Silvia Lorenzini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Silvia Lorenzini has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Davide Petturiti
Department of Economics, University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy
5 shared publications - Barbara Vantaggi
Department of MEMOTEF, “La Sapienza” University of Rome, Rome, Italy
4 shared publications - Andrea Cinfrignini
University of Perugia
2 shared publications - Michel Grabisch
Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne
2 shared publications - Matteo Brunelli
University of Trento
1 shared publication Michel Grabisch
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Pairwise comparisons meet optimal transport theory
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Open AccessPairwise comparisons meet optimal transport theory
- Open Access
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Global Optimization
- Vol. 96 (1) , 259-296
Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria under ambiguity and $\alpha $-maxmin preferencesA Kantorovich-like optimal transport problem is formulated by seeking to minimize the Choquet integral of a given cost function with respect to the $$\alpha $$ -mixture of joint belief functions with given marginals, and their dual plausibility functions. This extension of the classical probabilistic problem allows to deal with misspecified marginal distributions by relying on a parameter $$\alpha \in [0,1]$$ that acts like a pessimism index. We show that the particular subcase given by a marginal belief function and a marginal probability measure can be used to model a game under ambiguity, through the definition of the Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibrium with Dempster-Shafer uncertainty and $$\alpha $$ -maxmin preferences. An algorithm is provided for approximating an equilibrium based on a suitable entropic formulation of the defined optimal transport problem. Finally, a distinguished application is found in a market with a finite set of types of investors having misspecified distribution. Investors’ choices result in a purchase portfolio on a finite set of assets which, in turn, depends on asset prices fixed by the market maker and the interactions among investors.- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Global Optimization
- Vol. 96 (1) , 259-296
Open AccessStackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria under ambiguity and $\alpha $-maxmin preferencesA Kantorovich-like optimal transport problem is formulated by seeking to minimize the Choquet integral of a given cost function with respect to the $$\alpha $$ -mixture of joint belief functions with given marginals, and their dual plausibility functions. This extension of the classical probabilistic problem allows to deal with misspecified marginal distributions by relying on a parameter $$\alpha \in [0,1]$$ that acts like a pessimism index. We show that the particular subcase given by a marginal belief function and a marginal probability measure can be used to model a game under ambiguity, through the definition of the Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibrium with Dempster-Shafer uncertainty and $$\alpha $$ -maxmin preferences. An algorithm is provided for approximating an equilibrium based on a suitable entropic formulation of the defined optimal transport problem. Finally, a distinguished application is found in a market with a finite set of types of investors having misspecified distribution. Investors’ choices result in a purchase portfolio on a finite set of assets which, in turn, depends on asset prices fixed by the market maker and the interactions among investors. - 11 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-75
Enforcing Sparsity of Imprecise Transport Plans in Dempster-Shafer Optimal Transport
- 11 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-75
Enforcing Sparsity of Imprecise Transport Plans in Dempster-Shafer Optimal Transport
- Open Access
Properties of the core and other solution concepts of Bel coalitional games in the ex-ante scenario
We study the properties of the core and other solution concepts of Bel coalitional games, that generalize classical coalitional games by introducing uncertainty in the framework. In this uncertain environment, we work with contracts, that specify how agents divide the values of the coalitions in the different states of the world. Every agent can have different a priori knowledge on the true state of the world, which is modeled through the Dempster-Shafer theory, while agents' preferences between contracts are modeled by the Choquet integral. We focus on the "ex-ante" scenario, when the contract is evaluated before uncertainty is resolved. We investigate the geometrical structure of the ex-ante core when agents have the same a priori knowledge which is a probability distribution. Finally, we define the (pre)nucleolus, the kernel and the bargaining set (a la Mas-Colell) in the ex-ante situation and we study their properties. It is found that the inclusion relations among these solution concepts are the same as in the classical case. Coincidence of the ex-ante core and the ex-ante bargaining set holds for convex Bel coalitional games, at the price of strengthening the definition of bargaining sets.
Open AccessProperties of the core and other solution concepts of Bel coalitional games in the ex-ante scenario
We study the properties of the core and other solution concepts of Bel coalitional games, that generalize classical coalitional games by introducing uncertainty in the framework. In this uncertain environment, we work with contracts, that specify how agents divide the values of the coalitions in the different states of the world. Every agent can have different a priori knowledge on the true state of the world, which is modeled through the Dempster-Shafer theory, while agents' preferences between contracts are modeled by the Choquet integral. We focus on the "ex-ante" scenario, when the contract is evaluated before uncertainty is resolved. We investigate the geometrical structure of the ex-ante core when agents have the same a priori knowledge which is a probability distribution. Finally, we define the (pre)nucleolus, the kernel and the bargaining set (a la Mas-Colell) in the ex-ante situation and we study their properties. It is found that the inclusion relations among these solution concepts are the same as in the classical case. Coincidence of the ex-ante core and the ex-ante bargaining set holds for convex Bel coalitional games, at the price of strengthening the definition of bargaining sets.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 187
A two-player newsvendor game with competition on demand under ambiguity
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 187
Open AccessA two-player newsvendor game with competition on demand under ambiguity
- Open Access
- 9 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 184
Bel coalitional games with application to market games
- 9 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 184
Open AccessBel coalitional games with application to market games
- Open Access
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Fuzzy Sets and Systems
- Vol. 515
Choquet-Wasserstein pseudo-distances via optimal transport under partially specified marginal probabilities
- 25 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Fuzzy Sets and Systems
- Vol. 515
Open AccessChoquet-Wasserstein pseudo-distances via optimal transport under partially specified marginal probabilities
- 13 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-217
Optimal Transport in Dempster-Shafer Theory and Choquet-Wasserstein Pseudo-Distances
- 13 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-217
Optimal Transport in Dempster-Shafer Theory and Choquet-Wasserstein Pseudo-Distances
- 12 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 186-200
Bel Coalitional Games