RSRihui Sun

Rihui Sun

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Rihui Sun has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • GHLeaker: A Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Global History Register Circumventing Kernel Address Isolation

    by Rihui Sun, Jin Wu, Hanyin Liu, Zikang Tao, Jian Dong, Dongsheng Wang, Gang Qu

    The Global History Register (GHR), an essential component of the Conditional Branch Predictor (CBP) in modern processors, has become a popular attack target because it stores recent branch histories including sensitive kernel control flow information. State-of-the-art GHR attacks can successfully extract bits stored in the GHR, inferring branch directions of executed conditional branch instructions, with conditions linked to secrets. However, retrieving GHR bits requires knowledge of the victim’s virtual address layout. Advancements in enhanced kernel address isolation techniques have significantly reduced the risk of these GHR attacks. In this paper, we introduce GHLeaker, a novel control-flow-based side-channel attack (SCA) that does not rely on kernel address knowledge. GHLeaker retrieves GHR branch information by correlating different branches, effectively bypassing kernel address isolation. We applied GHLeaker to attack Intel, AMD, and ARM processors, demonstrating that all these mainstream processors are vulnerable to the attack. On these platforms, GHLeaker successfully extracts secrets from the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Montgomery ladder algorithm which is widely used in cryptography systems such as RSA.

  • Open Access

    MistleTunnel: Attacking KASLR on Apple M-Series Silicon with a Novel TLB Side Channel

    by Hanyin Liu, Jin Wu, Rihui Sun, Kaiyuan Rong, Hongpei Zheng, Yun Chen, Jian Dong, Dongsheng Wang


  • Open Access

    Lightning: Leveraging DVFS-induced Transient Fault Injection to Attack Deep Learning Accelerator of GPUs

    by Rihui Sun, Pengfei Qiu, Yongqiang Lyu, Jian Dong, Haixia Wang, Dongsheng Wang, Gang Qu

    Graphics Processing Units (GPU) are widely used as deep learning accelerators because of its high performance and low power consumption. Additionally, it remains secure against hardware-induced transient fault injection attacks, a classic type of attacks that have been developed on other computing platforms. In this work, we demonstrate that well-trained machine learning models are robust against hardware fault injection attacks when the faults are generated randomly. However, we discover that these models have components, which we refer to as sensitive targets, that are vulnerable to faults. By exploiting this vulnerability, we propose the Lightning attack, which precisely strikes the model’s sensitive targets with hardware-induced transient faults based on the Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS). We design a sensitive targets search algorithm to find the most critical processing units of Deep Neural Network (DNN) models determining the inference results, and develop a genetic algorithm to automatically optimize the attack parameters for DVFS to induce faults. Experiments on three commodity Nvidia GPUs for four widely-used DNN models show that the proposed Lightning attack can reduce the inference accuracy by 69.1% on average for non-targeted attacks, and, more interestingly, achieve a success rate of 67.9% for targeted attacks.