Daniel Schoepflin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Daniel Schoepflin has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Vasilis Gkatzelis
Drexel University, Philadelphia, USA
3 shared publications - Ariel Shaulker
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
1 shared publication - Clayton Thomas
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
1 shared publication - David M. Pennock
DIMACS DIMACS Rutgers University Rutgers University Rutgers University
1 shared publication - Eric Balkanski
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, USA
1 shared publication - Kangning Wang
Rutgers University, Piscataway, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 502-520
Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 502-520
Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-20
Algorithmic and Structural Complexities of Menus in Unit-Demand Auctions
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-20
Algorithmic and Structural Complexities of Menus in Unit-Demand Auctions
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (6) , 2972-2985
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
In the budget-feasible mechanism design problem, an auctioneer with a strict budget constraint is looking to acquire services from a set of self-interested providers. The auctioneer aims to design a polynomial-time strategy-proof mechanism that maximizes the value of the services she acquires, subject to the sum of payments to providers falling within her budget. This problem has attracted a great deal of attention due to its combination of practical relevance and theoretical depth. In “Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions,” Balkanski, Garimidi, Gkatzelis, Schoepflin, and Tan provide the first such deterministic mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation for instances where the auctioneer’s valuation function is submodular. Moreover, this mechanism achieves an improved approximation even compared with previously known randomized mechanisms, and it takes the form of a clock auction, implying a suite of important properties that make this auction much more practical.
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (6) , 2972-2985
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
In the budget-feasible mechanism design problem, an auctioneer with a strict budget constraint is looking to acquire services from a set of self-interested providers. The auctioneer aims to design a polynomial-time strategy-proof mechanism that maximizes the value of the services she acquires, subject to the sum of payments to providers falling within her budget. This problem has attracted a great deal of attention due to its combination of practical relevance and theoretical depth. In “Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions,” Balkanski, Garimidi, Gkatzelis, Schoepflin, and Tan provide the first such deterministic mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation for instances where the auctioneer’s valuation function is submodular. Moreover, this mechanism achieves an improved approximation even compared with previously known randomized mechanisms, and it takes the form of a clock auction, implying a suite of important properties that make this auction much more practical.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (4) , 1965-1982
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
The recently introduced and highly practical class of deferred acceptance clock auctions offers a unique combination of desirable properties, including obvious strategy-proofness, unconditional winner privacy, and transparency. Early excitement around these auctions was dampened due to a result demonstrating that no deterministic and prior-free clock auction can guarantee better than a logarithmic approximation of the optimal social welfare, even in simple settings. In “Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions,” Feldman, Gkatzelis, Gravin, and Schoepflin reignite this excitement by demonstrating that one can achieve improved results for a wide class of instances if a clock auction can either use randomization or has access to prior information. The authors provide three different clock auctions that achieve these improved guarantees given access to different amounts of prior information, exhibiting how additional information can further simplify the auction design.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (4) , 1965-1982
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
The recently introduced and highly practical class of deferred acceptance clock auctions offers a unique combination of desirable properties, including obvious strategy-proofness, unconditional winner privacy, and transparency. Early excitement around these auctions was dampened due to a result demonstrating that no deterministic and prior-free clock auction can guarantee better than a logarithmic approximation of the optimal social welfare, even in simple settings. In “Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions,” Feldman, Gkatzelis, Gravin, and Schoepflin reignite this excitement by demonstrating that one can achieve improved results for a wide class of instances if a clock auction can either use randomization or has access to prior information. The authors provide three different clock auctions that achieve these improved guarantees given access to different amounts of prior information, exhibiting how additional information can further simplify the auction design.
- Open Access
- 15 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 483-494
Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
- 15 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 483-494
Open AccessMulti-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Drexel University Libraries
Designing and Analyzing Clock Auctions
In the canonical (forward) auction setting, an auctioneer faces a set of self-interested agents each competing for a service. The auctioneer must elicit the value of each agent for the service to decide which agents to serve aiming to maximize some objective, e.g., social welfare. The agents, however, can strategically misreport their private values, aiming to manipuate the auction and arrive at a more preferred outcome (e.g., acquiring the service at a lower price). The standard goal in auction design is, thus, to craft strategyproof auctions, meaning that there is no incentive for any of the agents to misreport their private information. Many of the celebrated results in auction design, notably, e.g., the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (which is strategyproof and functions in very general settings), rely on the crucial assumption that agents are perfectly rational and always can verify their optimal truthful strategies. Empirical literature in economics has long shown that this standard assumption of "unbounded rationality'' is overly simplistic and unrealistic. There has, thus, been a recent growing literature in economics aiming to model more accurately the reasoning of "real-world'' agents, and, in parallel, a growing literature on designing practical mechanisms which are robust to these more realistic models of agent behavior. The work in this thesis adds to the literature on designing practical mechanisms by focusing on designing (deferred acceptance) clock auctions auctions, which have numerous appealing properties and which have been shown, empirically, to be more robust to the strategic behavior of "real-world'' agents. We design clock auctions in a variety of standard auction settings, namely, (i) single-parameter forward auctions; (ii) budget-constrained procurement auctions - wherein an auctioneer aims to maximize the value she can obtain by acquiring services from a group of strategic sellers; and (iii) interdependent value forward auctions - wherein the value of each buyer depends on the private information held by all of the buyers. We propose multiple clock auctions in each of these settings and analyze their performance from both the traditional computer science perspective of worst-case analysis and in the Bayesian setting, a viewpoint more traditional to the economics literature.
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Drexel University Libraries
Designing and Analyzing Clock Auctions
In the canonical (forward) auction setting, an auctioneer faces a set of self-interested agents each competing for a service. The auctioneer must elicit the value of each agent for the service to decide which agents to serve aiming to maximize some objective, e.g., social welfare. The agents, however, can strategically misreport their private values, aiming to manipuate the auction and arrive at a more preferred outcome (e.g., acquiring the service at a lower price). The standard goal in auction design is, thus, to craft strategyproof auctions, meaning that there is no incentive for any of the agents to misreport their private information. Many of the celebrated results in auction design, notably, e.g., the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (which is strategyproof and functions in very general settings), rely on the crucial assumption that agents are perfectly rational and always can verify their optimal truthful strategies. Empirical literature in economics has long shown that this standard assumption of "unbounded rationality'' is overly simplistic and unrealistic. There has, thus, been a recent growing literature in economics aiming to model more accurately the reasoning of "real-world'' agents, and, in parallel, a growing literature on designing practical mechanisms which are robust to these more realistic models of agent behavior. The work in this thesis adds to the literature on designing practical mechanisms by focusing on designing (deferred acceptance) clock auctions auctions, which have numerous appealing properties and which have been shown, empirically, to be more robust to the strategic behavior of "real-world'' agents. We design clock auctions in a variety of standard auction settings, namely, (i) single-parameter forward auctions; (ii) budget-constrained procurement auctions - wherein an auctioneer aims to maximize the value she can obtain by acquiring services from a group of strategic sellers; and (iii) interdependent value forward auctions - wherein the value of each buyer depends on the private information held by all of the buyers. We propose multiple clock auctions in each of these settings and analyze their performance from both the traditional computer science perspective of worst-case analysis and in the Bayesian setting, a viewpoint more traditional to the economics literature.