Yu Jeffrey Hu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Yu Jeffrey Hu has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cheng He
Wisconsin School of Business University of Wisconsin-Madison 53706 Madison Wisconsin
1 shared publication - Duncan Simester
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
1 shared publication - Eric T. Anderson
Anderson: Hartmarx Research Associate Professor of Marketing, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone 1‐847‐467‐6482, Fax 847‐491‐2498
1 shared publication - Erik Brynjolfsson
Stanford University, Digital Economy Lab, Stanford, California, United States
1 shared publication - Ines Wilms
Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University
1 shared publication Jeroen Rombouts
Maastricht University Purdue University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
MLOps Monitoring at Scale for Digital Platforms
Machine learning models are widely recognized for their strong performance in forecasting. To keep that performance in streaming data settings, they have to be monitored and frequently re-trained. This can be done with machine learning operations (MLOps) techniques under supervision of an MLOps engineer. However, in digital platform settings where the number of data streams is typically large and unstable, standard monitoring becomes either suboptimal or too labor intensive for the MLOps engineer. As a consequence, companies often fall back on very simple worse performing ML models without monitoring. We solve this problem by adopting a design science approach and introducing a new monitoring framework, the Machine Learning Monitoring Agent (MLMA), that is designed to work at scale for any ML model with reasonable labor cost. A key feature of our framework concerns test-based automated re-training based on a data-adaptive reference loss batch. The MLOps engineer is kept in the loop via key metrics and also acts, pro-actively or retrospectively, to maintain performance of the ML model in the production stage. We conduct a large-scale test at a last-mile delivery platform to empirically validate our monitoring framework.
Open AccessMLOps Monitoring at Scale for Digital Platforms
Machine learning models are widely recognized for their strong performance in forecasting. To keep that performance in streaming data settings, they have to be monitored and frequently re-trained. This can be done with machine learning operations (MLOps) techniques under supervision of an MLOps engineer. However, in digital platform settings where the number of data streams is typically large and unstable, standard monitoring becomes either suboptimal or too labor intensive for the MLOps engineer. As a consequence, companies often fall back on very simple worse performing ML models without monitoring. We solve this problem by adopting a design science approach and introducing a new monitoring framework, the Machine Learning Monitoring Agent (MLMA), that is designed to work at scale for any ML model with reasonable labor cost. A key feature of our framework concerns test-based automated re-training based on a data-adaptive reference loss batch. The MLOps engineer is kept in the loop via key metrics and also acts, pro-actively or retrospectively, to maintain performance of the ML model in the production stage. We conduct a large-scale test at a last-mile delivery platform to empirically validate our monitoring framework.
- Open Access
The Effect of Product Recommendations on Online Investor Behaviors
Despite the popularity of product recommendations on online investment platforms, few studies have explored their impact on investor behaviors. Using data from a global e-commerce platform, we apply regression discontinuity design to causally examine the effects of product recommendations on online investors' mutual fund investments. Our findings indicate that recommended funds experience a significant rise in purchases, especially among low socioeconomic status investors who are most influenced by these recommendations. However, investors tend to suffer significantly worse investment returns after purchasing recommended funds, and this negative impact is also most significant for investors with low socioeconomic status. To explain this disparity, we find investors tend to gather less information and expend reduced effort in fund research when buying recommended funds. Furthermore, investors' redemption timing of recommended funds is less optimal than non-recommended funds. We also find that recommended funds experience a larger return reversal than non-recommended funds. In conclusion, product recommendations make investors behave more irrationally and these negative consequences are most significant for investors with low socioeconomic status, which can amplify wealth inequality among investors in financial markets.
Open AccessThe Effect of Product Recommendations on Online Investor Behaviors
Despite the popularity of product recommendations on online investment platforms, few studies have explored their impact on investor behaviors. Using data from a global e-commerce platform, we apply regression discontinuity design to causally examine the effects of product recommendations on online investors' mutual fund investments. Our findings indicate that recommended funds experience a significant rise in purchases, especially among low socioeconomic status investors who are most influenced by these recommendations. However, investors tend to suffer significantly worse investment returns after purchasing recommended funds, and this negative impact is also most significant for investors with low socioeconomic status. To explain this disparity, we find investors tend to gather less information and expend reduced effort in fund research when buying recommended funds. Furthermore, investors' redemption timing of recommended funds is less optimal than non-recommended funds. We also find that recommended funds experience a larger return reversal than non-recommended funds. In conclusion, product recommendations make investors behave more irrationally and these negative consequences are most significant for investors with low socioeconomic status, which can amplify wealth inequality among investors in financial markets.
- 20 July 2009
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 47 (3) , 482-499
DYNAMICS OF RETAIL ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT
We use a controlled field experiment to investigate the dynamic effects of retail advertising. The experimental design overcomes limitations hindering previous investigations of this issue. Our study uncovers dynamic advertising effects that have not been considered in previous literature. We find that current advertising does affect future sales, but surprisingly, the effect is not always positive; for the firm’s best customers, the long‐run outcome may be negative. This finding reflects two competing effects: brand switching and intertemporal substitution. We also find evidence of cross‐channel substitution, with the firm’s best customers switching demand to the ordering channel that corresponds to the advertising. (JEL L2, L81, M3)
- 20 July 2009
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 47 (3) , 482-499
DYNAMICS OF RETAIL ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT
We use a controlled field experiment to investigate the dynamic effects of retail advertising. The experimental design overcomes limitations hindering previous investigations of this issue. Our study uncovers dynamic advertising effects that have not been considered in previous literature. We find that current advertising does affect future sales, but surprisingly, the effect is not always positive; for the firm’s best customers, the long‐run outcome may be negative. This finding reflects two competing effects: brand switching and intertemporal substitution. We also find evidence of cross‐channel substitution, with the firm’s best customers switching demand to the ordering channel that corresponds to the advertising. (JEL L2, L81, M3)