Cecilia Ducci
Research Subjects
Cecilia Ducci has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Francesco Niccolò Moro
University of Bologna
1 shared publication - Ingvild Bode
University of Southern Denmark
1 shared publication - Pak K. Lee
University of Kent
1 shared publication - Paola Coletti
Università degli Studi di Bergamo Bergamo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Digital Sovereignty and the EU's Identity Between Technological Innovation and European Values
The debate around ‘digital sovereignty’ identifies tensions rooted in the disparity between the EU's considerable economic and regulatory power in digital matters and its limited mandate and capabilities in foreign policy. Artificial intelligence (AI) is considered a strategic industry in Europe and abroad. Whilst most studies have focused on the ‘tech war’ between China and the United States, the role of the EU in this context is often underappreciated in affecting the outcome of this global competition. Nevertheless, contrary to conventional wisdom, so far, the EU has been a key policy entrepreneur with respect to the development and promotion of norms that regulate the use of AI, highlighting in particular a human‐centric and trustworthy vision of AI. Focusing on the EU is important because of its relevance in setting norms in this area. In the context of the US–China ‘tech war’, the article thus looks into the EU's position in the global race to technology and, in particular, how it makes sense of the competition in the field of AI. The research aims to shed light on how the EU constructs its identity in this competitive context vis‐à‐vis the United States and China by investigating the narratives on AI at the EU level. The article carries out an interpretivist narrative analysis of the major policies, regulations and official discussions by the EU, including the AI Act, the European Commission's White Paper and other European Commission's official communications on AI. The article aims to raise awareness of the EU's role in shaping norms and practices on AI and opens up the debate on European identity.
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Open AccessDigital Sovereignty and the EU's Identity Between Technological Innovation and European Values
The debate around ‘digital sovereignty’ identifies tensions rooted in the disparity between the EU's considerable economic and regulatory power in digital matters and its limited mandate and capabilities in foreign policy. Artificial intelligence (AI) is considered a strategic industry in Europe and abroad. Whilst most studies have focused on the ‘tech war’ between China and the United States, the role of the EU in this context is often underappreciated in affecting the outcome of this global competition. Nevertheless, contrary to conventional wisdom, so far, the EU has been a key policy entrepreneur with respect to the development and promotion of norms that regulate the use of AI, highlighting in particular a human‐centric and trustworthy vision of AI. Focusing on the EU is important because of its relevance in setting norms in this area. In the context of the US–China ‘tech war’, the article thus looks into the EU's position in the global race to technology and, in particular, how it makes sense of the competition in the field of AI. The research aims to shed light on how the EU constructs its identity in this competitive context vis‐à‐vis the United States and China by investigating the narratives on AI at the EU level. The article carries out an interpretivist narrative analysis of the major policies, regulations and official discussions by the EU, including the AI Act, the European Commission's White Paper and other European Commission's official communications on AI. The article aims to raise awareness of the EU's role in shaping norms and practices on AI and opens up the debate on European identity.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Global Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 5 (2)
Narrating and Practising the US–China “Tech War”
US and Chinese domestic and foreign policies increasingly point towards great-power competition. Technology plays a significant role therein, with the bilateral “tech war” portraying economic and technological interdependence as a national security threat. This represents a significant shift in US China policy, which had, since the Clinton administration, focused on economic engagement. Prominent realist accounts consider this change as the inevitable consequence of shifts in the balance of power associated with China’s rise. We propose an alternative perspective, arguing that the US side of the “tech war” is shaped by shifts in dominant, meaning-making narratives. Based on discursive and practice theories in International Relations, we use the concept of narrative practices to understand this process. Narrative practices emphasize the procedural and relational aspect of narratives, rather than viewing them as something that actors pursue in a limited, strategic manner. Empirically, we trace the trajectory of actors performing changing narrative practices from the Obama to the Biden Administrations. The central focus of the policy shift lies in how these narrative practices are integrated in and sustain two different master narratives. US actors gradually moved away from performing narrative practices of engagement connected to the liberal “capitalist peace” master narrative towards “tech war” narrative practices entrenched in and supporting the realist master narrative centred on great-power competition. We therefore hold that the “tech war” arises from the incremental build-up of social meaning associated with actors performing “tech war” narrative practices rather than a strategically executed narrative plan.
- 8 April 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Global Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 5 (2)
Open AccessNarrating and Practising the US–China “Tech War”
US and Chinese domestic and foreign policies increasingly point towards great-power competition. Technology plays a significant role therein, with the bilateral “tech war” portraying economic and technological interdependence as a national security threat. This represents a significant shift in US China policy, which had, since the Clinton administration, focused on economic engagement. Prominent realist accounts consider this change as the inevitable consequence of shifts in the balance of power associated with China’s rise. We propose an alternative perspective, arguing that the US side of the “tech war” is shaped by shifts in dominant, meaning-making narratives. Based on discursive and practice theories in International Relations, we use the concept of narrative practices to understand this process. Narrative practices emphasize the procedural and relational aspect of narratives, rather than viewing them as something that actors pursue in a limited, strategic manner. Empirically, we trace the trajectory of actors performing changing narrative practices from the Obama to the Biden Administrations. The central focus of the policy shift lies in how these narrative practices are integrated in and sustain two different master narratives. US actors gradually moved away from performing narrative practices of engagement connected to the liberal “capitalist peace” master narrative towards “tech war” narrative practices entrenched in and supporting the realist master narrative centred on great-power competition. We therefore hold that the “tech war” arises from the incremental build-up of social meaning associated with actors performing “tech war” narrative practices rather than a strategically executed narrative plan.