Barry Herman
Barry Herman has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- José Antonio Ocampo
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, USA
1 shared publication Shari Spiegel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 5 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Development
- Vol. 67 (3-4) , 178-186
Comprehensive, Fair and Speedy Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises through New Law in Capital-market Countries
- 5 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Development
- Vol. 67 (3-4) , 178-186
Comprehensive, Fair and Speedy Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises through New Law in Capital-market Countries
- 18 February 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 489-496
Conclusion
In this chapter, the editors conclude the book by recognizing that the burden of this book is to demonstrate that an important piece of the international financial architecture is missing and that its absence has been felt in protracted and economically painful workouts from sovereign insolvencies. As the sovereign debt workout processes are political at their core, they tend to benefit the powerful at the expense of the powerless. The editors also emphasize that principles for effective and fair bankruptcy systems for private entities if applied to the sovereign case could better balance the costs and pains of government insolvencies, except that the very nature of sovereignty precludes their direct application. But while there is no global government to enforce any sovereign bankruptcy law, there are various ways that governments can cooperatively formulate and operate a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The concluding chapter of this book suggests two modalities by which such a system might operate.
- 18 February 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 489-496
Conclusion
In this chapter, the editors conclude the book by recognizing that the burden of this book is to demonstrate that an important piece of the international financial architecture is missing and that its absence has been felt in protracted and economically painful workouts from sovereign insolvencies. As the sovereign debt workout processes are political at their core, they tend to benefit the powerful at the expense of the powerless. The editors also emphasize that principles for effective and fair bankruptcy systems for private entities if applied to the sovereign case could better balance the costs and pains of government insolvencies, except that the very nature of sovereignty precludes their direct application. But while there is no global government to enforce any sovereign bankruptcy law, there are various ways that governments can cooperatively formulate and operate a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The concluding chapter of this book suggests two modalities by which such a system might operate.