Benjamin Cyr
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Benjamin Cyr has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kevin Fu
Electrical & Computer Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, USA
2 shared publications - Srinivas Tadigadapa
Northeastern University
2 shared publications - Takeshi Sugawara
The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Vedant Sumaria
Electrical & Computer Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, USA
2 shared publications - Chaowei Xiao
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
1 shared publication - Kevin Fu
Northeastern University, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
- p. 1-17
How Lasers Exploit Photoacoustic and Photoelectric Phenomena to Inject Signals into MEMS Microphones
An amplitude-modulated laser can be used to generate false, yet coherent acoustic signals on the outputs of MEMS microphones. While this vulnerability has ramifications on the security of cyber-physical systems that trust these microphones, the physical explanation of this effect remained a mystery. Without an understanding of the physical phenomena contributing to this signal injection, it is difficult to design effective and reliable defenses. In this work, we show the degree to which the mechanisms of thermoelastic bending, thermal diffusion, and photocurrent generation are used to inject signals into MEMS microphones. We provide models for each of these mechanisms, develop a procedure to empirically determine their relative contributions, and highlight the effects on eight commercial MEMS microphones. We accomplish this with a precise setup to isolate each mechanism using several laser wavelengths and a vacuum chamber. The results indicate that the injected signal on the microphone is dependent on the wavelength of the incoming light. Shorter wavelengths (such as a 450 nm blue laser) exploit photoacoustic effects, and the periodic heating and expansion of air is the dominant factor in seven of eight sample microphones. Longer wavelengths (such as a 904 nm infrared laser) exploit photoelectric effects on the sensitive ASIC, generating signals that are between 2x and 100x stronger than photoacoustic signals in six of eight sample microphones. This understanding of the physical causality of laser signal injection leads to recommendations for future laser-resistant microphone designs. These include adding light-blocking structures at the system or device level, improving to glob top application, and adding simple light or temperature sensors for injection detection. Based on the fundamental causality, we also suggest potential vulnerabilities within other sensors with similar characteristics to MEMS microphones, such as conventional microphones, ultrasonic sensors, and inertial sensors.
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
- p. 1-17
Open AccessHow Lasers Exploit Photoacoustic and Photoelectric Phenomena to Inject Signals into MEMS Microphones
An amplitude-modulated laser can be used to generate false, yet coherent acoustic signals on the outputs of MEMS microphones. While this vulnerability has ramifications on the security of cyber-physical systems that trust these microphones, the physical explanation of this effect remained a mystery. Without an understanding of the physical phenomena contributing to this signal injection, it is difficult to design effective and reliable defenses. In this work, we show the degree to which the mechanisms of thermoelastic bending, thermal diffusion, and photocurrent generation are used to inject signals into MEMS microphones. We provide models for each of these mechanisms, develop a procedure to empirically determine their relative contributions, and highlight the effects on eight commercial MEMS microphones. We accomplish this with a precise setup to isolate each mechanism using several laser wavelengths and a vacuum chamber. The results indicate that the injected signal on the microphone is dependent on the wavelength of the incoming light. Shorter wavelengths (such as a 450 nm blue laser) exploit photoacoustic effects, and the periodic heating and expansion of air is the dominant factor in seven of eight sample microphones. Longer wavelengths (such as a 904 nm infrared laser) exploit photoelectric effects on the sensitive ASIC, generating signals that are between 2x and 100x stronger than photoacoustic signals in six of eight sample microphones. This understanding of the physical causality of laser signal injection leads to recommendations for future laser-resistant microphone designs. These include adding light-blocking structures at the system or device level, improving to glob top application, and adding simple light or temperature sensors for injection detection. Based on the fundamental causality, we also suggest potential vulnerabilities within other sensors with similar characteristics to MEMS microphones, such as conventional microphones, ultrasonic sensors, and inertial sensors.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
How Lasers Exploit Photoacoustic and PhotoelectricPhenomena to Inject Signals into MEMS Microphones
An amplitude-modulated laser can be used to generate false, yet coherent acoustic signals on the outputs of MEMS microphones. While this vulnerability has ramifications on the security of cyber-physical systems that trust these microphones, the physical explanation of this effect remained a mystery. Without an understanding of the physical phenomena contributing to this signal injection, it is difficult to design effective and reliable defenses. In this work, we show the degree to which the mechanisms of thermoelastic bending, thermal diffusion, and photocurrent generation are used to inject signals into MEMS microphones. We provide models for each of these mechanisms, develop a procedure to empirically determine their relative contributions, and highlight the effects on eight commercial MEMS microphones. We accomplish this with a precise setup to isolate each mechanism using several laser wavelengths and a vacuum chamber. The results indicate that the injected signal on the microphone is dependent on the wavelength of the incoming light, where long wavelengths (such as a 904~nm infrared laser) exploit photoelectric effects on the ASIC, while short wavelengths (such as a 450~nm blue laser) exploit photoacoustic effects on the diaphragm and surrounding air. This understanding leads to recommendations for future laser-resistant microphone designs with improvements to glob top application, reducing the material asymmetries within the MEMS structure, and adding simple light or temperature sensors for injection detection. Based on the fundamental causality, we also suggest potential vulnerabilities within other sensors with similar characteristics to MEMS microphones, such as conventional microphones, ultrasonic sensors, and inertial sensors.
- 11 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessHow Lasers Exploit Photoacoustic and PhotoelectricPhenomena to Inject Signals into MEMS Microphones
An amplitude-modulated laser can be used to generate false, yet coherent acoustic signals on the outputs of MEMS microphones. While this vulnerability has ramifications on the security of cyber-physical systems that trust these microphones, the physical explanation of this effect remained a mystery. Without an understanding of the physical phenomena contributing to this signal injection, it is difficult to design effective and reliable defenses. In this work, we show the degree to which the mechanisms of thermoelastic bending, thermal diffusion, and photocurrent generation are used to inject signals into MEMS microphones. We provide models for each of these mechanisms, develop a procedure to empirically determine their relative contributions, and highlight the effects on eight commercial MEMS microphones. We accomplish this with a precise setup to isolate each mechanism using several laser wavelengths and a vacuum chamber. The results indicate that the injected signal on the microphone is dependent on the wavelength of the incoming light, where long wavelengths (such as a 904~nm infrared laser) exploit photoelectric effects on the ASIC, while short wavelengths (such as a 450~nm blue laser) exploit photoacoustic effects on the diaphragm and surrounding air. This understanding leads to recommendations for future laser-resistant microphone designs with improvements to glob top application, reducing the material asymmetries within the MEMS structure, and adding simple light or temperature sensors for injection detection. Based on the fundamental causality, we also suggest potential vulnerabilities within other sensors with similar characteristics to MEMS microphones, such as conventional microphones, ultrasonic sensors, and inertial sensors.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2267-2281
Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving
In Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), one fundamental pillar is perception, which leverages sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection and Ranging) to understand the driving environment. Due to its direct impact on road safety, multiple prior efforts have been made to study its the security of perception systems. In contrast to prior work that concentrates on camera-based perception, in this work we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in AV settings, which is highly important but unexplored. We consider LiDAR spoofing attacks as the threat model and set the attack goal as spoofing obstacles close to the front of a victim AV. We find that blindly applying LiDAR spoofing is insufficient to achieve this goal due to the machine learning-based object detection process. Thus, we then explore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed attack to fool the machine learning model. We formulate this task as an optimization problem and design modeling methods for the input perturbation function and the objective function. We also identify the inherent limitations of directly solving the problem using optimization and design an algorithm that combines optimization and global sampling, which improves the attack success rates to around 75%. As a case study to understand the attack impact at the AV driving decision level, we construct and evaluate two attack scenarios that may damage road safety and mobility. We also discuss defense directions at the AV system, sensor, and machine learning model levels. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Domain-specific security and
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2267-2281
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAdversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving
In Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), one fundamental pillar is perception, which leverages sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection and Ranging) to understand the driving environment. Due to its direct impact on road safety, multiple prior efforts have been made to study its the security of perception systems. In contrast to prior work that concentrates on camera-based perception, in this work we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in AV settings, which is highly important but unexplored. We consider LiDAR spoofing attacks as the threat model and set the attack goal as spoofing obstacles close to the front of a victim AV. We find that blindly applying LiDAR spoofing is insufficient to achieve this goal due to the machine learning-based object detection process. Thus, we then explore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed attack to fool the machine learning model. We formulate this task as an optimization problem and design modeling methods for the input perturbation function and the objective function. We also identify the inherent limitations of directly solving the problem using optimization and design an algorithm that combines optimization and global sampling, which improves the attack success rates to around 75%. As a case study to understand the attack impact at the AV driving decision level, we construct and evaluate two attack scenarios that may damage road safety and mobility. We also discuss defense directions at the AV system, sensor, and machine learning model levels. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Domain-specific security and