GTGuanhong Tao

Guanhong Tao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Guanhong Tao has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Threat Behavior Textual Search by Attention Graph Isomorphism

    by Chanwoo Bae, Guanhong Tao, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang

    Cyber attacks cause over \$1 trillion loss every year. An important task for cyber security analysts is attack forensics. It entails understanding malware behaviors and attack origins. However, existing automated or manual malware analysis can only disclose a subset of behaviors due to inherent difficulties (e.g., malware cloaking and obfuscation). As such, analysts often resort to text search techniques to identify existing malware reports based on the symptoms they observe, exploiting the fact that malware samples share a lot of similarity, especially those from the same origin. In this paper, we propose a novel malware behavior search technique that is based on graph isomorphism at the attention layers of Transformer models. We also compose a large dataset collected from various agencies to facilitate such research. Our technique outperforms state-of-the-art methods, such as those based on sentence embeddings and keywords by 6-14%. In the case study of 10 real-world malwares, our technique can correctly attribute 8 of them to their ground truth origins while using Google only works for 3 cases.

  • Open Access

    Fusion is Not Enough: Single Modal Attacks on Fusion Models for 3D Object Detection

    by Zhiyuan Cheng, Hongjun Choi, James Liang, Shiwei Feng, Guanhong Tao, Dongfang Liu, Michael Zuzak, Xiangyu Zhang

    Multi-sensor fusion (MSF) is widely used in autonomous vehicles (AVs) for perception, particularly for 3D object detection with camera and LiDAR sensors. The purpose of fusion is to capitalize on the advantages of each modality while minimizing its weaknesses. Advanced deep neural network (DNN)-based fusion techniques have demonstrated the exceptional and industry-leading performance. Due to the redundant information in multiple modalities, MSF is also recognized as a general defence strategy against adversarial attacks. In this paper, we attack fusion models from the camera modality that is considered to be of lesser importance in fusion but is more affordable for attackers. We argue that the weakest link of fusion models depends on their most vulnerable modality, and propose an attack framework that targets advanced camera-LiDAR fusion-based 3D object detection models through camera-only adversarial attacks. Our approach employs a two-stage optimization-based strategy that first thoroughly evaluates vulnerable image areas under adversarial attacks, and then applies dedicated attack strategies for different fusion models to generate deployable patches. The evaluations with six advanced camera-LiDAR fusion models and one camera-only model indicate that our attacks successfully compromise all of them. Our approach can either decrease the mean average precision (mAP) of detection performance from 0.824 to 0.353, or degrade the detection score of a target object from 0.728 to 0.156, demonstrating the efficacy of our proposed attack framework. Code is available.


  • Open Access

    Rapid Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs via Subconscious Exploitation and Echopraxia

    by Guangyu Shen, Siyuan Cheng, Kaiyuan Zhang, Guanhong Tao, Shengwei An, Lu Yan, Zhuo Zhang, Shiqing Ma, Xiangyu Zhang

    Large Language Models (LLMs) have become prevalent across diverse sectors, transforming human life with their extraordinary reasoning and comprehension abilities. As they find increased use in sensitive tasks, safety concerns have gained widespread attention. Extensive efforts have been dedicated to aligning LLMs with human moral principles to ensure their safe deployment. Despite their potential, recent research indicates aligned LLMs are prone to specialized jailbreaking prompts that bypass safety measures to elicit violent and harmful content. The intrinsic discrete nature and substantial scale of contemporary LLMs pose significant challenges in automatically generating diverse, efficient, and potent jailbreaking prompts, representing a continuous obstacle. In this paper, we introduce RIPPLE (Rapid Optimization via Subconscious Exploitation and Echopraxia), a novel optimization-based method inspired by two psychological concepts: subconsciousness and echopraxia, which describe the processes of the mind that occur without conscious awareness and the involuntary mimicry of actions, respectively. Evaluations across 6 open-source LLMs and 4 commercial LLM APIs show RIPPLE achieves an average Attack Success Rate of 91.5\%, outperforming five current methods by up to 47.0\% with an 8x reduction in overhead. Furthermore, it displays significant transferability and stealth, successfully evading established detection mechanisms. The code of our work is available at \url{https://github.com/SolidShen/RIPPLE_official/tree/official}


  • Open Access

    Threat Behavior Textual Search by Attention Graph Isomorphism

    by Chanwoo Bae, Guanhong Tao, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang

    Chanwoo Bae, Guanhong Tao, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang. Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2024.


  • Open Access

    ParaFuzz: An Interpretability-Driven Technique for Detecting Poisoned Samples in NLP

    by Lu Yan, Zhuo Zhang, Guanhong Tao, Kaiyuan Zhang, Xuan Chen, Guangyu Shen, Xiangyu Zhang

    Backdoor attacks have emerged as a prominent threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, where the presence of specific triggers in the input can lead poisoned models to misclassify these inputs to predetermined target classes. Current detection mechanisms are limited by their inability to address more covert backdoor strategies, such as style-based attacks. In this work, we propose an innovative test-time poisoned sample detection framework that hinges on the interpretability of model predictions, grounded in the semantic meaning of inputs. We contend that triggers (e.g., infrequent words) are not supposed to fundamentally alter the underlying semantic meanings of poisoned samples as they want to stay stealthy. Based on this observation, we hypothesize that while the model's predictions for paraphrased clean samples should remain stable, predictions for poisoned samples should revert to their true labels upon the mutations applied to triggers during the paraphrasing process. We employ ChatGPT, a state-of-the-art large language model, as our paraphraser and formulate the trigger-removal task as a prompt engineering problem. We adopt fuzzing, a technique commonly used for unearthing software vulnerabilities, to discover optimal paraphrase prompts that can effectively eliminate triggers while concurrently maintaining input semantics. Experiments on 4 types of backdoor attacks, including the subtle style backdoors, and 4 distinct datasets demonstrate that our approach surpasses baseline methods, including STRIP, RAP, and ONION, in precision and recall.


  • Open Access

    Backdooring Neural Code Search

    by Weisong Sun, Yuchen Chen, Guanhong Tao, Chunrong Fang, Xiangyu Zhang, Quanjun Zhang, Bin Luo

    Reusing off-the-shelf code snippets from online repositories is a common practice, which significantly enhances the productivity of software developers. To find desired code snippets, developers resort to code search engines through natural language queries. Neural code search models are hence behind many such engines. These models are based on deep learning and gain substantial attention due to their impressive performance. However, the security aspect of these models is rarely studied. Particularly, an adversary can inject a backdoor in neural code search models, which return buggy or even vulnerable code with security/privacy issues. This may impact the downstream software (e.g., stock trading systems and autonomous driving) and cause financial loss and/or life-threatening incidents. In this paper, we demonstrate such attacks are feasible and can be quite stealthy. By simply modifying one variable/function name, the attacker can make buggy/vulnerable code rank in the top 11%. Our attack BADCODE features a special trigger generation and injection procedure, making the attack more effective and stealthy. The evaluation is conducted on two neural code search models and the results show our attack outperforms baselines by 60%. Our user study demonstrates that our attack is more stealthy than the baseline by two times based on the F1 score.

  • Open Access

    Adversarial Training of Self-supervised Monocular Depth Estimation against Physical-World Attacks

    by Zhiyuan Cheng, James Liang, Guanhong Tao, Dongfang Liu, Xiangyu Zhang

    Monocular Depth Estimation (MDE) is a critical component in applications such as autonomous driving. There are various attacks against MDE networks. These attacks, especially the physical ones, pose a great threat to the security of such systems. Traditional adversarial training method requires ground-truth labels hence cannot be directly applied to self-supervised MDE that does not have ground-truth depth. Some self-supervised model hardening techniques (e.g., contrastive learning) ignore the domain knowledge of MDE and can hardly achieve optimal performance. In this work, we propose a novel adversarial training method for self-supervised MDE models based on view synthesis without using ground-truth depth. We improve adversarial robustness against physical-world attacks using L0-norm-bounded perturbation in training. We compare our method with supervised learning based and contrastive learning based methods that are tailored for MDE. Results on two representative MDE networks show that we achieve better robustness against various adversarial attacks with nearly no benign performance degradation.


  • Open Access

    D-square-B: Deep Distribution Bound for Natural-looking Adversarial Attack

    by Qiuling Xu, Guanhong Tao, Xiangyu Zhang

    We propose a novel technique that can generate natural-looking adversarial examples by bounding the variations induced for internal activation values in some deep layer(s), through a distribution quantile bound and a polynomial barrier loss function. By bounding model internals instead of individual pixels, our attack admits perturbations closely coupled with the existing features of the original input, allowing the generated examples to be natural-looking while having diverse and often substantial pixel distances from the original input. Enforcing per-neuron distribution quantile bounds allows addressing the non-uniformity of internal activation values. Our evaluation on ImageNet and five different model architecture demonstrates that our attack is quite effective. Compared to the state-of-the-art pixel space attack, semantic attack, and feature space attack, our attack can achieve the same attack success/confidence level while having much more natural-looking adversarial perturbations. These perturbations piggy-back on existing local features and do not have any fixed pixel bounds.

  • Open Access

    Towards Feature Space Adversarial Attack

    by Qiuling Xu, Guanhong Tao, Siyuan Cheng, Xiangyu Zhang

    We propose a new adversarial attack to Deep Neural Networks for image classification. Different from most existing attacks that directly perturb input pixels, our attack focuses on perturbing abstract features, more specifically, features that denote styles, including interpretable styles such as vivid colors and sharp outlines, and uninterpretable ones. It induces model misclassfication by injecting imperceptible style changes through an optimization procedure. We show that our attack can generate adversarial samples that are more natural-looking than the state-of-the-art unbounded attacks. The experiment also supports that existing pixel-space adversarial attack detection and defense techniques can hardly ensure robustness in the style related feature space.