Yusuf Hakan Kalayci
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yusuf Hakan Kalayci has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Shaddin Dughmi
University of Southern California
2 shared publications - Vikram Kher
Yale University
2 shared publications - David Kempe
University of Southern California
1 shared publication - David Kempe
University of Southern California David.M
1 shared publication - David Kempe
University of Southern California David
1 shared publication - Evi Micha
University of Southern California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Temporal Panel Selection in Ongoing Citizens' Assemblies
Permanent citizens' assemblies are ongoing deliberative bodies composed of randomly selected citizens, organized into panels that rotate over time. Unlike one-off panels, which represent the population in a single snapshot, permanent assemblies enable shifting participation across multiple rounds. This structure offers a powerful framework for ensuring that different groups of individuals are represented over time across successive panels. In particular, it allows smaller groups of individuals that may not warrant representation in every individual panel to be represented across a sequence of them. We formalize this temporal sortition framework by requiring proportional representation both within each individual panel and across the sequence of panels. Building on the work of Ebadian and Micha (2025), we consider a setting in which the population lies in a metric space, and the goal is to achieve both proportional representation, ensuring that every group of citizens receives adequate representation, and individual fairness, ensuring that each individual has an equal probability of being selected. We extend the notion of representation to a temporal setting by requiring that every initial segment of the panel sequence, viewed as a cumulative whole, proportionally reflects the structure of the population. We present algorithms that provide varying guarantees of proportional representation, both within individual panels and across any sequence of panels, while also maintaining individual fairness over time.
Open AccessTemporal Panel Selection in Ongoing Citizens' Assemblies
Permanent citizens' assemblies are ongoing deliberative bodies composed of randomly selected citizens, organized into panels that rotate over time. Unlike one-off panels, which represent the population in a single snapshot, permanent assemblies enable shifting participation across multiple rounds. This structure offers a powerful framework for ensuring that different groups of individuals are represented over time across successive panels. In particular, it allows smaller groups of individuals that may not warrant representation in every individual panel to be represented across a sequence of them. We formalize this temporal sortition framework by requiring proportional representation both within each individual panel and across the sequence of panels. Building on the work of Ebadian and Micha (2025), we consider a setting in which the population lies in a metric space, and the goal is to achieve both proportional representation, ensuring that every group of citizens receives adequate representation, and individual fairness, ensuring that each individual has an equal probability of being selected. We extend the notion of representation to a temporal setting by requiring that every initial segment of the panel sequence, viewed as a cumulative whole, proportionally reflects the structure of the population. We present algorithms that provide varying guarantees of proportional representation, both within individual panels and across any sequence of panels, while also maintaining individual fairness over time.
- Open Access
Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems
When uncertainty meets costly information gathering, a fundamental question emerges: which data points should we probe to unlock near-optimal solutions? Sparsification of stochastic packing problems addresses this trade-off. The existing notions of sparsification measure the level of sparsity, called degree, as the ratio of queried items to the optimal solution size. While effective for matching and matroid-type problems with uniform structures, this cardinality-based approach fails for knapsack-type constraints where feasible sets exhibit dramatic structural variation. We introduce a polyhedral sparsification framework that measures the degree as the smallest scalar needed to embed the query set within a scaled feasibility polytope, naturally capturing redundancy without relying on cardinality. Our main contribution establishes that knapsack, multiple knapsack, and generalized assignment problems admit (1 - epsilon)-approximate sparsifiers with degree polynomial in 1/p and 1/epsilon -- where p denotes the independent activation probability of each element -- remarkably independent of problem dimensions. The key insight involves grouping items with similar weights and deploying a charging argument: when our query set misses an optimal item, we either substitute it with a queried item from the same group or leverage that group's excess contribution to compensate for the loss. This reveals an intriguing complexity-theoretic separation -- while the multiple knapsack problem lacks an FPTAS and generalized assignment is APX-hard, their sparsification counterparts admit efficient (1 - epsilon)-approximation algorithms that identify polynomial-degree query sets. Finally, we raise an open question: can such sparsification extend to general integer linear programs with degree independent of problem dimensions?
Open AccessNear-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems
When uncertainty meets costly information gathering, a fundamental question emerges: which data points should we probe to unlock near-optimal solutions? Sparsification of stochastic packing problems addresses this trade-off. The existing notions of sparsification measure the level of sparsity, called degree, as the ratio of queried items to the optimal solution size. While effective for matching and matroid-type problems with uniform structures, this cardinality-based approach fails for knapsack-type constraints where feasible sets exhibit dramatic structural variation. We introduce a polyhedral sparsification framework that measures the degree as the smallest scalar needed to embed the query set within a scaled feasibility polytope, naturally capturing redundancy without relying on cardinality. Our main contribution establishes that knapsack, multiple knapsack, and generalized assignment problems admit (1 - epsilon)-approximate sparsifiers with degree polynomial in 1/p and 1/epsilon -- where p denotes the independent activation probability of each element -- remarkably independent of problem dimensions. The key insight involves grouping items with similar weights and deploying a charging argument: when our query set misses an optimal item, we either substitute it with a queried item from the same group or leverage that group's excess contribution to compensate for the loss. This reveals an intriguing complexity-theoretic separation -- while the multiple knapsack problem lacks an FPTAS and generalized assignment is APX-hard, their sparsification counterparts admit efficient (1 - epsilon)-approximation algorithms that identify polynomial-degree query sets. Finally, we raise an open question: can such sparsification extend to general integer linear programs with degree independent of problem dimensions?
- Open Access
Optimal Stopping vs Best-of-$N$ for Inference Time Optimization
Large language model (LLM) generation often requires balancing output quality against inference cost, especially when using multiple generations. We introduce a new framework for inference-time optimization based on the classical Pandora's Box problem. Viewing each generation as opening a costly "box" with random reward, we develop algorithms that decide when to stop generating without knowing the underlying reward distribution. Our first contribution is a UCB-style Pandora's Box algorithm, which achieves performance that is provably close to Weitzman's algorithm, the optimal strategy when the distribution is known. We further adapt this method to practical LLM settings by addressing reward scaling across prompts via a Bradley-Terry inspired transformation. This leads to an adaptive inference-time optimization method that normalizes rewards and learns stopping thresholds on the fly. Experiments on the AlpacaFarm and HH-RLHF datasets, using multiple LLM-reward model pairs, show that our adaptive strategy can obtain the same performance as non-adaptive Best-of-N sampling while requiring 15-35 percent fewer generations on average. Our results establish a principled bridge between optimal stopping theory and inference-time scaling, providing both theoretical performance bounds and practical efficiency gains for LLM deployment.
Open AccessOptimal Stopping vs Best-of-$N$ for Inference Time Optimization
Large language model (LLM) generation often requires balancing output quality against inference cost, especially when using multiple generations. We introduce a new framework for inference-time optimization based on the classical Pandora's Box problem. Viewing each generation as opening a costly "box" with random reward, we develop algorithms that decide when to stop generating without knowing the underlying reward distribution. Our first contribution is a UCB-style Pandora's Box algorithm, which achieves performance that is provably close to Weitzman's algorithm, the optimal strategy when the distribution is known. We further adapt this method to practical LLM settings by addressing reward scaling across prompts via a Bradley-Terry inspired transformation. This leads to an adaptive inference-time optimization method that normalizes rewards and learns stopping thresholds on the fly. Experiments on the AlpacaFarm and HH-RLHF datasets, using multiple LLM-reward model pairs, show that our adaptive strategy can obtain the same performance as non-adaptive Best-of-N sampling while requiring 15-35 percent fewer generations on average. Our results establish a principled bridge between optimal stopping theory and inference-time scaling, providing both theoretical performance bounds and practical efficiency gains for LLM deployment.
- Open Access
Full Proportional Justified Representation
In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that proportionally represents voters' approval ballots is an essential task. The notion of justified representation (JR) demands that any large "cohesive" group of voters should be proportionally "represented". The "cohesiveness" is defined in different ways; two common ways are the following: (C1) demands that the group unanimously approves a set of candidates proportional to its size, while (C2) requires each member to approve at least a fixed fraction of such a set. Similarly, "representation" have been considered in different ways: (R1) the coalition's collective utility from the winning set exceeds that of any proportionally sized alternative, and (R2) for any proportionally sized alternative, at least one member of the coalition derives less utility from it than from the winning set. Three of the four possible combinations have been extensively studied: (C1)-(R1) defines Proportional Justified Representation (PJR), (C1)-(R2) defines Extended Justified Representation (EJR), (C2)-(R2) defines Full Justified Representation (FJR). All three have merits, but also drawbacks. PJR is the weakest notion, and perhaps not sufficiently demanding; EJR may not be compatible with perfect representation; and it is open whether a committee satisfying FJR can be found efficiently. We study the combination (C2)-(R1), which we call Full Proportional Justified Representation (FPJR). We investigate FPJR's properties and find that it shares PJR's advantages over EJR: several proportionality axioms (e.g. priceability, perfect representation) imply FPJR and PJR but not EJR. We also find that efficient rules like the greedy Monroe rule and the method of equal shares satisfy FPJR, matching a key advantage of EJR over FJR. However, the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule may violate FPJR, so neither of EJR and FPJR implies the other.
Open AccessFull Proportional Justified Representation
In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that proportionally represents voters' approval ballots is an essential task. The notion of justified representation (JR) demands that any large "cohesive" group of voters should be proportionally "represented". The "cohesiveness" is defined in different ways; two common ways are the following: (C1) demands that the group unanimously approves a set of candidates proportional to its size, while (C2) requires each member to approve at least a fixed fraction of such a set. Similarly, "representation" have been considered in different ways: (R1) the coalition's collective utility from the winning set exceeds that of any proportionally sized alternative, and (R2) for any proportionally sized alternative, at least one member of the coalition derives less utility from it than from the winning set. Three of the four possible combinations have been extensively studied: (C1)-(R1) defines Proportional Justified Representation (PJR), (C1)-(R2) defines Extended Justified Representation (EJR), (C2)-(R2) defines Full Justified Representation (FJR). All three have merits, but also drawbacks. PJR is the weakest notion, and perhaps not sufficiently demanding; EJR may not be compatible with perfect representation; and it is open whether a committee satisfying FJR can be found efficiently. We study the combination (C2)-(R1), which we call Full Proportional Justified Representation (FPJR). We investigate FPJR's properties and find that it shares PJR's advantages over EJR: several proportionality axioms (e.g. priceability, perfect representation) imply FPJR and PJR but not EJR. We also find that efficient rules like the greedy Monroe rule and the method of equal shares satisfy FPJR, matching a key advantage of EJR over FJR. However, the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule may violate FPJR, so neither of EJR and FPJR implies the other.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9815-9823
Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection
We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (9) , 9815-9823
Open AccessProportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection
We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma
- Open Access
Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection
We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma <= 1 + 6.71 * (alpha)/(alpha-1). Our results lead to three notable byproducts. First, we show that the EAR achieves constant proportional fairness in the ordinal model, giving the first positive result on metric proportional fairness with ordinal information. Second, we show that for the core fairness objective, the EAR achieves the same asymptotic tradeoff between resource augmentation and approximation as the recent results of Li et al., which used full knowledge of the metric. Finally, our results imply a very simple single-winner voting rule with metric distortion at most 44.
Open AccessProportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection
We introduce a novel definition for a small set R of k points being "representative" of a larger set in a metric space. Given a set V (e.g., documents or voters) to represent, and a set C of possible representatives, our criterion requires that for any subset S comprising a theta fraction of V, the average distance of S to their best theta*k points in R should not be more than a factor gamma compared to their average distance to the best theta*k points among all of C. This definition is a strengthening of proportional fairness and core fairness, but - different from those notions - requires that large cohesive clusters be represented proportionally to their size. Since there are instances for which - unless gamma is polynomially large - no solutions exist, we study this notion in a resource augmentation framework, implicitly stating the constraints for a set R of size k as though its size were only k/alpha, for alpha > 1. Furthermore, motivated by the application to elections, we mostly focus on the "ordinal" model, where the algorithm does not learn the actual distances; instead, it learns only for each point v in V and each candidate pairs c, c' which of c, c' is closer to v. Our main result is that the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) of Aziz and Lee is (alpha, gamma) representative with gamma <= 1 + 6.71 * (alpha)/(alpha-1). Our results lead to three notable byproducts. First, we show that the EAR achieves constant proportional fairness in the ordinal model, giving the first positive result on metric proportional fairness with ordinal information. Second, we show that for the core fairness objective, the EAR achieves the same asymptotic tradeoff between resource augmentation and approximation as the recent results of Li et al., which used full knowledge of the metric. Finally, our results imply a very simple single-winner voting rule with metric distortion at most 44.