GDGokce Dayanikli

Gokce Dayanikli

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Gokce Dayanikli has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Incorporating authority perception, economic status and behavioural response in infectious disease control

    by Huaning Liu, Junke Yang, Soren Larsen, Pamela Martinez, Gokce Dayanikli

    We introduce a multi-population mean field game framework to examine how economic status and authority perception shape vaccination and social distancing decisions under different epidemic control policies. We conducted a survey to inform our model and stratify the population into six groups by income and perception of authority, capturing behavioural heterogeneity. Individuals choose socialization and vaccination levels to optimize objectives such as minimizing treatment costs, complying with social distancing guidelines if they are authority-followers, or reducing losses from decreased social interactions if they are authority-indifferents, alongside economic costs. Public health authorities influence behaviour through social distancing guidelines and vaccination costs. We characterize the Nash equilibrium via a forward–backward differential equation system, provide its mathematical analysis and numerically solve it. Our findings reveal a trade-off between social distancing and vaccination. Under stricter guidelines that target both susceptible and infected individuals, followers reduce both socialization and vaccination levels, while indifferents increase socialization owing to followers’ preventative measures. Adaptive guidelines targeting infected individuals effectively reduce infections and narrow the gap between low- and high-income groups, while lower vaccination costs incentivize vaccination among low-income groups. Trust-building remains critical in epidemic mitigation, underscoring the importance of data-informed, game-theoretical models for understanding complex human responses to mitigation policies.

  • Open Access

    From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and Back: A Mean Field Perspective

    by René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanıklı, François Delarue, Mathieu Laurière

    Mean field games (MFGs) and mean field control (MFC) have been introduced to study large populations of strategic players. They correspond respectively to non-cooperative or cooperative scenarios, where the aim is to find the Nash equilibrium and social optimum. They approximate finite player problems and have many applications in economics, biology, machine learning. This paper studies how players can pass from a non-cooperative to a cooperative regime, and vice-versa. The first direction is reminiscent of mechanism design, in which the game’s definition is modified so that non-cooperative players reach an outcome similar to a cooperative scenario. The second direction studies how initially cooperative players gradually deviate from social optimum to reach Nash equilibrium when they optimize their individual cost very much in the spirit of the free-rider phenomenon. To formalize these connections, we introduce and theoretically analyze two new classes of games which lie between MFG and MFC: $$\lambda $$ λ -interpolated MFGs, in which the cost of an individual player is an interpolation of the MFG and the MFC costs, and p -partial MFGs, in which a proportion of the population deviates from social optimum by behaving non-cooperatively. We conclude by providing an algorithm for myopic players to learn a p -partial mean field equilibrium.

  • Open Access

    Incorporating Authority Perception, Economic Status, and Behavioral Response in Infectious Disease Control

    by Huaning Liu, Junke Yang, Soren L. Larsen, Pamela P. Martinez, Gokce Dayanikli

    We introduce a multi-population mean field game framework to examine how economic status and authority perception shape vaccination and social distancing decisions under different epidemic control policies. We carried out a survey to inform our model and stratify the population into six groups based on income and perception of authority, capturing behavioral heterogeneity. Individuals adjust their socialization and vaccination levels to optimize objectives such as minimizing treatment costs, complying with social-distancing guidelines if they are authority-followers, or reducing losses from decreased social interactions if they are authority-indifferents, alongside economic costs. Public health authorities influence behavior through social-distancing guidelines and vaccination costs. We characterize the Nash equilibrium via a forward-backward differential equation system, provide its mathematical analysis, and develop a numerical algorithm to solve it. Our findings reveal a trade-off between social-distancing and vaccination decisions. Under stricter guidelines that target both susceptible and infected individuals, followers reduce both socialization and vaccination levels, while indifferents increase socialization due to followers' preventative measures. Adaptive guidelines targeting infected individuals effectively reduce infections and narrow the gap between low- and high-income groups, even when susceptible individuals socialize more and vaccinate less. Lower vaccination costs incentivize vaccination among low-income groups, but their impact on disease spread is smaller than when they are coupled with social-distancing guidelines. Trust-building emerges as a critical factor in epidemic mitigation, underscoring the importance of data-informed, game-theoretical models that aim to understand complex human responses to mitigation policies.

  • Top Cited Papers

    A Machine Learning Method for Stackelberg Mean Field Games

    by Gökçe Dayanıklı, Mathieu Laurière

    We propose a single-level numerical approach to solve Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) problems. In the Stackelberg MFG, an infinite population of agents plays a noncooperative game and chooses their controls to optimize their individual objectives while interacting with the principal and other agents through the population distribution. The principal can influence the mean field Nash equilibrium at the population level through policies, and she optimizes her own objective, which depends on the population distribution. This leads to a bilevel problem between the principal and mean field of agents that cannot be solved using traditional methods for MFGs. We propose a reformulation of this problem as a single-level mean field optimal control problem through a penalization approach. We prove convergence of the reformulated problem to the original problem. We propose a machine learning method based on (feed-forward and recurrent) neural networks and illustrate it on several examples from the literature. We also give a modified example to show the scalability of the proposed method and show its efficiency by comparing its performance with an alternative bilevel approach.


  • Open Access

    Cooperation, Competition, and Common Pool Resources in Mean Field Games

    by Gokce Dayanikli, Mathieu Lauriere

    Mean field games (MFGs) have been introduced to study Nash equilibria in very large population of self-interested agents. However, when applied to common pool resource (CPR) games, MFG equilibria lead to the so-called tragedy of the commons (TOTC). Empirical studies have shown that in many situations, TOTC does not materialize which hints at the fact that standard MFG models cannot explain the behavior of agents in CPR games. In this work, we study two models which incorporate a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors, either at the individual level or the population level. After defining these models, we study optimality conditions in the form of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and we prove that the mean field models provide approximate equilibria controls for corresponding finite-agent games. We then show an application to a model of fish stock management, for which the solution can be computed by solving systems of ordinary differential equations, which we prove to have a unique solution. Numerical results illustrate the impact of the level of cooperation at the individual and the population levels on the CPR.

  • Open Access

    Learning Fair Policies for Infectious Diseases Mitigation using Path Integral Control

    by Zhuangzhuang Jia, Hyuk Park, Gökçe Dayanıklı, Grani A. Hanasusanto

    Infectious diseases pose major public health challenges to society, highlighting the importance of designing effective policies to reduce economic loss and mortality. In this paper, we propose a framework for sequential decision-making under uncertainty to design fairness-aware disease mitigation policies that incorporate various measures of unfairness. Specifically, our approach learns equitable vaccination and lockdown strategies based on a stochastic multi-group SIR model. To address the challenges of solving the resulting sequential decision-making problem, we adopt the path integral control algorithm as an efficient solution scheme. Through a case study, we demonstrate that our approach effectively improves fairness compared to conventional methods and provides valuable insights for policymakers.

  • Open Access

    A Machine Learning Method for Stackelberg Mean Field Games

    by Gokce Dayanikli, Mathieu Lauriere

    We propose a single-level numerical approach to solve Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) problems. In Stackelberg MFG, an infinite population of agents play a non-cooperative game and choose their controls to optimize their individual objectives while interacting with the principal and other agents through the population distribution. The principal can influence the mean field Nash equilibrium at the population level through policies, and she optimizes her own objective, which depends on the population distribution. This leads to a bi-level problem between the principal and mean field of agents that cannot be solved using traditional methods for MFGs. We propose a reformulation of this problem as a single-level mean field optimal control problem through a penalization approach. We prove convergence of the reformulated problem to the original problem. We propose a machine learning method based on (feed-forward and recurrent) neural networks and illustrate it on several examples from the literature.

  • Open Access

    Learning Discrete-Time Major-Minor Mean Field Games

    by Kai Cui, Gökçe Dayanıklı, Mathieu Laurière, Matthieu Geist, Olivier Pietquin, Heinz Koeppl

    Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and cannot model major players that strongly influence other players, severely limiting the class of problems that can be handled. We propose a novel discrete time version of major-minor MFGs (M3FGs), along with a learning algorithm based on fictitious play and partitioning the probability simplex. Importantly, M3FGs generalize MFGs with common noise and can handle not only random exogeneous environment states but also major players. A key challenge is that the mean field is stochastic and not deterministic as in standard MFGs. Our theoretical investigation verifies both the M3FG model and its algorithmic solution, showing firstly the well-posedness of the M3FG model starting from a finite game of interest, and secondly convergence and approximation guarantees of the fictitious play algorithm. Then, we empirically verify the obtained theoretical results, ablating some of the theoretical assumptions made, and show successful equilibrium learning in three example problems. Overall, we establish a learning framework for a novel and broad class of tractable games.


  • Open Access

    Learning Discrete-Time Major-Minor Mean Field Games

    by Kai Cui, Gökçe Dayanıklı, Mathieu Laurière, Matthieu Geist, Olivier Pietquin, Heinz Koeppl

    Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and cannot model major players that strongly influence other players, severely limiting the class of problems that can be handled. We propose a novel discrete time version of major-minor MFGs (M3FGs), along with a learning algorithm based on fictitious play and partitioning the probability simplex. Importantly, M3FGs generalize MFGs with common noise and can handle not only random exogeneous environment states but also major players. A key challenge is that the mean field is stochastic and not deterministic as in standard MFGs. Our theoretical investigation verifies both the M3FG model and its algorithmic solution, showing firstly the well-posedness of the M3FG model starting from a finite game of interest, and secondly convergence and approximation guarantees of the fictitious play algorithm. Then, we empirically verify the obtained theoretical results, ablating some of the theoretical assumptions made, and show successful equilibrium learning in three example problems. Overall, we establish a learning framework for a novel and broad class of tractable games.