Henrique Kawakami
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Henrique Kawakami has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ricardo Dahab
UNICAMP
2 shared publications Roberto Gallo
IC-UNICAMP, KRYPTUS
2 shared publications- Abhishek Chakraborty
IIT Kharagpur
1 shared publication - Chen Liu
Intel Corp., Hillsboro, OR, United States
1 shared publication Glauber Junqueira
SIDI
1 shared publication- Igor Chervatyuk
Intel Corp., Dublin, Ireland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Uncovering Software-Based Power Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M1/M2 Systems
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip power meter capabilities exposed to a software interface might be used for power side-channel attacks without physical access. In this paper, we show that such software-based power side-channel attack is also applicable on Apple silicon (e.g., M1/M2 platforms), exploiting the System Management Controller (SMC) and its power-related keys, which provides access to the on-chip power meters through a software interface to user space software. We observed data-dependent power consumption reporting from such SMC keys and analyzed the correlations between the power consumption and the processed data. Our work also demonstrated how an unprivileged user mode application successfully recovers bytes from an AES encryption key from a cryptographic service supported by a kernel mode driver in MacOS. We have also studied the feasibility of performing frequency throttling side-channel attack on Apple silicon. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of software-based power side-channels in the industry, possible countermeasures, and the overall implications of software interfaces for modern on-chip power management systems.
- 23 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessUncovering Software-Based Power Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M1/M2 Systems
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip power meter capabilities exposed to a software interface might be used for power side-channel attacks without physical access. In this paper, we show that such software-based power side-channel attack is also applicable on Apple silicon (e.g., M1/M2 platforms), exploiting the System Management Controller (SMC) and its power-related keys, which provides access to the on-chip power meters through a software interface to user space software. We observed data-dependent power consumption reporting from such SMC keys and analyzed the correlations between the power consumption and the processed data. Our work also demonstrated how an unprivileged user mode application successfully recovers bytes from an AES encryption key from a cryptographic service supported by a kernel mode driver in MacOS. We have also studied the feasibility of performing frequency throttling side-channel attack on Apple silicon. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of software-based power side-channels in the industry, possible countermeasures, and the overall implications of software interfaces for modern on-chip power management systems.
- Open Access
- 22 June 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Security and system architecture: comparison of Android customizations
- 22 June 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessSecurity and system architecture: comparison of Android customizations
- 1 July 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 2324898X,p. 1645-1651
Case Study: On the Security of Key Storage on PCs
In this work we review the security of the industry standard, software-based, cryptographic services providers Mozilla NSS Softoken and Microsoft CAPI CSPs. We also provide practical measurements of the user experienced security level. We found that this security level is much lower than expected and some service providers should be avoided.
- 1 July 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 2324898X,p. 1645-1651
Case Study: On the Security of Key Storage on PCs
In this work we review the security of the industry standard, software-based, cryptographic services providers Mozilla NSS Softoken and Microsoft CAPI CSPs. We also provide practical measurements of the user experienced security level. We found that this security level is much lower than expected and some service providers should be avoided.