Martina Vanelli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Martina Vanelli has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Giacomo Como
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
4 shared publications - Fabio Fagnani
Department of Mathematical Sciences "G.L. Lagrange " Politecnico di Torino 10129 Torino Italy
3 shared publications - Laura Arditti
Department of Mathematical Sciences G.L. Lagrange Politecnico di Torino, Torino, Italy
3 shared publications - Fabio Fagnani1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid auction with K-Lipschitz supply functions
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum unit price p. The market clears at the price at which the aggregate demand intersects the total supply and firms are paid the bid prices. We study a game theoretic model of competition among such firms and focus on its equilibria (Supply function equilibrium). The game we consider is a generalization of both models where firms can either set a fixed quantity (Cournot model) or set a fixed price (Bertrand model). Our main result is to prove existence and provide a characterization of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the space of K-Lipschitz supply functions.
Open AccessNash equilibria of the pay-as-bid auction with K-Lipschitz supply functions
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum unit price p. The market clears at the price at which the aggregate demand intersects the total supply and firms are paid the bid prices. We study a game theoretic model of competition among such firms and focus on its equilibria (Supply function equilibrium). The game we consider is a generalization of both models where firms can either set a fixed quantity (Cournot model) or set a fixed price (Bertrand model). Our main result is to prove existence and provide a characterization of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the space of K-Lipschitz supply functions.
- Open Access
On games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or only anti-coordinating agents are potential, also in the presence of heterogeneities, this does not hold when both type of agents are simultaneously present. This makes their analysis more difficult and existence of Nash equilibria not guaranteed. Our main result is a checkable condition on the threshold distributions that characterizes the existence of Nash equilibria in such mixed games. When this condition is satisfied an explicit algorithm allows to determine the complete set of such equilibria. Moreover, for the special case when only one type of agents is present (either coordinating or anti-coordinating), our results allow an explicit computation of the cardinality of Nash equilibria.
Open AccessOn games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or only anti-coordinating agents are potential, also in the presence of heterogeneities, this does not hold when both type of agents are simultaneously present. This makes their analysis more difficult and existence of Nash equilibria not guaranteed. Our main result is a checkable condition on the threshold distributions that characterizes the existence of Nash equilibria in such mixed games. When this condition is satisfied an explicit algorithm allows to determine the complete set of such equilibria. Moreover, for the special case when only one type of agents is present (either coordinating or anti-coordinating), our results allow an explicit computation of the cardinality of Nash equilibria.
- Open Access
Robustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game. Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in some standard network games such as the coordination and the anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anticoordinating games.
Open AccessRobustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game. Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in some standard network games such as the coordination and the anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anticoordinating games.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC-PapersOnLine
- Vol. 53 (2) , 10975-10980
On games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in IFAC-PapersOnLine
- Vol. 53 (2) , 10975-10980
On games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents