Derek Christensen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Derek Christensen has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Clay Partridge
2 shared publications- Brian Mittendorf
The Ohio State University
1 shared publication - Cassie Mongold
University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign
1 shared publication - Christine A. Botosan
Financial Accounting Standards Board
1 shared publication - Daniel D. Wangerin
University of Wisconsin–Madison
1 shared publication Daniel P. Lynch
Wisconsin School of Business University of Wisconsin–Madison Madison Wisconsin USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 82 (2)
An examination of direct and spillover effects of accounting standards on firms’ information environments
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 82 (2)
Open AccessAn examination of direct and spillover effects of accounting standards on firms’ information environments
- 1 February 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Financial Reporting
- p. 1-9
FASB Staff Call for Research on ASU 2016-13—Financial Instruments—Credit Losses (Topic 326): Measurement of Credit Losses on Financial Instruments
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) staff invites academics to conduct research on Accounting Standards Update 2016-13 (or current expected credit loss (CECL) standard) and share their results, whether published or in process, with the FASB via the Academic Paper Submission Portal (https://www.fasb.org/about-us/connecting-with-stakeholders/academics#Share-Your-Research-With-the-FASB). The FASB staff will read all submitted studies and incorporate the relevant findings in the CECL post-implementation review process. In an effort to support the FASB staff’s interest in CECL, this article briefly summarizes the accounting changes under CECL, research topics of interest, and existing academic research and provides links to helpful resources. JEL Classifications: M41.
- 1 February 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Financial Reporting
- p. 1-9
FASB Staff Call for Research on ASU 2016-13—Financial Instruments—Credit Losses (Topic 326): Measurement of Credit Losses on Financial Instruments
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) staff invites academics to conduct research on Accounting Standards Update 2016-13 (or current expected credit loss (CECL) standard) and share their results, whether published or in process, with the FASB via the Academic Paper Submission Portal (https://www.fasb.org/about-us/connecting-with-stakeholders/academics#Share-Your-Research-With-the-FASB). The FASB staff will read all submitted studies and incorporate the relevant findings in the CECL post-implementation review process. In an effort to support the FASB staff’s interest in CECL, this article briefly summarizes the accounting changes under CECL, research topics of interest, and existing academic research and provides links to helpful resources. JEL Classifications: M41.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 3-14
The role of standard setters in financial reporting
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 3-14
The role of standard setters in financial reporting
- Open Access
- 8 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (3) , 159-185
Do Reporting Incentives and Consequences Change under the New Lease Accounting Standard?
This research evaluates whether reporting incentives and consequences change under the new lease accounting standard. Under prior guidance (SFAS 13), we predict and find firms with high financing cost sensitivities to leverage have greater incentive to finance investments with operating leases. Under the new lease accounting standard (ASU 2016-02), we predict and find this leverage incentive remains but is reduced, consistent with the FASB’s objective to limit opportunities to structure lease contracts for balance sheet purposes. Under ASU 2016-02, we also predict and find that the leverage incentive encourages firms to reduce operating lease liabilities by decreasing the duration of minimum lease payments. Lastly, we predict and find that firms use fewer operating leases under both SFAS 13 and ASU 2016-02 when managers’ income objectives exclude depreciation and/or interest expense. These findings suggest reporting incentives remain post ASU 2016-02 that encourage firms to structure leases to achieve accounting outcomes. Data Availability: This study uses licensed data from a variety of sources (see Appendix A for a detailed list of providers). JEL Classifications: D82; G34; M41.
- 8 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 100 (3) , 159-185
Open AccessDo Reporting Incentives and Consequences Change under the New Lease Accounting Standard?
This research evaluates whether reporting incentives and consequences change under the new lease accounting standard. Under prior guidance (SFAS 13), we predict and find firms with high financing cost sensitivities to leverage have greater incentive to finance investments with operating leases. Under the new lease accounting standard (ASU 2016-02), we predict and find this leverage incentive remains but is reduced, consistent with the FASB’s objective to limit opportunities to structure lease contracts for balance sheet purposes. Under ASU 2016-02, we also predict and find that the leverage incentive encourages firms to reduce operating lease liabilities by decreasing the duration of minimum lease payments. Lastly, we predict and find that firms use fewer operating leases under both SFAS 13 and ASU 2016-02 when managers’ income objectives exclude depreciation and/or interest expense. These findings suggest reporting incentives remain post ASU 2016-02 that encourage firms to structure leases to achieve accounting outcomes. Data Availability: This study uses licensed data from a variety of sources (see Appendix A for a detailed list of providers). JEL Classifications: D82; G34; M41.
- Top Cited Papers
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 42 (1) , 615-648
Improvements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842
Prior literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency generally overlooks the connection between firms' financial and managerial reporting systems. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether increases in the quality of firms' internal information environments (IIQ) and/or the quality of their external information environments (EIQ) explain improvements in investment efficiency following financial reporting changes. Leveraging the transition window to the new lease standard (Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 842), we use a difference‐in‐differences design and find that firms that materially change their internal controls due to ASC 842 (treatment firms) significantly improve their investment efficiency in the final year of the transition window. Multiple falsification tests rule out that contemporaneous improvements in treatment firms' EIQ explain our finding. Additional channel analyses suggest the increases in IIQ for treatment firms predominantly alleviate moral hazard risk between central and divisional managers within the firm, leading to a reduction in empire building. Our findings extend the literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency. They also contribute to the literature on the consequences of ASC 842 by answering the FASB's call for research on how ASC 842 affects firms' asset utilizations.
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 42 (1) , 615-648
Top Cited PapersImprovements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842
Prior literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency generally overlooks the connection between firms' financial and managerial reporting systems. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether increases in the quality of firms' internal information environments (IIQ) and/or the quality of their external information environments (EIQ) explain improvements in investment efficiency following financial reporting changes. Leveraging the transition window to the new lease standard (Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 842), we use a difference‐in‐differences design and find that firms that materially change their internal controls due to ASC 842 (treatment firms) significantly improve their investment efficiency in the final year of the transition window. Multiple falsification tests rule out that contemporaneous improvements in treatment firms' EIQ explain our finding. Additional channel analyses suggest the increases in IIQ for treatment firms predominantly alleviate moral hazard risk between central and divisional managers within the firm, leading to a reduction in empire building. Our findings extend the literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency. They also contribute to the literature on the consequences of ASC 842 by answering the FASB's call for research on how ASC 842 affects firms' asset utilizations.