Hannaneh Akrami
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
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Research Subjects
Hannaneh Akrami has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jugal Garg
Department of Industrial & Enterprise Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign USA
8 shared publications - Eklavya Sharma
Department of Industrial & Enterprise Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign USA
4 shared publications - Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, USA
3 shared publications - Kurt Mehlhorn
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
3 shared publications - Setareh Taki
Grubhub, USA
3 shared publications - Aniket Murhekar
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 444
On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 444
Open AccessOn the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
- Open Access
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 39 (13) , 13529-13537
Achieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously
We study the problem of computing fair divisions of a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. For the past many decades, the literature has explored various notions of fairness, that can be primarily seen as either having envy-based or share-based lens. For the discrete setting of resource-allocation problems, envy-free up to any good (EFX) and maximin share (MMS) are widely considered as the flag-bearers of fairness notions in the above two categories, thereby capturing different aspects of fairness herein. Due to lack of existence results of these notions and the fact that a good approximation of EFX or MMS does not imply particularly strong guarantees of the other, it becomes important to understand the compatibility of EFX and MMS allocations with one another. In this work, we identify a novel way to simultaneously achieve MMS guarantees with EFX/EF1 notions of fairness, while beating the best known approximation factors by Chaudhury et al. and Amanatidis et al. Our main contribution is to constructively prove the existence of (i) a partial allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EFX, and (ii) a complete allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EF1. Our algorithms run in pseudo-polynomial time if the approximation factor for MMS is relaxed to 2/3 - e for any constant e>0 and in polynomial time if, in addition, the EFX (or EF1) guarantee is relaxed to (1-d)-EFX (or (1-d)-EF1) for any constant d>0. In particular, we improve from the best approximation factor known prior to our work by Chaudhury et al., which computes partial allocations that are 1/2-MMS and EFX in pseudo-polynomial time.
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 39 (13) , 13529-13537
Open AccessAchieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously
We study the problem of computing fair divisions of a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. For the past many decades, the literature has explored various notions of fairness, that can be primarily seen as either having envy-based or share-based lens. For the discrete setting of resource-allocation problems, envy-free up to any good (EFX) and maximin share (MMS) are widely considered as the flag-bearers of fairness notions in the above two categories, thereby capturing different aspects of fairness herein. Due to lack of existence results of these notions and the fact that a good approximation of EFX or MMS does not imply particularly strong guarantees of the other, it becomes important to understand the compatibility of EFX and MMS allocations with one another. In this work, we identify a novel way to simultaneously achieve MMS guarantees with EFX/EF1 notions of fairness, while beating the best known approximation factors by Chaudhury et al. and Amanatidis et al. Our main contribution is to constructively prove the existence of (i) a partial allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EFX, and (ii) a complete allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EF1. Our algorithms run in pseudo-polynomial time if the approximation factor for MMS is relaxed to 2/3 - e for any constant e>0 and in polynomial time if, in addition, the EFX (or EF1) guarantee is relaxed to (1-d)-EFX (or (1-d)-EF1) for any constant d>0. In particular, we improve from the best approximation factor known prior to our work by Chaudhury et al., which computes partial allocations that are 1/2-MMS and EFX in pseudo-polynomial time.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 39 (13) , 13520-13528
Epistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness concepts in this line of work. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts, existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, thereby making the study of approximations and relaxations of EFX a natural line of research. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [2023] introduced a promising relaxation of EFX, called epistemic EFX (EEFX). An allocation is EEFX, if for every agent, it is possible to shuffle the items in the remaining bundles so that she becomes ``EFX-satisfied''. Caragiannis et al. [2023] prove existence and polynomial-time computability of EEFX allocations for additive valuations. A natural question asks what happens when we consider valuations more general than additive? We address this important open question and answer it affirmatively by establishing the existence of EEFX allocations for an arbitrary number of agents with general monotone valuations. To the best of our knowledge, besides EF1, EEFX is the only known relaxation of EFX to have such strong existential guarantees. Furthermore, we complement our existential result by proving computational and information-theoretic lower bounds. We prove that even for an arbitrary number of (more than one) agents with identical submodular valuations, it is PLS-hard to compute EEFX allocations and it requires exponentially-many value queries to do so.
- 11 April 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 39 (13) , 13520-13528
Open AccessEpistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness concepts in this line of work. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts, existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, thereby making the study of approximations and relaxations of EFX a natural line of research. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [2023] introduced a promising relaxation of EFX, called epistemic EFX (EEFX). An allocation is EEFX, if for every agent, it is possible to shuffle the items in the remaining bundles so that she becomes ``EFX-satisfied''. Caragiannis et al. [2023] prove existence and polynomial-time computability of EEFX allocations for additive valuations. A natural question asks what happens when we consider valuations more general than additive? We address this important open question and answer it affirmatively by establishing the existence of EEFX allocations for an arbitrary number of agents with general monotone valuations. To the best of our knowledge, besides EF1, EEFX is the only known relaxation of EFX to have such strong existential guarantees. Furthermore, we complement our existential result by proving computational and information-theoretic lower bounds. We prove that even for an arbitrary number of (more than one) agents with identical submodular valuations, it is PLS-hard to compute EEFX allocations and it requires exponentially-many value queries to do so.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (2) , 738-751
EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number
A Simpler Approach to the EFX Problem Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) has emerged as a compelling fairness notion in discrete fair division. However, its existence remains one of the biggest open problems in the field. In a breakthrough, Chaudhury et al. (2020) establish the existence of EFX allocations for three agents with additive valuations through intricate case analysis. The paper “EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number” by Akrami, Alon, Chaudhury, Garg, Mehlhorn, and Mehta offers a simpler approach for improving the EFX guarantee. They demonstrate the existence of EFX allocations for three agents when at least one has additive valuations (whereas the other two have general monotone valuations). Additionally, they nearly resolve a conjecture regarding the rainbow cycle number, leading to an (almost) tight bound for the existence of approximate EFX allocations with few unallocated items achievable through this approach.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (2) , 738-751
EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number
A Simpler Approach to the EFX Problem Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) has emerged as a compelling fairness notion in discrete fair division. However, its existence remains one of the biggest open problems in the field. In a breakthrough, Chaudhury et al. (2020) establish the existence of EFX allocations for three agents with additive valuations through intricate case analysis. The paper “EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number” by Akrami, Alon, Chaudhury, Garg, Mehlhorn, and Mehta offers a simpler approach for improving the EFX guarantee. They demonstrate the existence of EFX allocations for three agents when at least one has additive valuations (whereas the other two have general monotone valuations). Additionally, they nearly resolve a conjecture regarding the rainbow cycle number, leading to an (almost) tight bound for the existence of approximate EFX allocations with few unallocated items achievable through this approach.
- Open Access
On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data, motivating the study of economic processes with data as an asset. However, data differs from classical economic assets in terms of free duplication: there is no concept of limited supply since it can be replicated at zero marginal cost. This distinction introduces fundamental differences between economic processes involving data and those concerning other assets. We study a parallel to exchange (Arrow-Debreu) markets where data is the asset. Here, agents with datasets exchange data fairly and voluntarily, aiming for mutual benefit without monetary compensation. This framework is particularly relevant for non-profit organizations that seek to improve their ML models through data exchange, yet are restricted from selling their data for profit. We propose a general framework for data exchange, built on two core principles: (i) fairness, ensuring that each agent receives utility proportional to their contribution to others; contributions are quantifiable using standard credit-sharing functions like the Shapley value, and (ii) stability, ensuring that no coalition of agents can identify an exchange among themselves which they unanimously prefer to the current exchange. We show that fair and stable exchanges exist for all monotone continuous utility functions. Next, we investigate the computational complexity of finding approximate fair and stable exchanges. We present a local search algorithm for instances with monotone submodular utility functions, where each agent contributions are measured using the Shapley value. We prove that this problem lies in CLS under mild assumptions. Our framework opens up several intriguing theoretical directions for research in data economics.
Open AccessOn the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data, motivating the study of economic processes with data as an asset. However, data differs from classical economic assets in terms of free duplication: there is no concept of limited supply since it can be replicated at zero marginal cost. This distinction introduces fundamental differences between economic processes involving data and those concerning other assets. We study a parallel to exchange (Arrow-Debreu) markets where data is the asset. Here, agents with datasets exchange data fairly and voluntarily, aiming for mutual benefit without monetary compensation. This framework is particularly relevant for non-profit organizations that seek to improve their ML models through data exchange, yet are restricted from selling their data for profit. We propose a general framework for data exchange, built on two core principles: (i) fairness, ensuring that each agent receives utility proportional to their contribution to others; contributions are quantifiable using standard credit-sharing functions like the Shapley value, and (ii) stability, ensuring that no coalition of agents can identify an exchange among themselves which they unanimously prefer to the current exchange. We show that fair and stable exchanges exist for all monotone continuous utility functions. Next, we investigate the computational complexity of finding approximate fair and stable exchanges. We present a local search algorithm for instances with monotone submodular utility functions, where each agent contributions are measured using the Shapley value. We prove that this problem lies in CLS under mild assumptions. Our framework opens up several intriguing theoretical directions for research in data economics.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 198
Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 198
Open AccessImproving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
- Open Access
Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
We consider fair division of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to her if she receives goods worth at least her ($1$-out-of-$n$) MMS value. An allocation is called MMS if all agents receive their MMS values. However, since MMS allocations do not always exist, the focus shifted to investigating its ordinal and multiplicative approximations. In the ordinal approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $1$-out-of-$d$ MMS allocations (for the smallest possible $d>n$). A series of works led to the state-of-the-art factor of $d=\lfloor3n/2\rfloor$ [Hosseini et al.'21]. We show that $1$-out-of-$4\lceil n/3\rceil$ MMS allocations always exist, thereby improving the state-of-the-art of ordinal approximation. In the multiplicative approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $α$-MMS allocations (for the largest possible $α< 1$), which guarantees each agent at least $α$ times her MMS value. We introduce a general framework of "approximate MMS with agent priority ranking". An allocation is said to be $T$-MMS, for a non-increasing sequence $T = (τ_1, \ldots, τ_n)$ of numbers, if the agent at rank $i$ in the order gets a bundle of value at least $τ_i$ times her MMS value. This framework captures both ordinal approximation and multiplicative approximation as special cases. We show the existence of $T$-MMS allocations where $τ_i \ge \max(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n}, \frac{2n}{2n+i-1})$ for all $i$. Furthermore, we can get allocations that are $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$-MMS ex-post and $(0.8253 + \frac{1}{36n})$-MMS ex-ante. We also prove that our algorithm does not give better than $(0.8631 + \frac{1}{2n})$-MMS ex-ante.Open AccessImproving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
We consider fair division of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to her if she receives goods worth at least her ($1$-out-of-$n$) MMS value. An allocation is called MMS if all agents receive their MMS values. However, since MMS allocations do not always exist, the focus shifted to investigating its ordinal and multiplicative approximations. In the ordinal approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $1$-out-of-$d$ MMS allocations (for the smallest possible $d>n$). A series of works led to the state-of-the-art factor of $d=\lfloor3n/2\rfloor$ [Hosseini et al.'21]. We show that $1$-out-of-$4\lceil n/3\rceil$ MMS allocations always exist, thereby improving the state-of-the-art of ordinal approximation. In the multiplicative approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $α$-MMS allocations (for the largest possible $α< 1$), which guarantees each agent at least $α$ times her MMS value. We introduce a general framework of "approximate MMS with agent priority ranking". An allocation is said to be $T$-MMS, for a non-increasing sequence $T = (τ_1, \ldots, τ_n)$ of numbers, if the agent at rank $i$ in the order gets a bundle of value at least $τ_i$ times her MMS value. This framework captures both ordinal approximation and multiplicative approximation as special cases. We show the existence of $T$-MMS allocations where $τ_i \ge \max(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n}, \frac{2n}{2n+i-1})$ for all $i$. Furthermore, we can get allocations that are $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$-MMS ex-post and $(0.8253 + \frac{1}{36n})$-MMS ex-ante. We also prove that our algorithm does not give better than $(0.8631 + \frac{1}{2n})$-MMS ex-ante. - Open Access
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 3, 2485-2493
Simplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of (3/4 + 1/12n). Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than 2/3 factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of (3/4 + min(1/36, 3/(16n-4))). For small n, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 3, 2485-2493
Open AccessSimplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of (3/4 + 1/12n). Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than 2/3 factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of (3/4 + min(1/36, 3/(16n-4))). For small n, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.
- Open AccessBreaking the $3/4$ Barrier for Approximate Maximin ShareWe study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the desirable fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to her if she receives goods worth at least her MMS value. An allocation is called MMS if all agents receive at least their MMS value. Since MMS allocations need not exist when $n>2$, a series of works showed the existence of approximate MMS allocations with the current best factor of $\frac34 + O(\frac{1}{n})$. However, a simple example in [DFL82, BEF21, AGST23] showed the limitations of existing approaches and proved that they cannot improve this factor to $3/4 + Ω(1)$. In this paper, we bypass these barriers to show the existence of $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{3}{3836})$-MMS allocations by developing new reduction rules and analysis techniques.Open AccessBreaking the $3/4$ Barrier for Approximate Maximin ShareWe study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the desirable fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to her if she receives goods worth at least her MMS value. An allocation is called MMS if all agents receive at least their MMS value. Since MMS allocations need not exist when $n>2$, a series of works showed the existence of approximate MMS allocations with the current best factor of $\frac34 + O(\frac{1}{n})$. However, a simple example in [DFL82, BEF21, AGST23] showed the limitations of existing approaches and proved that they cannot improve this factor to $3/4 + Ω(1)$. In this paper, we bypass these barriers to show the existence of $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{3}{3836})$-MMS allocations by developing new reduction rules and analysis techniques.
- Open Access
Simplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$. Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than $2/3$ factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \min(\frac{1}{36}, \frac{3}{16n-4}))$. For small $n$, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.Open AccessSimplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$. Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than $2/3$ factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \min(\frac{1}{36}, \frac{3}{16n-4}))$. For small $n$, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.