HAHitoshi Arima

Hitoshi Arima

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Double-effect sedation: do physicians not intend a decrease in consciousness when it is caused by drugs that can also reduce specific symptoms?

    by Hitoshi Arima

    The ethics of palliative sedation has been debated intensely. Recently, it has been emphasised that many drugs with sedating effects are also effective in reducing specific symptoms like pain and seizures. For example, midazolam is commonly used to sedate terminally ill patients but it can also reduce seizures. Hence, when midazolam is administered to a patient suffering from seizures, it may also lower the patient’s consciousness. Similarly, morphine is useful in the management of end-stage pain and dyspnoea, but can also reduce the patient’s consciousness, especially when administered in large doses. Cases in which a drug thus alleviates a symptom as well as lowers patient consciousness are called double-effect sedation (DES). Many claim that the decrease in consciousness in DES is merely a side effect and not an intended consequence, even if its occurrence was foreseen in advance or it will be maintained for some time until the patient dies. Additionally, it is often contended that DES is therefore justifiable by the doctrine of double effect (DDE) even though the decrease in consciousness is bad. The purpose of this paper is to examine these claims. I argue that the claims, while sometimes correct, are very frequently false. It will be shown that physicians often intend to reduce consciousness in DES. In such cases, as I conclude, DDE may not serve to justify DES, and DES should be subject to the same rigorous moral evaluations as the use of sedating drugs that do not reduce specific symptoms.


  • Open Access

    Intending to avoid the treatment burdens only: the doctrine of double effect and withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment

    by Hitoshi Arima

    It is often believed that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is justifiable only when the patient’s death is not intended. Also, in accordance with this belief, many argue that the justification of withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is an application of the doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE). This paper aims to defend these accounts from some important criticisms. Baruch Brody maintains that most people intend the patient’s death when they withhold/withdraw such treatments and that therefore, there are many cases of withholding/withdrawing treatment that are clearly justifiable but rendered unjustifiable by the accounts. Daniel P. Sulmasy asserts that withholding/withdrawing treatment rarely satisfies DDE’s fourth condition (that the good effect of the act is proportionately greater than its bad effect) because the goodness of avoiding treatment burden seldom compares to the badness of shortening life. I examine these claims and show that they are mistaken. Central to the discussion in this paper is the idea that those who withhold/withdraw life-sustaining treatment often only intend to avoid the burdens posed by the treatment itself and not to shorten the patient’s life. It will be argued that both Brody and Sulmasy are led to an erroneous conclusion because they fail to have an accurate understanding of this idea and its implications.


  • Open Access

    Continuous deep sedation and the doctrine of double effect: Do physicians not intend to make the patient unconscious until death if they gradually increase the sedatives?

    by Hitoshi Arima

    Continuous deep sedation (CDS) has the effect of making the patient unconscious until death, and that it has this effect is clearly an undesirable aspect of CDS. However, some authors have recently maintained that many physicians do not intend this effect when practicing CDS. According to these authors, CDS is differentiated into two types; in what is called “gradual” CDS (or CDS as a result of proportionate palliative sedation), physicians start with low doses of sedatives and increase them only gradually, whereas in “rapid” CDS (or palliative sedation to unconsciousness), physicians rapidly administer a heavy dose that clearly induces unconsciousness from the beginning. The claim is that the physicians intend permanent unconsciousness only if they rapidly administer a heavy dose, but they do not intend it when the unconsciousness is the result of a gradual increase of sedatives. This paper attempts to refute these claims based on a close examination of the protocol of gradual CDS. If my argument is valid, the doctrine of double effect would not be useful in justifying most, if not all, cases of CDS.