Dennis Sprokholt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dennis Sprokholt has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pramod Bhatotia
TU Munich, Munich, Germany
4 shared publications - Soham Chakraborty
TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands
4 shared publications - Martin Fink
TU Munich, Munich, Germany
3 shared publications - Sebastian Reimers
TU Munich, Munich, Germany
3 shared publications - Redha Gouicem
RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
2 shared publications - Theofilos Augoustis
TU Munich, Munich, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 103-119
Beyond the Fence: Sound Compilation for GPU and Heterogeneous CPU+GPU Systems
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 103-119
Open AccessBeyond the Fence: Sound Compilation for GPU and Heterogeneous CPU+GPU Systems
- Open Access
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 416-432
Focaccia: Semantic Validation for CPU Emulators
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 416-432
Open AccessFocaccia: Semantic Validation for CPU Emulators
- Open Access
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 857-873
Should Linux Kernel Memory Model Dependencies Be Afraid of a Big Bad Optimizing Compiler?
- 10 April 2027
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 857-873
Open AccessShould Linux Kernel Memory Model Dependencies Be Afraid of a Big Bad Optimizing Compiler?
- Open Access
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-227
Burrow: A Proof Framework for Weak Memory
Burrow is a proof framework for weak memory mapping proofs. Those mappings appear as optimizations and translations between languages inside compilers and binary translators. However, their mechanized proofs, when defined over formal axiomatic weak memory semantics, are often large and complex. In this paper, we discuss the proof primitives provided by Burrow which simplify mechanizing those mapping proofs and help to prove many lemmas generally . To demonstrate the benefits of these primitives, we use Burrow to prove a mapping from x86 to Arm correct.
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-227
Open AccessBurrow: A Proof Framework for Weak Memory
Burrow is a proof framework for weak memory mapping proofs. Those mappings appear as optimizations and translations between languages inside compilers and binary translators. However, their mechanized proofs, when defined over formal axiomatic weak memory semantics, are often large and complex. In this paper, we discuss the proof primitives provided by Burrow which simplify mechanizing those mapping proofs and help to prove many lemmas generally . To demonstrate the benefits of these primitives, we use Burrow to prove a mapping from x86 to Arm correct.
- Open Access
- 22 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 157-174
Arancini: A Hybrid Binary Translator for Weak Memory Model Architectures
- 22 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 157-174
Open AccessArancini: A Hybrid Binary Translator for Weak Memory Model Architectures
- Open Access
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 538-552
Cage: Hardware-Accelerated Safe WebAssembly
WebAssembly (WASM) is an immensely versatile and increasingly popular compilation target. It executes applications written in several languages (e.g., C/C++) with near-native performance in various domains (e.g., mobile, edge, cloud). Despite WASM's sandboxing feature, which isolates applications from other instances and the host platform, WASM does not inherently provide any memory safety guarantees for applications written in low-level, unsafe languages. To this end, we propose Cage, a hardware-accelerated toolchain for WASM that supports unmodified applications compiled to WASM and utilizes diverse Arm hardware features aiming to enrich the memory safety properties of WASM. Precisely, Cage leverages Arm's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) to (i) provide spatial and temporal memory safety for heap and stack allocations and (ii) improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism. Cage further employs Arm's Pointer Authentication (PAC) to prevent leaked pointers from being reused by other WASM instances, thus enhancing WASM's security properties. We implement our system based on 64-bit WASM. We provide a WASM compiler and runtime with support for Arm's MTE and PAC. On top of that, Cage's LLVM-based compiler toolchain transforms unmodified applications to provide spatial and temporal memory safety for stack and heap allocations and prevent function pointer reuse. Our evaluation on real hardware shows that Cage incurs minimal runtime (<5.8%) and memory (<3.7%) overheads and can improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism, achieving a speedup of over 5.1%, while offering efficient memory safety guarantees.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 538-552
Open AccessCage: Hardware-Accelerated Safe WebAssembly
WebAssembly (WASM) is an immensely versatile and increasingly popular compilation target. It executes applications written in several languages (e.g., C/C++) with near-native performance in various domains (e.g., mobile, edge, cloud). Despite WASM's sandboxing feature, which isolates applications from other instances and the host platform, WASM does not inherently provide any memory safety guarantees for applications written in low-level, unsafe languages. To this end, we propose Cage, a hardware-accelerated toolchain for WASM that supports unmodified applications compiled to WASM and utilizes diverse Arm hardware features aiming to enrich the memory safety properties of WASM. Precisely, Cage leverages Arm's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) to (i) provide spatial and temporal memory safety for heap and stack allocations and (ii) improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism. Cage further employs Arm's Pointer Authentication (PAC) to prevent leaked pointers from being reused by other WASM instances, thus enhancing WASM's security properties. We implement our system based on 64-bit WASM. We provide a WASM compiler and runtime with support for Arm's MTE and PAC. On top of that, Cage's LLVM-based compiler toolchain transforms unmodified applications to provide spatial and temporal memory safety for stack and heap allocations and prevent function pointer reuse. Our evaluation on real hardware shows that Cage incurs minimal runtime (<5.8%) and memory (<3.7%) overheads and can improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism, achieving a speedup of over 5.1%, while offering efficient memory safety guarantees.