PMPeter Bro Miltersen

Peter Bro Miltersen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Peter Bro Miltersen has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions

    by Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, Yulong Zeng

    Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as (Walrasian) envy-free pricing do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets. When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this mechanism are small constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for welfare the approximation converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources and, in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.

  • Open Access

    Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

    by Branislav Bosansky, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sorensen

    The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken in favor of the leader). We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games (or extensive-form games) and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for several classes of these sequential games.

  • Open Access

    Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods

    by Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen

    We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely perfect substitutes and perfect complements, we establish the computational properties of algorithms operating in this framework. For the class of valuations with perfect complements, our algorithm yields a surprisingly succinct characterization of instances that admit a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.