Pierre-Olivier Weill
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Pierre-Olivier Weill has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrea L. Eisfeldt
UCLA Anderson School of Management and NBER, Los Angeles, USA
1 shared publication - Andrew Atkeson
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
1 shared publication Assa Cohen
1 shared publicationBenjamin Lester
1 shared publication- Benjamin Lester
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
1 shared publication Federal Reserve Bank Of Richmond
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Financial Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 161-184
The Evolution of the Corporate Bond Market: A Theoretical Analysis
We develop a model of a dealer-intermediated over-the-counter market designed to study three major changes in the structure of the US corporate bond market: the increase in dealers’ balance sheet costs, the emergence of electronic trading platforms, and the growing presence of bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. Our model provides a unified analysis of these changes, clarifies the economic channels at play, and allows us to quantify their effects on a variety of market outcomes. Our quantitative analysis suggests that while electronic trading significantly reduced the cost of raising capital in the corporate bond market, these gains were almost completely offset by the combined effects of balance sheet costs and changes in the demand for liquidity. We find that electronic trading also caused a meaningful decline in the bid-ask spread, whereas other changes in the market structure had little effect on transaction costs.
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Financial Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 161-184
Open AccessThe Evolution of the Corporate Bond Market: A Theoretical Analysis
We develop a model of a dealer-intermediated over-the-counter market designed to study three major changes in the structure of the US corporate bond market: the increase in dealers’ balance sheet costs, the emergence of electronic trading platforms, and the growing presence of bond mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. Our model provides a unified analysis of these changes, clarifies the economic channels at play, and allows us to quantify their effects on a variety of market outcomes. Our quantitative analysis suggests that while electronic trading significantly reduced the cost of raising capital in the corporate bond market, these gains were almost completely offset by the combined effects of balance sheet costs and changes in the demand for liquidity. We find that electronic trading also caused a meaningful decline in the bid-ask spread, whereas other changes in the market structure had little effect on transaction costs.
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 222
Inventory, market making, and liquidity in OTC markets
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 222
Inventory, market making, and liquidity in OTC markets
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers
- Vol. 17 (6) , 1-67
A Tractable Model of Monetary Exchange with Ex-Post Heterogeneity
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers
- Vol. 17 (6) , 1-67
A Tractable Model of Monetary Exchange with Ex-Post Heterogeneity
- Open Access
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
The Market for OTC Derivatives
The Market for OTC Derivatives
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Open AccessThe Market for OTC Derivatives
The Market for OTC Derivatives
- 23 September 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 43 (s2) , 261-282
Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets
On November 14–15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a conference on “Liquidity in frictional asset markets.” In this paper, we review the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both finance and monetary theory using a simple search‐theoretic model, and we discuss the papers presented at the conference in the context of this literature. We will show the diversity of topics covered in this literature, for example, the dynamics of housing and credit markets, the functioning of payment systems, optimal monetary policy and the cost of inflation, the role of banks, the effect of informational frictions on asset trading.
- 23 September 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 43 (s2) , 261-282
Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets
On November 14–15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a conference on “Liquidity in frictional asset markets.” In this paper, we review the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both finance and monetary theory using a simple search‐theoretic model, and we discuss the papers presented at the conference in the context of this literature. We will show the diversity of topics covered in this literature, for example, the dynamics of housing and credit markets, the functioning of payment systems, optimal monetary policy and the cost of inflation, the role of banks, the effect of informational frictions on asset trading.
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 15 (S1) , 119-144
LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED MARKETS
We study a competitive dynamic financial market subject to a transient selling pressure when market makers face a capacity constraint on their number of trades per unit of time with outside investors. We show that profit-maximizing market makers provide liquidity in order to manage their trading capacity constraint optimally over time: they use slack trading capacity early to accumulate assets when the selling pressure is strong in order to relax their trading capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when the selling pressure subsides. When the trading capacity constraint binds, the bid–ask spread is strictly positive, widening and narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories. Because the equilibrium asset allocation is constrained Pareto-optimal, the time variations in bid–ask spread are not a symptom of inefficient liquidity provision.
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 15 (S1) , 119-144
LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED MARKETS
We study a competitive dynamic financial market subject to a transient selling pressure when market makers face a capacity constraint on their number of trades per unit of time with outside investors. We show that profit-maximizing market makers provide liquidity in order to manage their trading capacity constraint optimally over time: they use slack trading capacity early to accumulate assets when the selling pressure is strong in order to relax their trading capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when the selling pressure subsides. When the trading capacity constraint binds, the bid–ask spread is strictly positive, widening and narrowing as market makers build up and unwind their inventories. Because the equilibrium asset allocation is constrained Pareto-optimal, the time variations in bid–ask spread are not a symptom of inefficient liquidity provision.