Changqing An
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Changqing An has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jilong Wang
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Shuying Zhuang
Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Baojun Liu
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Deliang Chang
QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Fasheng Miao
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Jia Zhang
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1062-1063
$Poster:$ RMap: Uncovering Risky DNS Resolution Chains and Misconfigurations
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1062-1063
Open Access$Poster:$ RMap: Uncovering Risky DNS Resolution Chains and Misconfigurations
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 199-213
Rumors Stop with the Wise: Unveiling Inbound SAV Deployment through Spoofed ICMP Messages
In the era of increasing network-based threats, particularly IP spoofing, Source Address Validation (SAV) is paramount for network security. The effective deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation (ISAV) is crucial yet often inadequate, posing significant risks to Internet infrastructure. This study presents ICMP_Sonar, a measurement system that deploys "rumors" -carefully crafted spoofed ICMP packets-to probe the network's defenses, revealing the "wise" networks with their robust ISAV implementations. ICMP_Sonar introduces two novel approaches that exploit the characteristics of ICMP unreachable messages and ICMP fragment needed messages, and exhibits the advantages of high coverage, fine granularity, low error rates, and the ability to measure in both IPv4 and IPv6. We also evaluate the applicability and security risks of ICMP error messages. Through large-scale measurements, ICMP_Sonar successfully covers 86M IPv4 hosts (0.8M IPv6 hosts), 3.5M IPv4 /24 subnets (24K IPv6 /40 subnets), and 59K IPv4 ASes (8.3K IPv6 ASes), surpassing the state-of-the-art dual-stack method's coverage by 16.2 (51.6), 2.9 (2.34), and 1.7 (1.7) times, respectively. The broad coverage across multiple granularities enables us to capture a more comprehensive and fine-grained view of ISAV deployment. Measurements show that while the percentage of ASes with no ISAV deployment is lower than previously identified, the percentage of ASes with partial ISAV deployment is much higher, indicating significant gaps in overall security. The analysis also reveals that ISAV deployment practices vary across different networks and between IPv4 and IPv6.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 199-213
Open AccessRumors Stop with the Wise: Unveiling Inbound SAV Deployment through Spoofed ICMP Messages
In the era of increasing network-based threats, particularly IP spoofing, Source Address Validation (SAV) is paramount for network security. The effective deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation (ISAV) is crucial yet often inadequate, posing significant risks to Internet infrastructure. This study presents ICMP_Sonar, a measurement system that deploys "rumors" -carefully crafted spoofed ICMP packets-to probe the network's defenses, revealing the "wise" networks with their robust ISAV implementations. ICMP_Sonar introduces two novel approaches that exploit the characteristics of ICMP unreachable messages and ICMP fragment needed messages, and exhibits the advantages of high coverage, fine granularity, low error rates, and the ability to measure in both IPv4 and IPv6. We also evaluate the applicability and security risks of ICMP error messages. Through large-scale measurements, ICMP_Sonar successfully covers 86M IPv4 hosts (0.8M IPv6 hosts), 3.5M IPv4 /24 subnets (24K IPv6 /40 subnets), and 59K IPv4 ASes (8.3K IPv6 ASes), surpassing the state-of-the-art dual-stack method's coverage by 16.2 (51.6), 2.9 (2.34), and 1.7 (1.7) times, respectively. The broad coverage across multiple granularities enables us to capture a more comprehensive and fine-grained view of ISAV deployment. Measurements show that while the percentage of ASes with no ISAV deployment is lower than previously identified, the percentage of ASes with partial ISAV deployment is much higher, indicating significant gaps in overall security. The analysis also reveals that ISAV deployment practices vary across different networks and between IPv4 and IPv6.