Will Ma
Will Ma has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Balasubramanian Sivan
Google Research, New York City, USA
1 shared publication - Jackie Baek
Operations Research Center Sloan School of Management Massachusetts Institute of Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Prophet Inequalities on the Intersection of a Matroid and a Graph
We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and an independent set in the graph. Our main result is an ex-ante 1/(2d+2)-prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex. We establish this result through a framework that sets both dynamic prices for elements in the matroid (using the method of balanced thresholds), and static but discriminatory prices for vertices in the graph (motivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic programming). The threshold for accepting an agent is then the sum of these two prices. We show that for graphs induced by a certain family of interval-scheduling constraints, the value of d is 1. Our framework thus provides the first constant-factor prophet inequality when there are both matroid-independence constraints and interval-scheduling constraints. It also unifies and improves several results from the literature, leading to a 1/2-prophet inequality when agents have XOS valuation functions over a set of items and use them for a finite interval duration, and more generally, a 1/(d+1)-prophet inequality when these items each require a bundle of d resources to procure.
Open AccessProphet Inequalities on the Intersection of a Matroid and a Graph
We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and an independent set in the graph. Our main result is an ex-ante 1/(2d+2)-prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex. We establish this result through a framework that sets both dynamic prices for elements in the matroid (using the method of balanced thresholds), and static but discriminatory prices for vertices in the graph (motivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic programming). The threshold for accepting an agent is then the sum of these two prices. We show that for graphs induced by a certain family of interval-scheduling constraints, the value of d is 1. Our framework thus provides the first constant-factor prophet inequality when there are both matroid-independence constraints and interval-scheduling constraints. It also unifies and improves several results from the literature, leading to a 1/2-prophet inequality when agents have XOS valuation functions over a set of items and use them for a finite interval duration, and more generally, a 1/(d+1)-prophet inequality when these items each require a bundle of d resources to procure.
- Open Access
Separation between Second Price Auctions with Personalized Reserves and the Revenue Optimal Auction
What fraction of the single item $n$ buyers setting's expected optimal revenue MyeRev can the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers' valuation distributions are all drawn i.i.d. and the distributions satisfy the regularity condition, the second price auction with an anonymous reserve (ASP) is the optimal auction itself. As the setting gets more complex, there are established upper bounds on the fraction of MyeRev that ASP can achieve. On the contrary, no such upper bounds are known for the fraction of MyeRev achievable by the second price auction with eager personalized reserves (ESP). In particular, no separation was earlier known between ESP's revenue and MyeRev even in the most general setting of non-identical product distributions that don't satisfy the regularity condition. In this paper we establish the first separation results for ESP: we show that even in the case of distributions drawn i.i.d., but not necessarily satisfying the regularity condition, the ESP cannot achieve more than a $0.778$ fraction of MyeRev in general. Combined with Correa et al.'s result (EC 2017) that ESP can achieve at least a $0.745$ fraction of MyeRev, this nearly bridges the gap between upper and lower bounds on ESP's approximation factor.Open AccessSeparation between Second Price Auctions with Personalized Reserves and the Revenue Optimal Auction
What fraction of the single item $n$ buyers setting's expected optimal revenue MyeRev can the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers' valuation distributions are all drawn i.i.d. and the distributions satisfy the regularity condition, the second price auction with an anonymous reserve (ASP) is the optimal auction itself. As the setting gets more complex, there are established upper bounds on the fraction of MyeRev that ASP can achieve. On the contrary, no such upper bounds are known for the fraction of MyeRev achievable by the second price auction with eager personalized reserves (ESP). In particular, no separation was earlier known between ESP's revenue and MyeRev even in the most general setting of non-identical product distributions that don't satisfy the regularity condition. In this paper we establish the first separation results for ESP: we show that even in the case of distributions drawn i.i.d., but not necessarily satisfying the regularity condition, the ESP cannot achieve more than a $0.778$ fraction of MyeRev in general. Combined with Correa et al.'s result (EC 2017) that ESP can achieve at least a $0.745$ fraction of MyeRev, this nearly bridges the gap between upper and lower bounds on ESP's approximation factor.