Yi Shen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yi Shen has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael M. Zavlanos
Mechanical Engineering and Material Science Duke University Durham USA
3 shared publications Karl H. Johansson
School of Electrical Enginnering and Computer Science Control Systems KTH Royal Institute of Technology, and also with Digital Futures SE-10044 Stockholm Sweden
2 shared publicationsZifan Wang
School of Electrical Enginnering and Computer Science Control Systems KTH Royal Institute of Technology, and also with Digital Futures SE-10044 Stockholm Sweden
2 shared publications- Benjamin Alan Goldstein
Duke University School of Medicine
1 shared publication - Matthew M. Engelhard
Department of Biostatistics and Bioinformatics Duke University School of Medicine Durham North Carolina USA
1 shared publication - Michael J. Pencina
Duke University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 8 (2) , 1611-1622
FairPOT: Balancing AUC Performance and Fairness with Proportional Optimal Transport
Fairness metrics utilizing the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (AUC) have gained increasing attention in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, finance, and criminal justice. In these domains, fairness is often evaluated over risk scores rather than binary outcomes, and a common challenge is that enforcing strict fairness can significantly degrade AUC performance. To address this challenge, we propose Fair Proportional Optimal Transport (FairPOT), a novel, model-agnostic post-processing framework that strategically aligns risk score distributions across different groups using optimal transport, but does so selectively by transforming a controllable proportion, i.e., the top-λ quantile, of scores within the disadvantaged group. By varying λ, our method allows for a tunable trade-off between reducing AUC disparities and maintaining overall AUC performance. Furthermore, we extend FairPOT to the partial AUC setting, enabling fairness interventions to concentrate on the highest-risk regions. Extensive experiments on synthetic, public, and clinical datasets show that FairPOT consistently outperforms existing post-processing techniques in both global and partial AUC scenarios, often achieving improved fairness with slight AUC degradation or even positive gains in utility. The computational efficiency and practical adaptability of FairPOT make it a promising solution for real-world deployment.
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 8 (2) , 1611-1622
Open AccessFairPOT: Balancing AUC Performance and Fairness with Proportional Optimal Transport
Fairness metrics utilizing the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (AUC) have gained increasing attention in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, finance, and criminal justice. In these domains, fairness is often evaluated over risk scores rather than binary outcomes, and a common challenge is that enforcing strict fairness can significantly degrade AUC performance. To address this challenge, we propose Fair Proportional Optimal Transport (FairPOT), a novel, model-agnostic post-processing framework that strategically aligns risk score distributions across different groups using optimal transport, but does so selectively by transforming a controllable proportion, i.e., the top-λ quantile, of scores within the disadvantaged group. By varying λ, our method allows for a tunable trade-off between reducing AUC disparities and maintaining overall AUC performance. Furthermore, we extend FairPOT to the partial AUC setting, enabling fairness interventions to concentrate on the highest-risk regions. Extensive experiments on synthetic, public, and clinical datasets show that FairPOT consistently outperforms existing post-processing techniques in both global and partial AUC scenarios, often achieving improved fairness with slight AUC degradation or even positive gains in utility. The computational efficiency and practical adaptability of FairPOT make it a promising solution for real-world deployment.
- Open Access
Learning of Nash Equilibria in Risk-Averse Games
This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a risk measure with possibly different risk levels. To solve this problem, we propose a first-order risk-averse leaning algorithm, in which the CVaR gradient estimate depends on an estimate of the Value at Risk (VaR) value combined with the gradient of the stochastic cost function. Although estimation of the CVaR gradients using finitely many samples is generally biased, we show that the accumulated error of the CVaR gradient estimates is bounded with high probability. Moreover, assuming that the risk-averse game is strongly monotone, we show that the proposed algorithm converges to the risk-averse Nash equilibrium. We present numerical experiments on a Cournot game example to illustrate the performance of the proposed method.
Open AccessLearning of Nash Equilibria in Risk-Averse Games
This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a risk measure with possibly different risk levels. To solve this problem, we propose a first-order risk-averse leaning algorithm, in which the CVaR gradient estimate depends on an estimate of the Value at Risk (VaR) value combined with the gradient of the stochastic cost function. Although estimation of the CVaR gradients using finitely many samples is generally biased, we show that the accumulated error of the CVaR gradient estimates is bounded with high probability. Moreover, assuming that the risk-averse game is strongly monotone, we show that the proposed algorithm converges to the risk-averse Nash equilibrium. We present numerical experiments on a Cournot game example to illustrate the performance of the proposed method.
- Open Access
Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Policy Evaluation and Learning for Contextual Bandits
Off-policy evaluation and learning are concerned with assessing a given policy and learning an optimal policy from offline data without direct interaction with the environment. Often, the environment in which the data are collected differs from the environment in which the learned policy is applied. To account for the effect of different environments during learning and execution, distributionally robust optimization (DRO) methods have been developed that compute worst-case bounds on the policy values assuming that the distribution of the new environment lies within an uncertainty set. Typically, this uncertainty set is defined based on the KL divergence around the empirical distribution computed from the logging dataset. However, the KL uncertainty set fails to encompass distributions with varying support and lacks awareness of the geometry of the distribution support. As a result, KL approaches fall short in addressing practical environment mismatches and lead to over-fitting to worst-case scenarios. To overcome these limitations, we propose a novel DRO approach that employs the Wasserstein distance instead. While Wasserstein DRO is generally computationally more expensive compared to KL DRO, we present a regularized method and a practical (biased) stochastic gradient descent method to optimize the policy efficiently. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the finite sample complexity and iteration complexity for our proposed method. We further validate our approach using a public dataset that was recorded in a randomized stoke trial.
Open AccessWasserstein Distributionally Robust Policy Evaluation and Learning for Contextual Bandits
Off-policy evaluation and learning are concerned with assessing a given policy and learning an optimal policy from offline data without direct interaction with the environment. Often, the environment in which the data are collected differs from the environment in which the learned policy is applied. To account for the effect of different environments during learning and execution, distributionally robust optimization (DRO) methods have been developed that compute worst-case bounds on the policy values assuming that the distribution of the new environment lies within an uncertainty set. Typically, this uncertainty set is defined based on the KL divergence around the empirical distribution computed from the logging dataset. However, the KL uncertainty set fails to encompass distributions with varying support and lacks awareness of the geometry of the distribution support. As a result, KL approaches fall short in addressing practical environment mismatches and lead to over-fitting to worst-case scenarios. To overcome these limitations, we propose a novel DRO approach that employs the Wasserstein distance instead. While Wasserstein DRO is generally computationally more expensive compared to KL DRO, we present a regularized method and a practical (biased) stochastic gradient descent method to optimize the policy efficiently. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the finite sample complexity and iteration complexity for our proposed method. We further validate our approach using a public dataset that was recorded in a randomized stoke trial.
- Open Access
Convergence Analysis of the Best Response Algorithm for Time-Varying Games
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best respond to other agents' previous actions; we call this a best response scheme. We start by analyzing the convergence rate of this best response scheme for standard time-invariant games. Specifically, we provide a sufficient condition on the strong monotonicity parameter of the time-invariant games under which the proposed best response algorithm achieves exponential convergence to the static Nash equilibrium. We further illustrate that this best response algorithm may oscillate when the proposed sufficient condition fails to hold, which indicates that this condition is tight. Next, we analyze this best response algorithm for time-varying games where the cost functions of each agent change over time. Under similar conditions as for time-invariant games, we show that the proposed best response algorithm stays asymptotically close to the evolving equilibrium. We do so by analyzing both the equilibrium tracking error and the dynamic regret. Numerical experiments on economic market problems are presented to validate our analysis.
Open AccessConvergence Analysis of the Best Response Algorithm for Time-Varying Games
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best respond to other agents' previous actions; we call this a best response scheme. We start by analyzing the convergence rate of this best response scheme for standard time-invariant games. Specifically, we provide a sufficient condition on the strong monotonicity parameter of the time-invariant games under which the proposed best response algorithm achieves exponential convergence to the static Nash equilibrium. We further illustrate that this best response algorithm may oscillate when the proposed sufficient condition fails to hold, which indicates that this condition is tight. Next, we analyze this best response algorithm for time-varying games where the cost functions of each agent change over time. Under similar conditions as for time-invariant games, we show that the proposed best response algorithm stays asymptotically close to the evolving equilibrium. We do so by analyzing both the equilibrium tracking error and the dynamic regret. Numerical experiments on economic market problems are presented to validate our analysis.