Chengyao Sun
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chengyao Sun has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Burenbatu Bao
Department of Hematology and Oncology, Affiliated Hospital of Inner Mongolia University for Nationalities, Tongliao, China
1 shared publication - Chaojie Liu
Department of Public Health, School of Psychology and Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
1 shared publication - Chengcheng Liu
Office of Cancer Screening, National Cancer Center/National Clinical Research Center for Cancer/Cancer Hospital, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences and Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Debin Wang
School of Health Service Management, Anhui Medical University, Hefei, China
1 shared publication - Fu
Department of Health Economics, School of Health Management/Public Health, Harbin Medical University, Harbin, China
1 shared publication - Guoxiang Liu
Department of Health Economics, College of Health Management of Harbin Medical University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 154 (4) , 919-934
Prediction that conflicts with judgment: The low absolute likelihood effect.
How do people predict the outcome of an event from a set of possible outcomes? One might expect people to predict whichever outcome they believe to be most likely to arise. However, we document a robust disconnect between what people predict and what they believe to be most likely. This disconnect arises because people consider not only relative likelihood but also absolute likelihood when predicting. If people think that an outcome is both the most likely to arise and has a high absolute likelihood of arising, they regularly predict it to arise. However, if people believe that an outcome is the most likely to arise but has a low absolute likelihood (e.g., it has a 20% chance, and other outcomes have smaller chances), they less often choose it as their prediction, even though they know it is most likely. We find that, when the most likely outcome has a low absolute likelihood, the final outcome feels hard to foresee, which leads people to use arbitrary prediction strategies, such as following a gut feeling or choosing randomly, instead of predicting more logically. We further find that predictions are less likely to depart from the most likely outcome when manipulations encourage people to focus more on relative likelihood and less on the low absolute likelihood. People also exhibit a smaller disconnect when advising others than when predicting for themselves. Thus, contrary to common assumptions, predictions may often systematically depart from likelihood judgments. We discuss implications for research on judgments, predictions, and uncertainty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 154 (4) , 919-934
Prediction that conflicts with judgment: The low absolute likelihood effect.
How do people predict the outcome of an event from a set of possible outcomes? One might expect people to predict whichever outcome they believe to be most likely to arise. However, we document a robust disconnect between what people predict and what they believe to be most likely. This disconnect arises because people consider not only relative likelihood but also absolute likelihood when predicting. If people think that an outcome is both the most likely to arise and has a high absolute likelihood of arising, they regularly predict it to arise. However, if people believe that an outcome is the most likely to arise but has a low absolute likelihood (e.g., it has a 20% chance, and other outcomes have smaller chances), they less often choose it as their prediction, even though they know it is most likely. We find that, when the most likely outcome has a low absolute likelihood, the final outcome feels hard to foresee, which leads people to use arbitrary prediction strategies, such as following a gut feeling or choosing randomly, instead of predicting more logically. We further find that predictions are less likely to depart from the most likely outcome when manipulations encourage people to focus more on relative likelihood and less on the low absolute likelihood. People also exhibit a smaller disconnect when advising others than when predicting for themselves. Thus, contrary to common assumptions, predictions may often systematically depart from likelihood judgments. We discuss implications for research on judgments, predictions, and uncertainty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Prediction that Conflicts with Judgment: The Low Absolute Likelihood Effect
How do people predict the outcome of an event from a set of possible outcomes? One might expect people to predict whichever outcome they believe to be most likely to arise. However, we document a robust disconnect between what people predict and what they believe to be most likely. This disconnect arises because people consider not only relative likelihood but also absolute likelihood when predicting. If people think that an outcome is both the most likely to arise and has a high absolute likelihood of arising, they regularly predict it to arise. However, if people believe that an outcome is the most likely to arise but has a low absolute likelihood (e.g., it has a 20% chance, and other outcomes have smaller chances), they less often choose it as their prediction, even though they know it is most likely. Our data suggest that, when the most likely outcome has a low absolute likelihood, the final outcome feels hard to foresee, which leads people to use arbitrary prediction strategies, such as following a gut feeling or choosing randomly, instead of predicting more logically. We further find that predictions are less likely to depart from the most likely outcome when manipulations encourage people to focus more on relative likelihood and less on the low absolute likelihood. Notably, people exhibit a smaller disconnect when advising others than when predicting for themselves. Thus, contrary to common assumptions, predictions often systematically depart from likelihood judgments. We discuss implications for research on judgments, predictions, and uncertainty.
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPrediction that Conflicts with Judgment: The Low Absolute Likelihood Effect
How do people predict the outcome of an event from a set of possible outcomes? One might expect people to predict whichever outcome they believe to be most likely to arise. However, we document a robust disconnect between what people predict and what they believe to be most likely. This disconnect arises because people consider not only relative likelihood but also absolute likelihood when predicting. If people think that an outcome is both the most likely to arise and has a high absolute likelihood of arising, they regularly predict it to arise. However, if people believe that an outcome is the most likely to arise but has a low absolute likelihood (e.g., it has a 20% chance, and other outcomes have smaller chances), they less often choose it as their prediction, even though they know it is most likely. Our data suggest that, when the most likely outcome has a low absolute likelihood, the final outcome feels hard to foresee, which leads people to use arbitrary prediction strategies, such as following a gut feeling or choosing randomly, instead of predicting more logically. We further find that predictions are less likely to depart from the most likely outcome when manipulations encourage people to focus more on relative likelihood and less on the low absolute likelihood. Notably, people exhibit a smaller disconnect when advising others than when predicting for themselves. Thus, contrary to common assumptions, predictions often systematically depart from likelihood judgments. We discuss implications for research on judgments, predictions, and uncertainty.
- Open Access
Effects of cancer treatment on household impoverishment: a multicentre cross-sectional study in China
Objectives To determine the incidence and intensity of household impoverishment induced by cancer treatment in China. Design Average income and daily consumption per capita of the households and out-of-pocket payments for cancer care were estimated. Household impoverishment was determined by comparing per capita daily consumption against the Chinese poverty line (CPL, US$1.2) and the World Bank poverty line (WBPL, US$1.9) for 2015. Both pre-treatment and post-treatment consumptions were calculated assuming that the households would divert daily consumption money to pay for cancer treatment. Participants Cancer patients diagnosed initially from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016 who had received cancer treatment subsequently. Those with multiple cancer diagnoses were excluded. Data sources A household questionnaire survey was conducted on 2534 cancer patients selected from nine hospitals in seven provinces through two-stage cluster/convenience sampling. Findings 5.89% (CPL) to 12.94% (WBPL) households were impoverished after paying for cancer treatment. The adjusted OR (AOR) of post-treatment impoverishment was higher for older patients (AOR=2.666–4.187 for ≥50 years vs Conclusions The financial burden of cancer treatment imposes a significant risk of household impoverishment despite wide coverage of social health insurance in China.
Open AccessEffects of cancer treatment on household impoverishment: a multicentre cross-sectional study in China
Objectives To determine the incidence and intensity of household impoverishment induced by cancer treatment in China. Design Average income and daily consumption per capita of the households and out-of-pocket payments for cancer care were estimated. Household impoverishment was determined by comparing per capita daily consumption against the Chinese poverty line (CPL, US$1.2) and the World Bank poverty line (WBPL, US$1.9) for 2015. Both pre-treatment and post-treatment consumptions were calculated assuming that the households would divert daily consumption money to pay for cancer treatment. Participants Cancer patients diagnosed initially from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016 who had received cancer treatment subsequently. Those with multiple cancer diagnoses were excluded. Data sources A household questionnaire survey was conducted on 2534 cancer patients selected from nine hospitals in seven provinces through two-stage cluster/convenience sampling. Findings 5.89% (CPL) to 12.94% (WBPL) households were impoverished after paying for cancer treatment. The adjusted OR (AOR) of post-treatment impoverishment was higher for older patients (AOR=2.666–4.187 for ≥50 years vs Conclusions The financial burden of cancer treatment imposes a significant risk of household impoverishment despite wide coverage of social health insurance in China.