Sönke Jendral
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sönke Jendral has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elena Dubrova
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
6 shared publications - Linus Backlund
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
2 shared publications - Albin Durfors
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication - Jakob Bach
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany
1 shared publication Lena Witterauf
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
1 shared publication- Pawel Bielski
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 37-45
Single-Trace SAT-Assisted Side-Channel Attack on MILENAGE
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 37-45
Open AccessSingle-Trace SAT-Assisted Side-Channel Attack on MILENAGE
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Understanding the Impact of Compiler Optimization Flags on Side-Channel Leakage: A Case Study of ML-KEM Inverse NTT
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessUnderstanding the Impact of Compiler Optimization Flags on Side-Channel Leakage: A Case Study of ML-KEM Inverse NTT
- Open Access
- 16 January 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (1) , 225-249
Fault Attacks on VOLEitH Signature Schemes
Ongoing efforts to transition to post-quantum public-key cryptosystems have created the need for algorithms with a variety of performance characteristics and security assumptions. Among the candidates in NIST’s post-quantum standardisation process for additional digital signatures are FAEST and SDitH, two Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation in-the-Head (VOLEitH)-based schemes. The security of FAEST is based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), while SDitH relies on the regular syndrome decoding problem. The VOLEitH paradigm enables competitive performance and signature sizes under conservative security assumptions. However, since it was introduced relatively recently, in 2023, its resistance to physical attacks has not yet been analysed. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of VOLEitH-based signature schemes in the context of fault injection attacks. We demonstrate two practical attacks on the reference implementations of the secondround variants of FAEST and SDitH in ARM Cortex-M4 capable of recovering the secret key from a single signature. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities of components specific to VOLEitH schemes, namely the batch all-but-one vector commitments and the VOLE generation. We also propose countermeasures to mitigate these attacks and enhance the physical security of VOLEitH-based digital signature schemes.
- 16 January 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (1) , 225-249
Open AccessFault Attacks on VOLEitH Signature Schemes
Ongoing efforts to transition to post-quantum public-key cryptosystems have created the need for algorithms with a variety of performance characteristics and security assumptions. Among the candidates in NIST’s post-quantum standardisation process for additional digital signatures are FAEST and SDitH, two Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation in-the-Head (VOLEitH)-based schemes. The security of FAEST is based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), while SDitH relies on the regular syndrome decoding problem. The VOLEitH paradigm enables competitive performance and signature sizes under conservative security assumptions. However, since it was introduced relatively recently, in 2023, its resistance to physical attacks has not yet been analysed. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of VOLEitH-based signature schemes in the context of fault injection attacks. We demonstrate two practical attacks on the reference implementations of the secondround variants of FAEST and SDitH in ARM Cortex-M4 capable of recovering the secret key from a single signature. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities of components specific to VOLEitH schemes, namely the batch all-but-one vector commitments and the VOLE generation. We also propose countermeasures to mitigate these attacks and enhance the physical security of VOLEitH-based digital signature schemes.
- Open Access
- 8 January 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (4)
Side-Channel Attacks on VOLEitH Signature Schemes
The ongoing transition to post-quantum cryptography has highlighted the need for digital signature schemes offering diverse performance and security trade-offs. Among the candidates in NIST’s ongoing post-quantum signature standardisation process is FAEST, a scheme built upon the Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation in-the-Head (VOLEitH) paradigm introduced in 2023. VOLEitH enables efficient zero-knowledge proofs with competitive signature sizes under conservative assumptions, allowing FAEST to rely primarily on the one-wayness of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Despite their promising efficiency, VOLEitH-based signature schemes have remained relatively unexplored from a physical security perspective. In this paper, we present the first side-channel security evaluation. Specifically, we demonstrate two single-trace, deep learning-assisted power analysis attacks on the masked implementation of FAEST by Aranha, Degn, Eilath, Nielsen, and Scholl. These attacks exploit leakage from witness bits and VOLE tag computations, recovering the full secret key with success probability above 0.99 from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor. We further analyse how the VOLEitH construction enables profiling of VOLE tags without knowledge of the secret key and how even partial leakage of these tags compromises security. Finally, we discuss practical countermeasures to mitigate such leakages and strengthen the physical resilience of VOLEitH-based signature implementations.
- 8 January 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (4)
Open AccessSide-Channel Attacks on VOLEitH Signature Schemes
The ongoing transition to post-quantum cryptography has highlighted the need for digital signature schemes offering diverse performance and security trade-offs. Among the candidates in NIST’s ongoing post-quantum signature standardisation process is FAEST, a scheme built upon the Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation in-the-Head (VOLEitH) paradigm introduced in 2023. VOLEitH enables efficient zero-knowledge proofs with competitive signature sizes under conservative assumptions, allowing FAEST to rely primarily on the one-wayness of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Despite their promising efficiency, VOLEitH-based signature schemes have remained relatively unexplored from a physical security perspective. In this paper, we present the first side-channel security evaluation. Specifically, we demonstrate two single-trace, deep learning-assisted power analysis attacks on the masked implementation of FAEST by Aranha, Degn, Eilath, Nielsen, and Scholl. These attacks exploit leakage from witness bits and VOLE tag computations, recovering the full secret key with success probability above 0.99 from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor. We further analyse how the VOLEitH construction enables profiling of VOLE tags without knowledge of the secret key and how even partial leakage of these tags compromises security. Finally, we discuss practical countermeasures to mitigate such leakages and strengthen the physical resilience of VOLEitH-based signature implementations.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 21-30
Single-trace Side-Channel Attacks on MAYO Exploiting Leaky Modular Multiplication
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 21-30
Open AccessSingle-trace Side-Channel Attacks on MAYO Exploiting Leaky Modular Multiplication
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
MAYO Key Recovery by Fixing Vinegar Seeds
As the industry prepares for the transition to post-quantum secure public key cryptographic algorithms, vulnerability analysis of their implementations is gaining importance. A theoretically secure cryptographic algorithm should also be able to withstand the challenges of physical attacks in real-world environments. MAYO is a candidate in the ongoing second round of the NIST post-quantum standardization process for selecting additional digital signature schemes. This paper demonstrates three first-order single-execution fault injection attacks on the official MAYO implementation on the ARM Cortex-M4. By using voltage glitching to disrupt the computation of the vinegar seed during the signature generation, we enable the recovery of the secret key directly from the faulty signatures. Our experimental results show that the success rates of the fault attacks in a single execution are 36%, 82%, and 99%, respectively. They emphasize the importance of developing countermeasures against fault attacks prior to the widespread deployment of post-quantum algorithms like MAYO.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessMAYO Key Recovery by Fixing Vinegar Seeds
As the industry prepares for the transition to post-quantum secure public key cryptographic algorithms, vulnerability analysis of their implementations is gaining importance. A theoretically secure cryptographic algorithm should also be able to withstand the challenges of physical attacks in real-world environments. MAYO is a candidate in the ongoing second round of the NIST post-quantum standardization process for selecting additional digital signature schemes. This paper demonstrates three first-order single-execution fault injection attacks on the official MAYO implementation on the ARM Cortex-M4. By using voltage glitching to disrupt the computation of the vinegar seed during the signature generation, we enable the recovery of the secret key directly from the faulty signatures. Our experimental results show that the success rates of the fault attacks in a single execution are 36%, 82%, and 99%, respectively. They emphasize the importance of developing countermeasures against fault attacks prior to the widespread deployment of post-quantum algorithms like MAYO.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 361-367
Towards Automatically Refining Low-Quality Domain Knowledge: A Case Study in Healthcare
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 361-367
Towards Automatically Refining Low-Quality Domain Knowledge: A Case Study in Healthcare