Chara Podimata
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chara Podimata has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zhiwei Steven Wu
Carnegie Mellon University
3 shared publications - Anish Agarwal
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
2 shared publications - Keegan Harris
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
2 shared publications - Keegan Harris
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications - Valia Efthymiou
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Akshay Krishnamurthy
Microsoft Research New York NY
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Do LLMs Track Public Opinion? A Multi-Model Study of Favorability Predictions in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election
We investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can track public opinion as measured by exit polls during the 2024 U.S. presidential election cycle. Our analysis focuses on headline favorability (e.g., "Favorable" vs. "Unfavorable") of presidential candidates across multiple LLMs queried daily throughout the election season. Using the publicly available llm-election-data-2024 dataset, we evaluate predictions from nine LLM configurations against a curated set of five high-quality polls from major organizations including Reuters, CNN, Gallup, Quinnipiac, and ABC. We find systematic directional miscalibration. For Kamala Harris, all models overpredict favorability by 10-40% relative to polls. For Donald Trump, biases are smaller (5-10%) and poll-dependent, with substantially lower cross-model variation. These deviations persist under temporal smoothing and are not corrected by internet-augmented retrieval. We conclude that off-the-shelf LLMs do not reliably track polls when queried in a straightforward manner and discuss implications for election forecasting.
Open AccessDo LLMs Track Public Opinion? A Multi-Model Study of Favorability Predictions in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election
We investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can track public opinion as measured by exit polls during the 2024 U.S. presidential election cycle. Our analysis focuses on headline favorability (e.g., "Favorable" vs. "Unfavorable") of presidential candidates across multiple LLMs queried daily throughout the election season. Using the publicly available llm-election-data-2024 dataset, we evaluate predictions from nine LLM configurations against a curated set of five high-quality polls from major organizations including Reuters, CNN, Gallup, Quinnipiac, and ABC. We find systematic directional miscalibration. For Kamala Harris, all models overpredict favorability by 10-40% relative to polls. For Donald Trump, biases are smaller (5-10%) and poll-dependent, with substantially lower cross-model variation. These deviations persist under temporal smoothing and are not corrected by internet-augmented retrieval. We conclude that off-the-shelf LLMs do not reliably track polls when queried in a straightforward manner and discuss implications for election forecasting.
- Open Access
Contextual Dynamic Pricing with Heterogeneous Buyers
We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over $T$ rounds) that depend on the observable $d$-dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size $K_{\star}$. We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret $\widetilde{O}(K_{\star}\sqrt{dT})$, which we prove to be tight in $d$ and $T$ up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on $K_{\star}$.Open AccessContextual Dynamic Pricing with Heterogeneous Buyers
We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over $T$ rounds) that depend on the observable $d$-dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size $K_{\star}$. We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret $\widetilde{O}(K_{\star}\sqrt{dT})$, which we prove to be tight in $d$ and $T$ up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on $K_{\star}$. - Open Access
Desirable Effort Fairness and Optimality Trade-offs in Strategic Learning
Strategic learning studies how decision rules interact with agents who may strategically change their inputs/features to achieve better outcomes. In standard settings, models assume that the decision-maker's sole scope is to learn a classifier that maximizes an objective (e.g., accuracy) assuming that agents best respond. However, real decision-making systems' goals do not align exclusively with producing good predictions. They may consider the external effects of inducing certain incentives, which translates to the change of certain features being more desirable for the decision maker. Further, the principal may also need to incentivize desirable feature changes fairly across heterogeneous agents. How much does this constrained optimization (i.e., maximize the objective, but restrict agents' incentive disparity) cost the principal? We propose a unified model of principal-agent interaction that captures this trade-off under three additional components: (1) causal dependencies between features, such that changes in one feature affect others; (2) heterogeneous manipulation costs between agents; and (3) peer learning, through which agents infer the principal's rule. We provide theoretical guarantees on the principal's optimality loss constrained to a particular desirability fairness tolerance for multiple broad classes of fairness measures. Finally, through experiments on real datasets, we show the explicit tradeoff between maximizing accuracy and fairness in desirability effort.
Open AccessDesirable Effort Fairness and Optimality Trade-offs in Strategic Learning
Strategic learning studies how decision rules interact with agents who may strategically change their inputs/features to achieve better outcomes. In standard settings, models assume that the decision-maker's sole scope is to learn a classifier that maximizes an objective (e.g., accuracy) assuming that agents best respond. However, real decision-making systems' goals do not align exclusively with producing good predictions. They may consider the external effects of inducing certain incentives, which translates to the change of certain features being more desirable for the decision maker. Further, the principal may also need to incentivize desirable feature changes fairly across heterogeneous agents. How much does this constrained optimization (i.e., maximize the objective, but restrict agents' incentive disparity) cost the principal? We propose a unified model of principal-agent interaction that captures this trade-off under three additional components: (1) causal dependencies between features, such that changes in one feature affect others; (2) heterogeneous manipulation costs between agents; and (3) peer learning, through which agents infer the principal's rule. We provide theoretical guarantees on the principal's optimality loss constrained to a particular desirability fairness tolerance for multiple broad classes of fairness measures. Finally, through experiments on real datasets, we show the explicit tradeoff between maximizing accuracy and fairness in desirability effort.
- Open Access
Incentive-Aware Machine Learning; Robustness, Fairness, Improvement & Causality
The article explores the emerging domain of incentive-aware machine learning (ML), which focuses on algorithmic decision-making in contexts where individuals can strategically modify their inputs to influence outcomes. It categorizes the research into three perspectives: robustness, aiming to design models resilient to "gaming"; fairness, analyzing the societal impacts of such systems; and improvement/causality, recognizing situations where strategic actions lead to genuine personal or societal improvement. The paper introduces a unified framework encapsulating models for these perspectives, including offline, online, and causal settings, and highlights key challenges such as differentiating between gaming and improvement and addressing heterogeneity among agents. By synthesizing findings from diverse works, we outline theoretical advancements and practical solutions for robust, fair, and causally-informed incentive-aware ML systems.
Open AccessIncentive-Aware Machine Learning; Robustness, Fairness, Improvement & Causality
The article explores the emerging domain of incentive-aware machine learning (ML), which focuses on algorithmic decision-making in contexts where individuals can strategically modify their inputs to influence outcomes. It categorizes the research into three perspectives: robustness, aiming to design models resilient to "gaming"; fairness, analyzing the societal impacts of such systems; and improvement/causality, recognizing situations where strategic actions lead to genuine personal or societal improvement. The paper introduces a unified framework encapsulating models for these perspectives, including offline, online, and causal settings, and highlights key challenges such as differentiating between gaming and improvement and addressing heterogeneity among agents. By synthesizing findings from diverse works, we outline theoretical advancements and practical solutions for robust, fair, and causally-informed incentive-aware ML systems.
- Open Access
Incentivizing Desirable Effort Profiles in Strategic Classification: The Role of Causality and Uncertainty
We study strategic classification in binary decision-making settings where agents can modify their features in order to improve their classification outcomes. Importantly, our work considers the causal structure across different features, acknowledging that effort in a given feature may affect other features. The main goal of our work is to understand \emph{when and how much agent effort is invested towards desirable features}, and how this is influenced by the deployed classifier, the causal structure of the agent's features, their ability to modify them, and the information available to the agent about the classifier and the feature causal graph. In the complete information case, when agents know the classifier and the causal structure of the problem, we derive conditions ensuring that rational agents focus on features favored by the principal. We show that designing classifiers to induce desirable behavior is generally non-convex, though tractable in special cases. We also extend our analysis to settings where agents have incomplete information about the classifier or the causal graph. While optimal effort selection is again a non-convex problem under general uncertainty, we highlight special cases of partial uncertainty where this selection problem becomes tractable. Our results indicate that uncertainty drives agents to favor features with higher expected importance and lower variance, potentially misaligning with principal preferences. Finally, numerical experiments based on a cardiovascular disease risk study illustrate how to incentivize desirable modifications under uncertainty.
Open AccessIncentivizing Desirable Effort Profiles in Strategic Classification: The Role of Causality and Uncertainty
We study strategic classification in binary decision-making settings where agents can modify their features in order to improve their classification outcomes. Importantly, our work considers the causal structure across different features, acknowledging that effort in a given feature may affect other features. The main goal of our work is to understand \emph{when and how much agent effort is invested towards desirable features}, and how this is influenced by the deployed classifier, the causal structure of the agent's features, their ability to modify them, and the information available to the agent about the classifier and the feature causal graph. In the complete information case, when agents know the classifier and the causal structure of the problem, we derive conditions ensuring that rational agents focus on features favored by the principal. We show that designing classifiers to induce desirable behavior is generally non-convex, though tractable in special cases. We also extend our analysis to settings where agents have incomplete information about the classifier or the causal graph. While optimal effort selection is again a non-convex problem under general uncertainty, we highlight special cases of partial uncertainty where this selection problem becomes tractable. Our results indicate that uncertainty drives agents to favor features with higher expected importance and lower variance, potentially misaligning with principal preferences. Finally, numerical experiments based on a cardiovascular disease risk study illustrate how to incentivize desirable modifications under uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 101
Preferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms
Online platforms that deliver ads and general recommendation systems are now integral to our daily routines. These platforms aim to maximize user engagement with their content, whether it involves ads or general recommendations. And yet, for all of their importance, researchers are still struggling to fully capture which factors drive user engagement on these platforms. Understanding these factors can not only unlock the possibility of increased revenue for the platforms, but can also help increase user satisfaction. Despite the multitude of models put forth to explain user engagement behavior, most focus on short-sighted/myopic preferences; i.e., users are assumed to make engagement decisions not caring about their prior interactions with the platform. In this paper, we take a different approach and aim to model users' evolving preferences. For that, we propose a model for learning with bandit feedback while accounting for deterministically evolving and unobservable states that we call Bandits with Deterministically Evolving States (B-DES). Our model presents a theoretically tractable setting for the users' evolving preferences in online ads that were qualitatively studied in the recent landmark experimental paper of Hohnhold et al., KDD15. In online ads (resp. recommendation systems), the reward that the ad-serving (resp. recommendation) algorithm obtains at each round is a function of the short-term reward of the action/ad (resp. content) chosen and how "healthy" the system is (as measured by its state). For example, in recommendation systems, the reward that the platform obtains from a user's engagement with a particular type of content depends not only on the inherent features of the specific content, but also on how the user's preferences have evolved as a result of interacting with other types of content on the platform. Our general model accounts for the different rate λ ε [0, 1] at which the state evolves (i.e., how fast a user's preferences shift as a result of previous content consumption) and encompasses standard multi-armed bandits as a special case. We adopt the perspective of an algorithm designer who wishes to design algorithms that minimize a notion of regret against the best-fixed sequence of arms pulled, which is significantly harder to attain compared to standard benchmark of the best-fixed action in hindsight. We present online learning algorithms for any possible value of the evolution rate λ, and show the robustness of our results to two model misspecifications: (i) states are evolving in a noisy manner, and (ii) λ is unknown. The full version of the paper can be found in: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.11655.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 101
Open AccessPreferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms
Online platforms that deliver ads and general recommendation systems are now integral to our daily routines. These platforms aim to maximize user engagement with their content, whether it involves ads or general recommendations. And yet, for all of their importance, researchers are still struggling to fully capture which factors drive user engagement on these platforms. Understanding these factors can not only unlock the possibility of increased revenue for the platforms, but can also help increase user satisfaction. Despite the multitude of models put forth to explain user engagement behavior, most focus on short-sighted/myopic preferences; i.e., users are assumed to make engagement decisions not caring about their prior interactions with the platform. In this paper, we take a different approach and aim to model users' evolving preferences. For that, we propose a model for learning with bandit feedback while accounting for deterministically evolving and unobservable states that we call Bandits with Deterministically Evolving States (B-DES). Our model presents a theoretically tractable setting for the users' evolving preferences in online ads that were qualitatively studied in the recent landmark experimental paper of Hohnhold et al., KDD15. In online ads (resp. recommendation systems), the reward that the ad-serving (resp. recommendation) algorithm obtains at each round is a function of the short-term reward of the action/ad (resp. content) chosen and how "healthy" the system is (as measured by its state). For example, in recommendation systems, the reward that the platform obtains from a user's engagement with a particular type of content depends not only on the inherent features of the specific content, but also on how the user's preferences have evolved as a result of interacting with other types of content on the platform. Our general model accounts for the different rate λ ε [0, 1] at which the state evolves (i.e., how fast a user's preferences shift as a result of previous content consumption) and encompasses standard multi-armed bandits as a special case. We adopt the perspective of an algorithm designer who wishes to design algorithms that minimize a notion of regret against the best-fixed sequence of arms pulled, which is significantly harder to attain compared to standard benchmark of the best-fixed action in hindsight. We present online learning algorithms for any possible value of the evolution rate λ, and show the robustness of our results to two model misspecifications: (i) states are evolving in a noisy manner, and (ii) λ is unknown. The full version of the paper can be found in: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.11655.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 52 (1) , 69-70
Strategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider the setup used in synthetic control methods, where there is a pre-intervention period when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, a natural extension of the well-studied (binary) strategic classification problem to the multiclass setting, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 52 (1) , 69-70
Open AccessStrategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider the setup used in synthetic control methods, where there is a pre-intervention period when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, a natural extension of the well-studied (binary) strategic classification problem to the multiclass setting, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.
- Open Access
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 69-70
Strategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider the setup used in synthetic control methods, where there is a pre-intervention period when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, a natural extension of the well-studied (binary) strategic classification problem to the multiclass setting, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 69-70
Open AccessStrategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider the setup used in synthetic control methods, where there is a pre-intervention period when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, a natural extension of the well-studied (binary) strategic classification problem to the multiclass setting, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.
- Open Access
When Should you Offer an Upgrade: Online Upgrading Mechanisms for Resource Allocation
In this work, we study an upgrading scheme for online resource allocation problems. We work in a sequential setting, where at each round a request for a resource arrives and the decision-maker has to decide whether to accept it (and thus, offer the resource) or reject it. The resources are ordered in terms of their value. If the decision-maker decides to accept the request, they can offer an upgrade-for-a-fee to the next more valuable resource. This fee is dynamically decided based on the currently available resources. After the upgrade-for-a-fee option is presented to the requester, they can either accept it, get upgraded, and pay the additional fee, or reject it and maintain their originally allocated resource. We take the perspective of the decision-maker and wish to design upgrading mechanisms in a way that simultaneously maximizes revenue and minimizes underutilization of resources. Both of these desiderata are encapsulated in a notion of regret that we define, and according to which we measure our algorithms' performance. We present a fast algorithm that achieves O(log T) regret. Finally, we implemented our algorithm utilizing data akin to those observed in the hospitality industry and estimated our upgrading mechanism would increase the annual revenue by over 17%.
Open AccessWhen Should you Offer an Upgrade: Online Upgrading Mechanisms for Resource Allocation
In this work, we study an upgrading scheme for online resource allocation problems. We work in a sequential setting, where at each round a request for a resource arrives and the decision-maker has to decide whether to accept it (and thus, offer the resource) or reject it. The resources are ordered in terms of their value. If the decision-maker decides to accept the request, they can offer an upgrade-for-a-fee to the next more valuable resource. This fee is dynamically decided based on the currently available resources. After the upgrade-for-a-fee option is presented to the requester, they can either accept it, get upgraded, and pay the additional fee, or reject it and maintain their originally allocated resource. We take the perspective of the decision-maker and wish to design upgrading mechanisms in a way that simultaneously maximizes revenue and minimizes underutilization of resources. Both of these desiderata are encapsulated in a notion of regret that we define, and according to which we measure our algorithms' performance. We present a fast algorithm that achieves O(log T) regret. Finally, we implemented our algorithm utilizing data akin to those observed in the hospitality industry and estimated our upgrading mechanism would increase the annual revenue by over 17%.
- Open Access
Strategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider a setup where there is a pre-intervention period, when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units to their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.
Open AccessStrategyproof Decision-Making in Panel Data Settings and Beyond
We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider a setup where there is a pre-intervention period, when the principal observes the outcomes of each unit, after which the principal uses these observations to assign a treatment to each unit. Unlike this classical setting, we permit the units generating the panel data to be strategic, i.e. units may modify their pre-intervention outcomes in order to receive a more desirable intervention. The principal's goal is to design a strategyproof intervention policy, i.e. a policy that assigns units to their utility-maximizing interventions despite their potential strategizing. We first identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which a strategyproof intervention policy exists, and provide a strategyproof mechanism with a simple closed form when one does exist. Along the way, we prove impossibility results for strategic multiclass classification, which may be of independent interest. When there are two interventions, we establish that there always exists a strategyproof mechanism, and provide an algorithm for learning such a mechanism. For three or more interventions, we provide an algorithm for learning a strategyproof mechanism if there exists a sufficiently large gap in the principal's rewards between different interventions. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model using real-world panel data collected from product sales over 18 months. We find that our methods compare favorably to baselines which do not take strategic interactions into consideration, even in the presence of model misspecification.