DTDavid Tao

David Tao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

David Tao has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    CASCADE: LLM-powered JavaScript Deobfuscator at Google

    by Shan Jiang, Pranoy Kovuri, David Tao, Zhixun Tan

    Software obfuscation, particularly prevalent in JavaScript, hinders code comprehension and analysis, posing significant challenges to software testing, static analysis, and malware detection. This paper introduces CASCADE, a novel hybrid approach that integrates the advanced coding capabilities of Gemini with the deterministic transformation capabilities of a compiler Intermediate Representation (IR), specifically JavaScript IR (JSIR). By employing Gemini to identify critical prelude functions—the foundational components underlying the most prevalent obfuscation techniques—and leveraging JSIR for subsequent code transformations, CASCADE effectively recovers semantic elements like original strings and API names, and reveals original program behaviors. This method overcomes limitations of existing static and dynamic deobfuscation techniques, eliminating hundreds to thousands of hard-coded rules while achieving reliability and flexibility. CASCADE is already deployed in Google’s production environment, demonstrating substantial improvements in JavaScript deobfuscation efficiency and reducing reverse engineering efforts.


  • Open Access

    Give and Take: An End-To-End Investigation of Giveaway Scam Conversion Rates

    by Enze Liu, George Kappos, Eric Mugnier, Luca Invernizzi, Stefan Savage, David Tao, Kurt Thomas, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Sarah Meiklejohn

    The Internet's combination of low communication cost, global reach, and functional anonymity has allowed fraudulent scam volumes to reach new heights. Designing effective interventions requires first understanding the context: how scammers reach potential victims, the earnings they make, and any potential bottlenecks for durable interventions. In this short paper, we focus on these questions in the context of cryptocurrency giveaway scams, where victims are tricked into irreversibly transferring funds to scammers under the pretense of even greater returns. Combining data from Twitter (also known as X), YouTube and Twitch livestreams, landing pages, and cryptocurrency blockchains, we measure how giveaway scams operate at scale. We find that 1 in 1000 scam tweets, and 4 in 100,000 livestream views, net a victim, and that scammers managed to extract nearly $4.62 million from just hundreds of victims during our measurement window.