 (11) , 10483-10494
Exponential PDF Approximation for Continuous Analytical Solutions in Aircraft Standby Systems
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Vol. 22 (11) , 10483-10494
Exponential PDF Approximation for Continuous Analytical Solutions in Aircraft Standby Systems
- Open Access
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
- Vol. 4 (3) , 1-25
On Self-Designing Learned Indexes
Learned indexes show promising performance compared with traditional indexes. However, most existing learned index structures rely on fixed heuristics, which limit their robustness under dynamic workloads. In this paper, we present SELIX, a self-designing learned index that automatically generates and optimizes index structures tailored to different workloads. We introduce a unified index template that allows different nodes to adopt structural configurations, node layouts, conflict resolution policies, and search strategies for flexible and fine-grained structural composition. On top of this template, we formulate structural optimization as a learnable function that maps workload states to index configurations, enabling automated search for optimal structures in the vast design space. We train this function using a deep reinforcement learning paradigm enhanced with meta-learning, and propose a dedicated online update strategy, which together enable fast and stable structural adaptation under workload drift. Experimental results show that SELIX consistently outperforms state-of-the-art learned indexes (ALEX, LIPP, FITing-Tree, PGM, XIndex, and FINEdex) in both in-memory and on-disk settings, achieving significantly higher throughput across diverse and dynamic workloads.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
- Vol. 4 (3) , 1-25
Open AccessOn Self-Designing Learned Indexes
Learned indexes show promising performance compared with traditional indexes. However, most existing learned index structures rely on fixed heuristics, which limit their robustness under dynamic workloads. In this paper, we present SELIX, a self-designing learned index that automatically generates and optimizes index structures tailored to different workloads. We introduce a unified index template that allows different nodes to adopt structural configurations, node layouts, conflict resolution policies, and search strategies for flexible and fine-grained structural composition. On top of this template, we formulate structural optimization as a learnable function that maps workload states to index configurations, enabling automated search for optimal structures in the vast design space. We train this function using a deep reinforcement learning paradigm enhanced with meta-learning, and propose a dedicated online update strategy, which together enable fast and stable structural adaptation under workload drift. Experimental results show that SELIX consistently outperforms state-of-the-art learned indexes (ALEX, LIPP, FITing-Tree, PGM, XIndex, and FINEdex) in both in-memory and on-disk settings, achieving significantly higher throughput across diverse and dynamic workloads.
- 19 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (21) , 45567-45582
Repeated Game-Based Long-Term Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain-Enabled Reliable Federated Learning in IIoT
Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for privacy-preserving collaborative model training in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). By leveraging the decentralization, immutability, and transparency of blockchain technology, Blockchain-enabled FL (BFL) has gained significant attention for enhancing FL’s security and reliability. However, BFL still faces challenges in motivating client participation. While several incentive mechanisms have been proposed, most primarily focus on short-term rewards and overlook the long-term influence of individual contributions on global model performance. To address these challenges, we propose a novel BFL framework that integrates model training with blockchain mining on the client side. Specifically, we design a long-term incentive mechanism based on repeated game theory, where the interactions between participants and the task publisher (TP) are modeled as an infinitely repeated game. We formally prove the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, providing theoretical guarantees for stable long-term cooperation. Furthermore, we introduce a hybrid reward scheme that jointly considers contributions to both training and mining tasks, encouraging sustained engagement and attracting new participants. Extensive experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 validate that the proposed mechanism enhances the robustness of FL and effectively promotes long-term client participation.
- 19 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (21) , 45567-45582
Repeated Game-Based Long-Term Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain-Enabled Reliable Federated Learning in IIoT
Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for privacy-preserving collaborative model training in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). By leveraging the decentralization, immutability, and transparency of blockchain technology, Blockchain-enabled FL (BFL) has gained significant attention for enhancing FL’s security and reliability. However, BFL still faces challenges in motivating client participation. While several incentive mechanisms have been proposed, most primarily focus on short-term rewards and overlook the long-term influence of individual contributions on global model performance. To address these challenges, we propose a novel BFL framework that integrates model training with blockchain mining on the client side. Specifically, we design a long-term incentive mechanism based on repeated game theory, where the interactions between participants and the task publisher (TP) are modeled as an infinitely repeated game. We formally prove the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, providing theoretical guarantees for stable long-term cooperation. Furthermore, we introduce a hybrid reward scheme that jointly considers contributions to both training and mining tasks, encouraging sustained engagement and attracting new participants. Extensive experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 validate that the proposed mechanism enhances the robustness of FL and effectively promotes long-term client participation.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (10) , 14229-14243
PBFL: A Privacy-Preserving Blockchain-Based Federated Learning Framework With Homomorphic Encryption and Single Masking
Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for secure data sharing in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), enabling collaborative model training without direct exchange of raw data. However, recent studies have shown that FL still suffers from privacy vulnerabilities, where adversaries can reconstruct sensitive information by analyzing shared model parameters. Although several privacy-preserving FL (PPFL) schemes have been proposed to address these challenges, they primarily focus on protecting local model privacy, with limited attention to protecting global model confidentiality during aggregation. Additionally, their reliance on centralized aggregation servers introduces risks of single points of failure. To address these challenges, we propose a novel privacy-preserving blockchain-based FL framework (PBFL) that integrates blockchain, homomorphic encryption (HE), and a single masking. Specifically, PBFL employs HE to enable secure model training within the ciphertext domain, ensuring global model confidentiality. The single masking technique allows clients to apply unique random masks to their encrypted local model updates, enabling secure aggregation while preserving local privacy. Additionally, PBFL leverages blockchain for decentralized aggregation and encrypted model storage, effectively mitigating the risks associated with centralized servers. Experimental results demonstrate that PBFL achieves comparable model accuracy to state-of-the-art solutions while providing enhanced privacy protection. Furthermore, even with a client dropout rate of up to 30%, PBFL outperforms other blockchain-based PPFL methods in terms of computational and communication efficiency.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (10) , 14229-14243
Top Cited PapersPBFL: A Privacy-Preserving Blockchain-Based Federated Learning Framework With Homomorphic Encryption and Single Masking
Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for secure data sharing in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), enabling collaborative model training without direct exchange of raw data. However, recent studies have shown that FL still suffers from privacy vulnerabilities, where adversaries can reconstruct sensitive information by analyzing shared model parameters. Although several privacy-preserving FL (PPFL) schemes have been proposed to address these challenges, they primarily focus on protecting local model privacy, with limited attention to protecting global model confidentiality during aggregation. Additionally, their reliance on centralized aggregation servers introduces risks of single points of failure. To address these challenges, we propose a novel privacy-preserving blockchain-based FL framework (PBFL) that integrates blockchain, homomorphic encryption (HE), and a single masking. Specifically, PBFL employs HE to enable secure model training within the ciphertext domain, ensuring global model confidentiality. The single masking technique allows clients to apply unique random masks to their encrypted local model updates, enabling secure aggregation while preserving local privacy. Additionally, PBFL leverages blockchain for decentralized aggregation and encrypted model storage, effectively mitigating the risks associated with centralized servers. Experimental results demonstrate that PBFL achieves comparable model accuracy to state-of-the-art solutions while providing enhanced privacy protection. Furthermore, even with a client dropout rate of up to 30%, PBFL outperforms other blockchain-based PPFL methods in terms of computational and communication efficiency.
- Open Access
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 160267-160283
Dynamic Incentive Design for Federated Learning Based on Consortium Blockchain Using a Stackelberg Game
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a powerful privacy-preserving approach that enables multiple devices to collaboratively train a machine learning model without sharing raw data. To motivate client participation and protect against malicious threats such as poisoning attacks, it is necessary to design a fair trading platform with an incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based FL framework and design a dynamic incentive mechanism to establish a decentralized and transparent trading platform. A reputation mechanism is employed to assess the reliability of participants, and blockchain technology is utilized to ensure secure and tamper-proof management. Additionally, we design a dynamic incentive mechanism based on reputation and Stackelberg game theory, where the task publisher, acting as the leader, determines the total reward, and the participants, as followers, decide their level of engagement. Participants are selected and rewarded based on their reputations and bids, within a constrained budget. Experimental results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets demonstrate that our proposed framework effectively promotes high-quality participants to engage in the training task. It prevents malicious participants from disrupting the training process, maintaining the high accuracy across different scenarios, even with 50% malicious participants.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 160267-160283
Open AccessDynamic Incentive Design for Federated Learning Based on Consortium Blockchain Using a Stackelberg Game
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a powerful privacy-preserving approach that enables multiple devices to collaboratively train a machine learning model without sharing raw data. To motivate client participation and protect against malicious threats such as poisoning attacks, it is necessary to design a fair trading platform with an incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based FL framework and design a dynamic incentive mechanism to establish a decentralized and transparent trading platform. A reputation mechanism is employed to assess the reliability of participants, and blockchain technology is utilized to ensure secure and tamper-proof management. Additionally, we design a dynamic incentive mechanism based on reputation and Stackelberg game theory, where the task publisher, acting as the leader, determines the total reward, and the participants, as followers, decide their level of engagement. Participants are selected and rewarded based on their reputations and bids, within a constrained budget. Experimental results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets demonstrate that our proposed framework effectively promotes high-quality participants to engage in the training task. It prevents malicious participants from disrupting the training process, maintaining the high accuracy across different scenarios, even with 50% malicious participants.
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Computers and Electrical Engineering
- Vol. 120
Trustworthy fog: A reputation-based consensus method for IoT with blockchain and fog computing
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Computers and Electrical Engineering
- Vol. 120
Trustworthy fog: A reputation-based consensus method for IoT with blockchain and fog computing