Bhagya Wimalasiri
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bhagya Wimalasiri has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benjamin Dowling
King's College London
5 shared publications - Britta Hale
Department of Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
3 shared publications - Xisen Tian
Naval Postgraduate School Naval Postgraduate School King's College London University of Sheffield
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5746-5760
Bridging the Cryptographic Transition: A Unified Framework for Post-Quantum Key Exchange
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5746-5760
Open AccessBridging the Cryptographic Transition: A Unified Framework for Post-Quantum Key Exchange
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 111-132
QUIC-MLS: Making a Space Security Draft Standard Resilient for Disconnected Environments
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 111-132
QUIC-MLS: Making a Space Security Draft Standard Resilient for Disconnected Environments
- Open Access
Key Establishment in the Space Environment
As reliance on space systems continues to increase, so does the need to ensure security for them. However, public work in space standards have struggled with defining security protocols that are well tailored to the domain and its risks. In this work, we investigate various space networking paradigms and security approaches, and identify trade-offs and gaps. Furthermore, we describe potential existing security protocol approaches that fit well into the space network paradigm in terms of both functionality and security. Finally, we establish future directions for enabling strong security for space communication.
Open AccessKey Establishment in the Space Environment
As reliance on space systems continues to increase, so does the need to ensure security for them. However, public work in space standards have struggled with defining security protocols that are well tailored to the domain and its risks. In this work, we investigate various space networking paradigms and security approaches, and identify trade-offs and gaps. Furthermore, we describe potential existing security protocol approaches that fit well into the space network paradigm in terms of both functionality and security. Finally, we establish future directions for enabling strong security for space communication.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Cryptography is Rocket Science
Space networking has become an increasing area of development with the advent of commercial satellite networks such as those hosted by Starlink and Kuiper, and increased satellite and space presence by governments around the world. Yet, historically such network designs have not been made public, leading to limited formal cryptographic analysis of the security offered by them. One of the few public protocols used in space networking is the Bundle Protocol, which is secured by Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec), an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard. We undertake a first analysis of BPSec under its default security context, building a model of the secure channel security goals stated in the IETF standard, and note issues therein with message loss detection. We prove BPSec secure, and also provide a stronger construction, one that supports the Bundle Protocol's functionality goals while also ensuring destination awareness of missing message components.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Open AccessCryptography is Rocket Science
Space networking has become an increasing area of development with the advent of commercial satellite networks such as those hosted by Starlink and Kuiper, and increased satellite and space presence by governments around the world. Yet, historically such network designs have not been made public, leading to limited formal cryptographic analysis of the security offered by them. One of the few public protocols used in space networking is the Bundle Protocol, which is secured by Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec), an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard. We undertake a first analysis of BPSec under its default security context, building a model of the secure channel security goals stated in the IETF standard, and note issues therein with message loss detection. We prove BPSec secure, and also provide a stronger construction, one that supports the Bundle Protocol's functionality goals while also ensuring destination awareness of missing message components.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (3) , 2283-2294
Quantum-Secure Hybrid Communication for Aviation Infrastructures
The rapid digitization of aviation communication and its dependent critical operations demand secure protocols that address domain-specific security requirements within the unique functional constraints of the aviation industry. These secure protocols must provide sufficient security against current and possible future attackers, given the inherent nature of the aviation community, that is highly complex and averse to frequent upgrades as well as its high safety and cost considerations. In this work we propose a pair of quantum-secure hybrid key exchange protocols (PQAG-KEM and PQAG-SIG) to secure communication between aircrafts in-flight and ground stations. PQAG-KEM leverages post-quantum and classical Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) to ensure the hybrid security of the protocol against classical as well as future quantum adversaries. PQAG-SIG, alternatively, uses quantum-safe digital signatures to achieve authentication security. We provide an implementation of both PQAG-KEM and PQAG-SIG, and compare favourably with current state-of-the-art secure avionic protocols. Finally, we provide a formal analysis of our new PQAG protocols in a strong hybrid key exchange framework.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (3) , 2283-2294
Quantum-Secure Hybrid Communication for Aviation Infrastructures
The rapid digitization of aviation communication and its dependent critical operations demand secure protocols that address domain-specific security requirements within the unique functional constraints of the aviation industry. These secure protocols must provide sufficient security against current and possible future attackers, given the inherent nature of the aviation community, that is highly complex and averse to frequent upgrades as well as its high safety and cost considerations. In this work we propose a pair of quantum-secure hybrid key exchange protocols (PQAG-KEM and PQAG-SIG) to secure communication between aircrafts in-flight and ground stations. PQAG-KEM leverages post-quantum and classical Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) to ensure the hybrid security of the protocol against classical as well as future quantum adversaries. PQAG-SIG, alternatively, uses quantum-safe digital signatures to achieve authentication security. We provide an implementation of both PQAG-KEM and PQAG-SIG, and compare favourably with current state-of-the-art secure avionic protocols. Finally, we provide a formal analysis of our new PQAG protocols in a strong hybrid key exchange framework.