ZWZhe Wu

Zhe Wu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Zhe Wu has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Recursive Time Series Prediction Modeling of Long-Term Trends in Surface Settlement During Railway Tunnel Construction

    by Feilian Zhang, Qicheng Wei, Zhe Wu, Jiawei Cao, Danlin Jian, Lantian Xiang

    The surface settlement of railroad tunnels is dynamically updated as the construction progresses, exhibiting complex nonlinear characteristics. The accuracy of the on-site nonlinear regression fitting prediction method needs to be improved. To prevent surface settlement and surrounding rock collapse during railroad tunnel construction, while also ensuring the safety of the tunnel and existing structures, we propose a recursive prediction model for the long-term trend of surface settlement utilizing a singular spectrum analysis (SSA), improved sand cat swarm optimization (ISCSO), and a kernel extreme learning machine (KELM). First, SSA decomposition, known for its adaptive decomposition of one-dimensional nonlinear time series, reorganizes the early surface settlement data. The dynamic sliding window method is introduced to construct the prediction dataset, which is then trained using the KELM. ISCSO is used to optimize the key parameters of the KELM to obtain the long-term trend curves of surface settlement through recursive time series prediction. The superiority and effectiveness of ISCSO and the model are verified through numerical experiments and simulation experiments based on engineering cases, providing a reference for the early warning and control of surface settlement during the construction of similar tunnels.


  • Open Access

    Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Worker Safety Supervision Based on Complex Network

    by Feilian Zhang, Jiawei Cao, Zhe Wu, Qicheng Wei

    To further enhance the management of infrastructure construction projects and safeguard the lives and property of the public, effectively motivating and guiding construction workers’ behaviors has become a critical issue in workplace safety. This study constructs a dynamic game model among construction workers using the Newman–Watts small-world network as a framework, based on the evolutionary game theory of complex networks. It systematically analyzes the effects of reward and punishment mechanisms on workers’ safe behavior decisions. The results show that reasonable rewards and penalties, dynamic incentive-based compensation systems, and strict supervisory mechanisms can significantly enhance the diffusion of safe behavior. Compared with existing solutions, the proposed model more accurately simulates the evolution of construction workers’ safe behavior within complex social networks, providing deeper insights into how reward and punishment mechanisms influence safe behavior decisions. The findings offer theoretical support for construction worker safety supervision and provide practical guidance for formulating more targeted safety management policies and reducing safety risks.