Sangwook Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sangwook Lee has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Changyul Lee
The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA
1 shared publication - Deokjin Kim
The Affiliated Institute of ETRI, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Dongkyun Yang
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam National University (CNU), Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, South Korea
1 shared publication - Giyeol Kim
The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA
1 shared publication - Jinsoo Jang
Chungnam National University, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Seyoung Baik
The Affiliated Institute of Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Daejeon, South Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 216190-216206
Harnessing Debug Facilities for Lightweight Monitoring of Memory Access Violations on Aerial Drones
Memory attacks pose a significant security threat in embedded systems, particularly in RTOS-based platforms such as PX4, where flat build options lack sufficient isolation between memory regions. In other words, the absence of memory isolation allows an attacker with arbitrary memory access capabilities to compromise the entire system. Although prior work has proposed memory isolation techniques using hardware features such as ARM TrustZone and the memory protection unit (MPU), these components are often unavailable on legacy devices and typically require substantial modifications to the software stack (e.g., OS and firmware)—even when only lightweight memory monitoring (e.g., detection of arbitrary function pointer manipulation), rather than strict isolation, is needed. To expand the range of available defensive measures, this paper presents a lightweight memory monitoring mechanism that leverages the watchpoint feature provided by the ARMv7-M architecture. By configuring watchpoint monitoring for critical memory objects, we can track all accesses to the protected region. Additionally, by maintaining a whitelist of allowed addresses for accessing the monitored region, we can effectively detect abnormal accesses. The proposed memory monitoring mechanism was implemented on the NuttX RTOS-based PX4 platform and validated through various static and dynamic memory monitoring scenarios. Performance evaluation results demonstrate that the approach introduces minimal overhead while ensuring stable drone flight.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 216190-216206
Open AccessHarnessing Debug Facilities for Lightweight Monitoring of Memory Access Violations on Aerial Drones
Memory attacks pose a significant security threat in embedded systems, particularly in RTOS-based platforms such as PX4, where flat build options lack sufficient isolation between memory regions. In other words, the absence of memory isolation allows an attacker with arbitrary memory access capabilities to compromise the entire system. Although prior work has proposed memory isolation techniques using hardware features such as ARM TrustZone and the memory protection unit (MPU), these components are often unavailable on legacy devices and typically require substantial modifications to the software stack (e.g., OS and firmware)—even when only lightweight memory monitoring (e.g., detection of arbitrary function pointer manipulation), rather than strict isolation, is needed. To expand the range of available defensive measures, this paper presents a lightweight memory monitoring mechanism that leverages the watchpoint feature provided by the ARMv7-M architecture. By configuring watchpoint monitoring for critical memory objects, we can track all accesses to the protected region. Additionally, by maintaining a whitelist of allowed addresses for accessing the monitored region, we can effectively detect abnormal accesses. The proposed memory monitoring mechanism was implemented on the NuttX RTOS-based PX4 platform and validated through various static and dynamic memory monitoring scenarios. Performance evaluation results demonstrate that the approach introduces minimal overhead while ensuring stable drone flight.
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 450-463
LTA: Control-Driven UAV Testing and Bug Localization with Flight Record Decomposition
As UAVs have been widely used in various domains, such as the military and industry, their safety and security have become crucial. One of their root causes is software bugs, which fall into two bug categories: traditional software bugs, such as memory safety bugs, and UAV-specific logical model-misimplementation (LMM) bugs leading to physical misbehavior, such as crashes. To discover and localize bugs, many proactive and reactive techniques have been proposed. However, LMM bug mitigation techniques are still immature, unlike well-established techniques for traditional software bugs, because existing approaches are unable to track the causal relationship between the LMM bug root cause in software and its resulting physical misbehavior. Specifically, existing proactive approaches require extensive, time-consuming dynamic testing to capture the physical impacts of LMM bug exploitation amidst a vast input space. Conversely, previous reactive approaches are inaccurate because existing work cannot accurately identify the causal relationship between misbehavior and bug-triggering inputs mixed with benign but suspicious inputs. To address the aforementioned problems, we propose LTA, the replay-based proactive LMM bug localization technique for UAVs. This technique encompasses three key strategies: (i) an accident playback-based input generation to narrow down bug-triggering input candidates, (ii) an input and trace decomposition to exclude false-positive bug-triggering inputs, and (iii) a causal analysis to precisely backtrack from bug-triggering inputs to their root causes. We evaluate LTA on PX4 with three models for quadcopters, hexacopters, and VTOL UAVs. As a result, LTA found 72 real accident cases (caused by LMM bugs) obtained from public accident logs and then localized bugs with 100% accuracy.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 450-463
Open AccessLTA: Control-Driven UAV Testing and Bug Localization with Flight Record Decomposition
As UAVs have been widely used in various domains, such as the military and industry, their safety and security have become crucial. One of their root causes is software bugs, which fall into two bug categories: traditional software bugs, such as memory safety bugs, and UAV-specific logical model-misimplementation (LMM) bugs leading to physical misbehavior, such as crashes. To discover and localize bugs, many proactive and reactive techniques have been proposed. However, LMM bug mitigation techniques are still immature, unlike well-established techniques for traditional software bugs, because existing approaches are unable to track the causal relationship between the LMM bug root cause in software and its resulting physical misbehavior. Specifically, existing proactive approaches require extensive, time-consuming dynamic testing to capture the physical impacts of LMM bug exploitation amidst a vast input space. Conversely, previous reactive approaches are inaccurate because existing work cannot accurately identify the causal relationship between misbehavior and bug-triggering inputs mixed with benign but suspicious inputs. To address the aforementioned problems, we propose LTA, the replay-based proactive LMM bug localization technique for UAVs. This technique encompasses three key strategies: (i) an accident playback-based input generation to narrow down bug-triggering input candidates, (ii) an input and trace decomposition to exclude false-positive bug-triggering inputs, and (iii) a causal analysis to precisely backtrack from bug-triggering inputs to their root causes. We evaluate LTA on PX4 with three models for quadcopters, hexacopters, and VTOL UAVs. As a result, LTA found 72 real accident cases (caused by LMM bugs) obtained from public accident logs and then localized bugs with 100% accuracy.