JQJun Qian

Jun Qian

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jun Qian has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • A Nonconsensus Aggregation Algorithm for Group Decision-Making Processes

    by Ziyang Wang, Xiao Sun, Jun Qian

    Group decision-making is ubiquitous in human society, aiming to pool individual wisdom to address complex problems. Traditional group decision-making prioritizes achieving group consensus, that is seeking a compromise solution acceptable to all decision-makers. However, in predictive and judgmental tasks with objective ground truths, such as expert forecasting and risk assessment, the goal of group decision-making should shift from orchestrating agreement to identifying the single optimal decision that best corresponds to reality. This paper proposes a nonconsensus aggregation algorithm that minimizes the correlation between decision-maker weights and decision deviations, thereby guiding aggregated results toward the optimal decision. Theoretically, the method is proved to provide the maximum likelihood estimate of the optimal decision. Extensive experiments on multi-problem decision-maker judgment datasets demonstrate that the proposed method significantly reduces decision errors compared to conventional aggregation methods, particularly for difficult or large-scale problems. This work offers a new and effective path for group decision-making in accuracy-oriented scenarios.

  • LGSegNet: A lightweight multi-scale network for brain tumor segmentation from multi-modal MRI

    by Syed Fakhar Bilal, Zisu Dong, Jianqiang Li, Jun Qian, Muhammad Arif, Zitong Wang, Baolin Zhu, Lijun Zhao

  • Open Access

    Evolutionary Dynamics in Data Trading with Risk Compensation

    by Jun Qian, Xiao Sun, Yueting Chai, Xiao Xue

    The fact that data can be privately possessed yet contain the attributes of public goods leads to the “Arrow’s Information Paradox” in data trading. If left unchecked, supply-side deception about data quality and demand-side data leakage can seriously undermine the trust between suppliers and demanders. Inspired by the ideas of reputation and punishment, this paper combines a risk compensation mechanism, which is widely available in the financial sector, with data trading. Specifically, we propose a data trading model with risk compensation and study the evolutionary dynamics of the population using evolutionary game theory. We define λ as the demander’s compensation share that the supplier has to bear for data quality cheating and η as the supplier’s compensation share that the demander has to bear for data leakage. Through numerical solution and simulation, we analyze the evolutionary stable states of the population and find that the risk compensation mechanism in some data trading scenarios can limit the supply side from cheating on data quality or the demand side from leaking data. The results show that λ and η act asymmetrically, with λ being able to affect both supply-side and demand-side strategies, while η affects only the demand-side strategy. This work reveals chaos and asymmetry in data trading with risk compensation, and the proposed model and replication dynamic equations may have implications for future research.

  • The Communality of Risk: Differentiating the Logic of Risk Governance Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

    by Xiao Sun, Jun Qian, Yanlin Ying, Yueting Chai, Yi Liu

    Human beings live in a world full of risks, from minor risks such as colds and fevers to major crises such as economic crises and hurricanes. How to cope with these risks is a constant topic in the evolution of humankind. The impact of various characteristics of risk on the risk-resistance outcomes has been well studied, including the probability, intensity and spread of risks. However, as an additional dimension independent of the above main characteristics, risk-resistance solutions that are appropriate to the risk have not received sufficient attention. We abstract this characteristic as the relative cost-effectiveness between collective solution and individual solution in resisting a risk and name it communality. Taking communality and intensity as the two main characteristics of risk, we propose a risk-resistance model and explore the critical impact of risk communality on the outcomes of risk resistance. Using numerical analysis, we map the state transition of the population on a two-dimensional surface consisting of communality and intensity. Simulation experiments validate the results from numerical analysis and reveal four regions in this surface, each of which corresponds to a governance structure endogenous to the population. The complex impact of population-endogenous governance structures on the risk-resistance outcomes reflects the real-world challenges of risk governance. This article suggests that social governors need to implement different logics in the face of risks with different communalities.