MHMiriam Saldaña Hernández

Miriam Saldaña Hernández

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Miriam Saldaña Hernández has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Sesgo en contrataciones: Estudio de viñetas sobre color de piel y género

    by Miriam Saldaña Hernández, José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Alejandro Tatsuo Moreno Okuno

    This paper examines gender and skin-color biases in simulated hiring decisions among Mexican university students. Using a vignette study with 12 fictitious CVs (identical in skills but varying by gender/race), we test for discrimination in candidate selection and wage assignments for managerial, accounting, and cleaning roles. Results from chi-square tests and regression analysis reveal: (1) darker-skinned candidates are less likely to be selected for high-status roles (finance/accounting); (2) women and dark-skinned candidates receive significantly lower salary offers. Our findings highlight how stereotypes persist among future decision-makers, with implications for labor market inequalities.

  • Capítulo 3: A survey of political corruption in Mexico: economic and political consequences

    by Universidad de Guanajuato, José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Miriam Saldaña Hernández, David Vázquez Guzmán, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, Ana Luz Ramos Soto, Universidad Autónoma “Benito Juárez” de Oaxaca

    Using a systematic literature review approach, the aim of this chapter is to identify and describe the economic and political consequences of political corruption and accountability in Mexico in the last two decades. Though corruption is usually associated with underdeveloped countries in general, the Mexican case presents particular characteristics that are worth studying separately. Moreover, we identify in strict economic literature the determinants of the relationship between political systems and political corruption, and we describe the economic cost of political corruption. As the evidence suggests, the characteristics of the Mexican political system along with the hegemony, highly centralized public finances, and a lack of electoral punishment have increased Mexico’s political corruption, and ultimately reduced political accountability. Moreover, evidence suggest that Mexico is trapped in a corruption equilibrium that keeps self-reinforcing.