Ross Boczar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ross Boczar has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arnab Maiti
University of Washington
1 shared publication - Kevin Jamieson
University of Washington
1 shared publication - Lillian J. Ratliff
University of Washington
1 shared publication - Maryam Fazel
Tsinghua University University of Washington University of Washington University of Washington
1 shared publication - Reilly Raab
Computer Science and Engineering University of California Santa Cruz 95064 Santa Cruz CA
1 shared publication - Yang Liu
University of California Santa Cruz
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (13) , 14758-14766
Fair Participation via Sequential Policies
Leading approaches to algorithmic fairness and policy-induced distribution shift are often misaligned with long-term objectives in sequential settings. We aim to correct these shortcomings by ensuring that both the objective and fairness constraints account for policy-induced distribution shift. First, we motivate this problem using an example in which individuals subject to algorithmic predictions modulate their willingness to participate with the policy maker. Fairness in this example is measured by the variance of group participation rates. Next, we develop a method for solving the resulting constrained, non-linear optimization problem and prove that this method converges to a fair, locally optimal policy given first-order information. Finally, we experimentally validate our claims in a semi-synthetic setting.
- 24 March 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 38 (13) , 14758-14766
Open AccessFair Participation via Sequential Policies
Leading approaches to algorithmic fairness and policy-induced distribution shift are often misaligned with long-term objectives in sequential settings. We aim to correct these shortcomings by ensuring that both the objective and fairness constraints account for policy-induced distribution shift. First, we motivate this problem using an example in which individuals subject to algorithmic predictions modulate their willingness to participate with the policy maker. Fairness in this example is measured by the variance of group participation rates. Next, we develop a method for solving the resulting constrained, non-linear optimization problem and prove that this method converges to a fair, locally optimal policy given first-order information. Finally, we experimentally validate our claims in a semi-synthetic setting.
- Open Access
Near-Optimal Pure Exploration in Matrix Games: A Generalization of Stochastic Bandits & Dueling Bandits
We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input matrix $A\in[-1,1]^{n\times m}$ and observe $A_{i,j}+η$ where $η$ is a zero-mean 1-sub-Gaussian noise. The aim of the learner is to identify the PSNE of $A$, whenever it exists, with high probability while taking as few samples as possible. Zhou et al. (2017) presents an instance-dependent sample complexity lower bound that depends only on the entries in the row and column in which the PSNE lies. We design a near-optimal algorithm whose sample complexity matches the lower bound, up to log factors. The problem of identifying the PSNE also generalizes the problem of pure exploration in stochastic multi-armed bandits and dueling bandits, and our result matches the optimal bounds, up to log factors, in both the settings.Open AccessNear-Optimal Pure Exploration in Matrix Games: A Generalization of Stochastic Bandits & Dueling Bandits
We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input matrix $A\in[-1,1]^{n\times m}$ and observe $A_{i,j}+η$ where $η$ is a zero-mean 1-sub-Gaussian noise. The aim of the learner is to identify the PSNE of $A$, whenever it exists, with high probability while taking as few samples as possible. Zhou et al. (2017) presents an instance-dependent sample complexity lower bound that depends only on the entries in the row and column in which the PSNE lies. We design a near-optimal algorithm whose sample complexity matches the lower bound, up to log factors. The problem of identifying the PSNE also generalizes the problem of pure exploration in stochastic multi-armed bandits and dueling bandits, and our result matches the optimal bounds, up to log factors, in both the settings.